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Introduction
Re-Configurations: A New Conceptual Framework  
for Research on the MENA Region
Rachid Ouaissa, Friederike Pannewick and Alena Strohmaier
This essay collection is the outcome of interdisciplinary research into political, 
societal, and cultural transformation processes in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region at the Philipps-Universität in Marburg, Germany. It builds on 
many years of collaboration between two research networks at the Center for Near 
and Middle Eastern Studies: the research network “Re-Configurations: History, 
Remembrance and Transformation Processes in the Middle East and North Africa” 
(2013–19), funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF), and the Leibniz-Prize research group “Figures of Thought | Turning 
Points: Cultural Practices and Social Change in the Arab World” (2013–20), funded 
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). Both research projects’ central 
interest lay in the political, social, and cultural transformation that has become 
especially visible since 2010–11; we conceptualize this transformation here using 
© The Author(s) 2021 
R. Ouaissa et al. (eds.), Re-Configurations, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen 
Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-31160-5_1
R. Ouaissa (*) · F. Pannewick 
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the term “re-configurations.” At the core of the inquiry are interpretations of visions 
of past and future, power relations and both political and symbolic representations.
With the concept of “re-configurations,” building on the work of Norbert Elias, 
we seek to construct a conceptual framework for notions of figuration processes 
(Elias 2003) and interdependencies between individual state and non-state actors 
and groups as well as the resulting restructuring of power relations. The concept 
describes the inextricable, ever-shifting entanglement between humans and his-
tory. We do not take stagnation as a premise (Bar 2009; Rougier 2005). Quite the 
contrary, the social groups and individuals in the MENA region are situated within 
continuous dynamics of repositioning. The various interdependencies between 
social groups and norms, along with the influences of indirect (regional and 
global) entanglements in regard to economic and social contexts and discourses, 
lead to a constant re-configuration and reinterpretation of power relations.
The notion of re-configurations expands upon conventional approaches of 
transformation and transition, which assume that social upheavals are linear and 
normative, and adapts them to the political, economic, and cultural realities of 
the MENA region. Michael Mann (1998) has already pointed out that the idea 
of a “great revolution”—such as the English Revolution, the French Revolution, 
and the Russian Revolution—, which assumes a clean break between old and new 
systems, is one of the academic fallacies of historiography. We therefore view 
the events of 2009–13 in the MENA region, as well as the uprisings in Sudan, 
Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq since 2019, as open-ended processes (Bozarslan 2015; 
Gerges 2014; Dawisha 2013).
The Green Movement of 2009 in Iran and the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia, 
Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen (2011–13) unleashed 
a deluge of international research into the backgrounds, effects, and meanings of 
popular protest movements and subsequent developments in the MENA region. In 
this complex and disparate research discourse, there is a gradually emerging episte-
mological shift in thinking across disciplines studying the MENA region.
The popular insurgency movements in the MENA region posed a genuine 
challenge to the social sciences and humanities (Beck 2013). Aside from the 
discussion as to whether these are upheavals or revolutions (see Bayat 2013; 
Jünemann and Zorob 2013), these events were embedded in a variety of histori-
cal and social trends and contexts. Bozarslan (2015) considers the popular insur-
gency movements to be the commencement of a new cycle in the history of the 
MENA region whose outcome remains to be seen. Ajami (2012) calls this the 
third Nahḍa, alluding to the Arab awakening and entry into modernity in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while Dawisha (2013) calls it the sec-
ond Nahḍa. Unlike Ajami, who counts the 1950s and 1960s—shaped by national 
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leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Habib Bourghiba in Tunisia and 
the early leaders of the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria—as the second Nahḍa, 
Dawisha only applies the word to the historical renewal movement of the nine-
teenth century and the upheavals of 2011. Other approaches interpret the events 
as the end of postcolonialism (see Tripp 2013; Lynch 2013; Khosrokhavar 2012; 
Dabashi 2012; Perthes 2015).
Likewise, the reasons for the emergence of the popular insurgency movements 
are interpreted variously. Among the underlying causes researchers point to are 
the economic policies of postcolonial elites in the MENA region (see Heydar-
ian 2014); the structural weakness of the highly pension-dependent and scarcely 
diversified regional economies and the associated difficulties with transition-
ing to capitalism (see Achcar 2013; Hanieh 2011); but also the pressure to con-
form triggered by neoliberal globalization and its attendant crises, which have 
also led to popular insurgency movements in other regions of the world (such 
as the ¡Democracia Real YA! movements in Latin America, the Occupy move-
ment in the US and Europe, and Movimiento 15-M in Spain; see Heydarian 2014; 
Guazzone and Pioppi 2012). According to other approaches still, these move-
ments resulted from a fragile alliance between a culturally, ideologically, and 
economically heterogeneous middle class facing decline and a broad, marginal-
ized subaltern stratum (cf. Kurlantzick 2013; Kandil 2012) on the other. Factors 
such as demographic change (see Courbage and Todd 2007; Ferguson 2011), 
generational conflicts (see Dhillon and Yousef 2009), and changing gender rela-
tions (see Moghadam 2003) also play a role, as shown by the focus on youth cul-
tures in the media and academia (see Honwana 2013; Jung et al. 2013; Wessel 
2013; Khalaf and Khalaf 2011). Embedded in the global framework of a trans-
national,  anti-system protest movement and as a result of the structural crisis of 
global capitalism (cf. Lawson 2012; Wallerstein 2011), the popular insurgency 
movements in the MENA region (see Beinin and Vairel 2011; Hinnebusch 2014) 
were ascribed a new collective self-confidence through the intensive use of novel 
social media platforms (see Jenkins et al. 2013; Strohmaier and Krewani 2021). 
Meanwhile, other approaches refer to the “Arab winter” (see Abdul-Hussain et al. 
2012) in light of wars and the progressive erosion of a number of states in the 
MENA region due to the rise of political Islam (see Bokhari and Senzai 2013; 
Cesari 2014; Hamid 2014).
Developments since 2010–11 have contributed to a growth in the reception 
of a number of research areas within MENA regional studies that had previously 
been given fairly scant attention. The intervening years have also brought changes 
in analytical perspectives. For example, political scientists and historians of the 
MENA region are now devoting greater focus to civil society actors and subal-
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tern groups (Al-Zubaidi et al. 2013; Harders 2015; Cronin 2012). There is also 
a growing emphasis on the agency of marginalized groups such as women (see 
Langohr 2015; Khalid 2015), young people (see Abdalla 2016; Ouaissa and Ger-
tel 2014) and ethnic-religious minorities or middle classes blocked from advance-
ment (Ouaissa 2013). In this context, the humanities, social sciences, and cultural 
studies are more closely considering day-to-day practices, subversive forms of 
resistance, mobilization techniques, and forms of representation (see Carapico 
2014). The uprisings were also interpreted as a rewriting or renegotiation of the 
social contracts between the states and societies of the region (see Bouziane et al. 
2013).
This development is accompanied by the growing influence in research of 
an expanded notion of politics that treats languages, art, literature, performance, 
graffiti, music, and film as analytical categories and even as reflections and seis-
mographs of social and political change (Salime 2015; Tripp 2012; Mehrez 2012; 
Dabashi 2012, p. 225 f.). Here, for example, the focus is placed on linguistic and 
aesthetic self-expression and the history of its interpretation (see Khalil 2011; 
Harb et al. 2013; Baker 2015). Some approaches look for portents of popular 
uprisings in literature (Sakr 2013; Mvogo 2012; El Maarouf 2014), while others 
examine the role of artistic forms of expression in transformation processes (see 
Amine and Roberson 2013; O'Rawe and Phelan 2016; Strohmaier 2019; Panne-
wick 2020).
These popular uprisings have made an important contribution to a new flour-
ishing of efforts to redesign and reclaim public space (see Schielke and Winegar 
2012; Kraidy 2016). Visual, auditory, and pictorial cultural practices are regarded 
as new forms of resistance; in particular, graffiti as a resistance practice and an 
aesthetic form of expression in public space has received special scrutiny in many 
publications (see Zoghbi and Don Stone 2011; Hamdy et al. 2014; Gröndahl 
2013). Moreover, the popular insurgency movements have raised the question 
of how to deal with past injustices. Transitional justice processes (see Fisher and 
Stewart 2014) and memory cultures can be identified in this context as a discur-
sive field in which power struggles over the interpretation of history play out and 
new, at times self-directed, narratives are shaped.
Re-Configurations as Dynamic Processes of Change
The concept of re-configurations builds on Norbert Elias’s notion of figuration. 
Elias uses figuration to describe the foundations of social life in human inter-
dependencies, i.e. a social community in the sense of a social network of mutu-
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ally dependent individuals (e.g. family, household, club). He argues”that human 
beings should be seen primarily as interdependent, forming figurations or net-
works with each other which connect the psychological with the social, or habi-
tus with social relations” (Van Krieken 2017). The term re-configurations extends 
this concept, breaking away from transition studies. It refers to dynamic change 
processes within structural, spatially situated, discursive, and symbolic power 
networks. By taking into account the interaction between action and structure, it 
makes visible the specific “order of change” (Elias 1978, p. 149).
The concept of re-configurations rests on a conceptual architecture that illu-
minates the constitution, modification, and transformation of political, economic, 
social, and cultural relations leading to the formation of new power relations. This 
paradigm frames patterns of interaction as a mixture of conflict and cooperation, 
which—going beyond Elias’s understanding of configuration—either usher in 
new constellations of order or seek to uphold the old ones. If the president of a 
country is deposed by a coup d’état, as in Egypt, this does not necessarily bring 
profound systemic change. On the contrary, according to the findings ten years 
after the popular insurgency movements in the MENA region, a constellation of 
order can be sustained at its core in spite of superficial corrections.
We therefore understand re-configurations of political, social and cultural 
systems as a process of both conflictual and cooperative interactions aimed at 
restoring or even maintaining the old order by building new alliances, whereby 
the orders, structures and discourses are then modified in order to preclude major 
changes. Thus, the process-based concept of re-configurations implies negotia-
tions and struggles over societies’ visions of the future, on the basis of histori-
cal experience, during the intermediate phase between a period of upheaval and 
a period of new order. This opens up a perspective for debates concerning par-
ticipation and political and symbolic representations. The visions of the future are 
themselves based on historically grounded narratives that shape the renegotiations 
of political and economic conditions; to paraphrase Koselleck (1988), they are the 
past of the future.
This essay collection deals with interdependent, overlapping, repetitive, 
cumulative, and transformative processes (Boudon 1979) whose analysis makes 
it possible to account for both repetitive structures and dynamics of change 
(Koselleck 2000, p. 12 f.). By departing formerly dominant narratives of nation-
alism and Islamism in the MENA region, with their highly ideologized view of 
history, scholars incorporate a number of heretofore marginalized voices and his-
tories into the broader social discourse. In this way, phenomena that have so far 
been neglected by research, such as labor disputes, everyday acts of resistance, 
(semi-)autonomous social spaces and actors, and minority or subaltern groups are 
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brought into the spotlight in order to lend historical depth to research on current 
developments in the MENA region. For example, Rachid Ouaissa’s chapter ana-
lyzes the re-configurations of the Algerian political system. He explains the  (re-)
establishment of power alliances and traces power shifts through oil price fluc-
tuations on the global market, laying out the concomitant instability of systems 
of co-option based on the distribution of rent. In times of power crises, the state 
class is prepared to make concessions, such as economic and political liberaliza-
tions. During the 1980s oil crisis, the single-party system was terminated, elec-
tions authorized, and the economic system liberalized. Eventually, the civil war 
(1992–2002) contributed to restoring the system and enabled those with power 
to co-opt the middle classes anew and secure loyalty to the Bouteflika system 
through the distribution of rent. Since February 2019, however, an unprecedented 
mass social mobilization has been underway. The Hirak movement disrupted the 
order within the state class and forced President Bouteflika to step down, but the 
regime, under military leadership, still tried to re-configure the political system 
by eliminating old clans and striking new alliances. This is the story of a political 
system’s re-configurations that seek to sustain the old order by building new alli-
ances.
The anthology also examines contemporary re-configurations of cul-
tural memory in various countries of the region arising from the weakening of 
 once-hegemonic grant narratives and the corresponding authoritarian systems. 
Over the past two decades, Germany has seen a significant rise in the study of 
cultural memory, remembrance cultures, forms of passing down historical knowl-
edge in private and collective contexts, the relationships between public and pri-
vate memory, the politics of history, etc.
To date these flourishing fields remain underdeveloped in reference to the 
countries of the MENA region (Silverstein and Makdisi 2006). Yet political 
upheavals often provoke an increased societal interest in historical subjects and 
diverse activities for the sake of reconstructing cultural memory. Various actors’ 
struggles over the power to assert an interpretation and define a society’s cultural 
memory invite conclusions about the depth of the social and political transfor-
mation in the MENA region. In this context, Susanne Buckley-Zistel’s chap-
ter asks what processes of reckoning with the past have been initiated and how 
these processes relate to the search for justice and the quest for remembrance on 
a more global scale. In the aftermath of the “Arab Spring,” the affected countries 
are going through various forms of transitions, significantly re-configuring the 
MENA region. A number of new civil society actors, political elites and inter-
national norm entrepreneurs are engaging with the lengthy histories of repres-
sion in the respective countries, as well as with the violence that occurred during 
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the Arab Spring, in order to deal with the legacy of human rights abuses (Sriram 
2017). These transitions to justice are not without obstacles and challenges, how-
ever. The objective of Buckley-Zistel’s chapter is therefore not to tell a story of 
various transitional justice and memory projects in post-Arab Spring countries 
but to situate the practice of doing so in time and space. On a related topic, Per-
rine Lachenal examines the notion of “martyr” as socially constructed and con-
tested along gendered and political lines in her chapter examining how heroes 
and martyrs have been produced and deployed in post-revolutionary Tunisia. It 
begins by revisiting governmental attempts, launched soon after the revolution, to 
monopolize and institutionally define who could benefit from official recognition 
as a martyr. Lachenal unpacks the divergent definitions of “martyrdom” accord-
ing to official institutions and bereaved families respectively, arguing that the 
boundaries of “martyr” as a moral category are often drawn in terms of differing 
masculinities. Her chapter goes on to demonstrate how the category of “martyrs 
of the nation” has progressively overshadowed the category of “martyrs of the 
revolution” in official memorial practices, as the commemoration of the revolu-
tion has progressively focused on its uniformed victims, leaving out the civilian 
dead.
The judicial dimensions of the political upheavals in the MENA region com-
prise another key aspect. In the case of Tunisia, the process of transitional jus-
tice was carried out after the successful overthrow of the old autocratic order. The 
Moroccan case shows that a reckoning with the past can also be enacted as a pub-
lic performance and exploited to justify a new regime. In another sense, contem-
porary trends in the MENA region offer diverse entry points for transition studies 
that go beyond judicial reckoning processes. Mariam Salehi’s chapter explains 
the development of the Tunisian transitional justice process. Drawing on Norbert 
Elias’s ideas about social processes, she argues that dynamics of transitional jus-
tice processes cannot be understood solely via international norms and the “jus-
tice industry,” which jointly shape institutionalized transitional justice projects, 
nor solely by considering the context and political preferences of domestic actors. 
Rather, she argues, they are shaped by the interplay of planned process with 
unplanned political and social dynamics; with a political context in flux, power 
shifts, and sometimes competing planned efforts in other realms. Basing her 
findings empirically on “process-concurrent” field research in post-Arab Spring 
Tunisia, she shows that a technocratic/institutionalized transitional justice project 
can develop dynamics that are somewhat, but not entirely, independent of power 
shifts. However, the abovementioned interplays may lead to frictional encounters, 
which trigger feedback loops, new processes, and new structures.
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In their chapter, Thorsten Bonacker and Tareq Sydiq explore how, accord-
ing to scholars of historical sociology, the re-configuration of social and political 
order in postcolonial society can best be understood as an ongoing (re)interpre-
tation of modernity’s cultural and political program. Thus, diverse actors shape 
the re-configuration of the social and political order in postcolonial societies and 
movements that hold competing views on what constitutes a modern society. 
They argue that one important way of developing these interpretations of moder-
nity is that actors vernacularize ideas and institutional models of modernity from 
what Bendix has called “reference societies” (1967). A reference society is simul-
taneously an imagined vision of how a society should look and an existing society 
to which actors refer when they link their claims for social change to a broader 
understanding of modernity. The chapter offers, first, a conceptual approach to 
understand the role of reference societies in the dynamics of postcolonial and 
post-revolutionary state-building. They argue that especially in situations of trans-
formation and institutional crisis, reference societies function as an important 
resource for claim-making and identity construction. Second, they illustrate the 
argument through the case of Iranian society, which has incorporated very differ-
ent versions of modernity in its postcolonial and post-revolutionary history, mak-
ing it a particularly interesting example.
Increasingly, however, transformations to states and societies no longer come 
solely from within. The impact of transregional factors on social processes is 
growing. Transnational processes are at the foundation of Claudia Derichs’s 
chapter, which is devoted to a multiregional perspective of a “global 1968.” The 
year 1968 has a special meaning in some parts of the world, but others do not 
attach much importance to it. While the European perspective tends to assert a 
“global 1968,” the timeline may look quite different from another vantage point. 
The chapter adopts such a vantage point in addressing “1968 and beyond” or the 
“long 1960s,” as the period is often referred to, as a time of global transforma-
tions, but with particular local manifestations in their ideological underpinnings 
and their justifications for (violent) action. Empirical examples of this include the 
Middle East and (Southeast) Asia; in particular, the chapter discusses the cases 
of the June War of 1967 in the Arab world and the massacres in Indonesia in 
1965. The defeat of Arab armies against Israel and Indonesia’s tragic events of 
the 1960s each paved the way for a gradual strengthening of various Islamic mis-
sionary and activist movements that spread across both regions and subsequently 
gained huge mobilizing momentum. This chapter argues that the emergence of 
strong Islamic movements in this period has had vast repercussions for decades 
to come, for example by advancing “Islamization” in many countries around the 
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globe. Research on the 1960s should therefore include these movements as sub-
stantial change agents in a period of global social and political transformation.
The rise of transregional factors extends beyond the political and artistic 
sphere; it also includes business. Globally operating entrepreneurs are capable of 
acting across different economic systems and can either adapt their operations to 
the local system or contrarily, through lobbying, seek to align the system with 
their own activities. Steffen Wippel elaborates on northern Morocco and the met-
ropolitan area of Tangier, which has experienced important urban, economic, and 
infrastructural re-configurations since the late 2000s. This includes the building of 
a globally significant mega-container port, the reconversion of the old inner-city 
port area into a glamorous waterfront, the establishment of huge industrial estates 
and new tourism facilities, and the construction of state-of-the-art land transport 
routes. Starting from a spatial perspective, his chapter tackles transformative 
effects on different spatial scales. Notably, it considers large-scale (trans-)regional 
links emerging from these new megaprojects, which make Tangier an interre-
gional hub and integrate new processes of regionalization on several levels. Fur-
thermore, effects on the city itself concern local processes of territorialization and 
fragmentation, which also affect people’s daily life in their work as well as leisure 
activities. In its conceptual considerations, the chapter seeks to grasp the differ-
ent shifting, intermingling, and interpenetrating scales of effects and interventions 
with regard to current transformation processes in and around Tangier.
In media and art, we increasingly encounter a transregional audience, in 
which forms of art and media circulate among regions. This does not only apply 
to mainstream media and the Internet. Cultural exchange and media fusions 
also take place around the world at local festivals; the effects of this on a global 
 avant-garde have yet to be seen. The focus here is on how exogenous factors 
such as international communities and organizations, diaspora groups, and other 
international actors influence the re-configurations. Alena Strohmaier’s chapter 
explores the formation of the (self-ascribed) label “Iranian diaspora” and its cin-
ematic representations. The Iranian diaspora and its filmmaking can be used to 
illustrate the transformation of both diaspora into postdiaspora and diaspora film 
into postdiaspora film. This re-configuration manifests itself spatially on three 
levels: the real space of the diaspora, which is subject to socio-political changes; 
the  internal-diegetic spaces in the films themselves, which constantly bring new 
themes to the fore; and film as its own space-creating entity, which constantly 
updates its own mediality. In Iranian diaspora film, these different spatial dimen-
sions come together.
Felix Lang’s chapter suggests possible avenues for adapting conceptual 
frameworks to the study of peripheral cultural production. The events unfolding 
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in Syria since spring 2011 have led to a thorough transformation of the intel-
lectual and artistic space in which Syrian authors, filmmakers, and artists move. 
Beginning with an overview of the connections of institutions, artists, and works 
which form this contemporary space of cultural production, his chapter goes on 
to consider the problems existing theoretical conceptions of such spaces from the 
sociology of arts (e.g. Bourdieu’s fields or Becker’s art worlds) encounter when 
faced with the empirical reality of the Syrian case. He shows that the transna-
tional, unstable, and often transient nature of these formations and their links with 
large-scale socio-political changes, such as wars, are difficult to grasp with con-
ceptual toolkit developed on the model of the exceptionally stable spaces of pro-
duction of Western Europe and the US. Sihem Hamlaoui discusses the effective 
implementation of change as a crucial concern for Tunisian educational leaders in 
the twenty-first century. One of the major challenges to the effective implementa-
tion of reforms is the resistance to change among teachers or staff members, as 
their habits slow the process of implementation of any educational reform. Resist-
ance to technology has been found to be a prominent cause of most system fail-
ures, especially when witnessed in the very people who are expected to use the 
technology the most. This highlights the importance of understanding the causes 
and possible remedies of technology resistance. Studies explored the black box of 
resistances and suggested a theoretical explanation. Hamlaoui’s chapter divulges 
the hidden motives behind Tunisian faculty members; resistance towards digi-
talization and suggest a theoretical implementation strategy in order to reach the 
intended goals of reform.
Research repeatedly addressed spatial aspects of transformation processes (for 
example, spatial inequality as a cause of the 2010–11 protests), but it also raises 
additional questions, which are discussed in terms of socially constructed space 
as proposed by cultural studies and the social sciences (e.g. Lefebvre 1974, 2006; 
Schroer 2006). By now, the struggles over future orders in the MENA region 
have attained an unforeseen level of drama. (Civil) wars, state disintegration, 
and quasi-state entities such as the “Islamic State” call into question the postco-
lonial order in places such as the Kurdistan cantons of Syria and the Kurdistan 
region of Iraq. Andrea Fischer-Tahir’s chapter turns the focus to the Kurdistan 
region of Iraq, discussing practices of consumption within the context of the neo-
liberal transformation. The chapter examines representations of everyday life in 
light of the consumption of meat, specifically chicken. Across class and spatial 
lines, today’s Kurdish household tends to consider chicken to be integral part of 
the daily diet. Industrialized poultry farming started in the 1970s within the con-
text of Baathist modernization, whereas in the 1990s, the “production” of chicken 
had been extremely limited due to the international embargo. However, the boom 
11Introduction
of international business since 2003 has improved access to chicken for most 
parts of the population. Nevertheless, neoliberal restructuration of Kurdistan’s 
economy brought new disorder as it led to total dependency on food imports, 
including chicken and eggs, whereas Kurdish farmers are unable to compete with 
mainly Turkish and Iranian players in commodity chains. The chapter considers 
ways of making this contradiction visible or invisible, respectively, within Kurd-
ish nationalist narratives that both reflect and structure re-configurations of the 
social order.
This puts to the test the suitability of “MENA” as a concept and raises the 
question of how we can conduct research in regional studies “that moves beyond 
fixed ‘spatial containers’ and other established spatial structures” (Wippel and 
Fischer-Tahir 2018, p. 13). It is now time to focus on entangled spaces that are 
trans-nationally and transregionally open-ended—transverse macro-areas, bor-
der zones, regional subspaces, and (trans-)local contacts and locations—from 
a multi-scale perspective. In this context, we understand space as a histori-
cally constructed product that also grounded in collectively shared representa-
tions (designations, symbols, maps, etc.) that can be handed down or questioned 
intergenerationally. Ideas of space rooted in different eras form a reservoir of 
reference points for identity, which can be repeatedly reactivated in new configu-
rations, especially when a hegemonic structure falters (Hirschhausen et al. 2015). 
Instead of treating the MENA region as a supposedly fixed geographical space, 
we advocate for framing it more accurately as a highly diverse but densely inter-
woven ensemble of overlapping “arenas” (Green 2014) consisting of changeable 
geographies of dense social networks of relationships.
Aside from spaces of conflict, our focus is also on the emergence and move-
ment of spaces of economic exchange, spaces where norms, values, and identities 
are renegotiated through forms of cooperation. A deterritorialized notion of space 
also encompasses the post-national “intermediate space,” “transitional space,” or 
“third space” of cultural production (see Bhabha 1994) as well as spaces of mem-
ory and cultural memory. It is also important to clarify how the radically changed 
spatial and temporal modalities of interaction in the digital age serve to structure 
social negotiation processes.
Generations constitute another aspect of re-configuration processes. Karl Man-
nheim (1928) defined a generation as a community whose members develop a 
similar structure of experience and relevance due to major historical events or 
sociostructural changes and, depending on the generational unit, act differently 
as protagonists of social change. Thus, individuals create historical configurations 
and are themselves formed by them (Pilcher 1994). Some chapters in this volume 
compare interpersonal generational relations and social generational relations in 
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the different social contexts and theorize them more robustly from a transregional 
perspective. This concerns the societal structuring of actors’ lifespan (transition to 
adult status, entanglement with social exclusion; “waithood” Dhillon and Yousef 
2009), the renegotiation of the collective past through transgenerational trans-
mission and the “(re)invention” of historical narratives and cultural practices as 
well as the negotiation of political projects that are represented primarily by the 
younger generation according to structural logic. Ten years after the Arab Spring, 
which was widely hailed as the outcome of youthful protests, we must espe-
cially identify the biographical patterns that guide processes of engagement and 
disengagement (cf. Fillieule 2001; Hivert 2013). The phenomenon of “youth” is 
viewed as a psycho-social space of possibility rather than a life stage with clear 
quantitative boundaries (King 2002). Although this space is derived from the 
social and familial march of generations, it can only be qualified in terms of the 
research subjects’ own patterns of interpretation, their own relevance structure, 
thus their own representations.
Christoph  Schwarz’s chapter asks how transitions to adulthood are institu-
tionalized and brokered. He further asks how class, gender, social exclusion, and 
precariousness are linked to the structure of these transitions and the hegemonic 
cultural definitions of “youth” and “adulthood.” Have these regimes shifted since 
the protest movements of 2011? To explore these questions and reconstruct the 
respective regimes of youth transitions in Morocco and Spain, his chapter con-
trasts two social movements: the Moroccan diplômés chômeurs (unemployed 
graduates) and the Spanish PAH (Platform for People Affected by Mortgages) 
housing movement. Amira Augustin discusses a protest movement that emerged 
in 2007 in South Yemen called the Southern Movement. At first, it was a loose 
amalgamation of different groups, most of them former army personnel and 
state employees of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) 
who were forced from their jobs after the southern faction lost the war of 1994. 
Because of state security forces’ brutal treatment of protesters, more and more 
people joined the demonstrations, and the appeals began to change to concrete 
political demands, such as national independence of the territory that had once 
formed the PDRY, which in 1990 unified with the Arab Republic of Yemen to 
form the Republic of Yemen. To understand how the demands of South Yem-
eni independence survived more than two decades of repression, Augustin’s 
chapter investigates the major everyday form of resistance in South Yemen. By 
appropriating hidden forms of resistance, such as intentional and unintentional 
intergenerational transmission of a counter-narrative, South Yemenis were able 
to strengthen the calls for independence in recent years. Using examples from 
participant observations in South Yemen, she discusses how intergenerational 
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transmission has served as an effective everyday form of resistance in the inde-
pendence struggle in South Yemen.
Nina Studer’s chapter analyzes and contextualizes French characteriza-
tions of drinking habits of the colonized in the Maghreb as inherently childlike. 
French colonial authors often equated the colonized Muslims in the Maghreb 
with European children. This infantilization of the colonized can be observed in 
descriptions of what the colonized habitually consumed, as their drinking prefer-
ences and habits allegedly revealed childlike behavior. The texts claimed that the 
Muslim colonized only enjoyed sugary drinks, such as tea or absinthe; that, “like 
children,” they only copied French bad habits; and that they lacked the mature 
characteristics that supposedly regulated the danger of overconsumption among 
French adults. Elites among the colonized also adopted these discourses and 
placed them into the wider field of descriptive mechanisms that served to dehu-
manize and degrade the colonized and, as a direct consequence of this, to justify 
the continued French colonization of the region.
In both conflictual and cooperative negotiation processes, actors communicate 
through words, symbols, (moving) pictures, narratives, and performances and cre-
ate meaning through such representations (Hall 1997). As resources of action and 
organized forms of knowledge, these representations structure the  re-configuration 
of social interaction systems and evolve in the process (Ankersmit 1997; Baber-
owski et al. 2008). This anthology therefore also focuses on aesthetic represen-
tations of rule, resistance, justice, and martyrdom, which, as central themes of 
political discourse, simultaneously reflect and structure political  re-configurations. 
After all, assignments and negotiations of meaning in social and political space are 
closely interrelated with aesthetic representation in works of art.
Re-configurations in politics and society are always reflected, questioned, 
advanced, or subverted in art. In the context of social transformation processes, 
new forms of literature and film have drawn a great deal of attention in academia 
and the media since 2011. Through the prism of popular insurgency movements, 
some authors view contemporary cultural production in the MENA region as both 
a harbinger and a catalyst of social change (Sakr 2013). The question of art’s rela-
tionship to society and politics has been raised with renewed urgency ever since 
the earliest days of the upheavals (Hyldig Dal 2013; Kraidy 2016). The currency 
of this question points to an old hermeneutic problem: how can art and the real-
ity surrounding the artwork be considered in tandem? Do social conditions shape 
artistic works, or do works of art influence their social context? However you 
phrase the question, it is rooted in a dichotomous understanding of two discon-
nected spheres. Now as always, there is a tendency to reduce artmaking to a pure 
reflection of the social relationships surrounding it or to oversimplify it as the 
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medium of a political message. Or, conversely, with an often euphemistic tone, 
artmaking is ascribed the power of social transformation without any evidence 
of such power. Our anthology calls into question this line of argument with its 
basis in a dichotomy of art versus politics. This entails an increased openness of 
social science approaches to literary and cinematic subject matter, laying impor-
tant groundwork for a critical examination of the complex of causes and effects in 
aesthetic production.
Within this context, Walaa Said’s chapter tackles the theme of violent 
death and its reflections in dystopian novels, with a close reading of Moham-
mad Rabie’s Otared (2014). Although the rates of violence and death in the 
Egyptian public places have increased dramatically since January 25, 2011, 
death and mourning have been dismissed as a focus of Tahrir writing, which is 
inclined to view that eventful day and its aftermath through a euphoric lens. As a 
 counter-response, the rising wave of dystopian novels has flourished to provide a 
more confrontational attitude toward death as an inherent component of the revo-
lutionary act. For her part, Charlotte Pardey characterizes the post-revolutionary 
Tunisian literary scene, addressing the ways in which the Tunisian literary estab-
lishment wishes for revolutionary events to be reworked in literature. Novels need 
time: to be written, read, and ultimately recognized as worthy of honors. Some 
years after the Tunisian uprising of 2010–11, it is time to explore the literary pro-
duction in their aftermath. Her chapter focuses on novels written in French and 
Arabic that have found acclaim in the Tunisian literary scene: they were all recip-
ients of the Tunisian prize for fiction, the Prix Comar d’Or, and all of the chosen 
works deal in one way or another with the 2010–11 uprising. This permits various 
insights. First, this chapter compares the novels and explores trends such as ref-
erences to past revolutions and autobiographic reflections. Second, it asks more 
structural questions about the context of the novels’ production (authors, publish-
ers) as well as about their honorary reception through literary prizes.
To what extent do literature and discourses of theater negotiate norms, values, 
and rules and critically comment on social re-configurations? This is the subject 
of the chapter by Friederike Pannewick. She investigates a crucial turning point 
in the late 1970s work of Syrian dramatist Saʿdallāh Wannūs (1941–1997). This 
internationally acclaimed author belonged to a generation of Arab intellectuals 
and artists whose political and artistic self-conception was strongly molded by 
the question of Palestine. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period marked by 
significant social and intellectual developments triggered by the country’s defeat 
by Israel in 1967, Wannūs provocatively formulated the lineaments of a politi-
cizing aesthetic, which was to make Arab theater into a vehicle of hope, insti-
gating political reforms and propelling processes of democratization. In 1977, 
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when President Anwar Sadat of Egypt became the first Arab politician to travel 
on official business to Israel, where he outlined his plans for peace in a speech 
to the Israeli parliament, a world came crushing down for Wannūs. He tried to 
take his own life on the night of this momentous event and did not write plays 
for more than ten years. This chapter shows how the plays he published after this 
self-imposed silence turned away from a politicized didactic theatre and towards 
psychological studies focusing on the individual, as well as minority and gender 
issues, which might be considered part of what Fadi Bardawil has described as an 
“inward turn” (2013, p. 1).
As the current world situation shows us, major re-configurations of systems of 
rule and radical social change can also come about through pandemics, major dis-
ease outbreaks, and natural disasters (Harper 2018). In his book  Al-Muqaddima, 
Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406), who developed an early groundbreaking theory on 
historical change, described the plague that reached North Africa in 1348, claim-
ing his own parents’ lives, as an important factor in the social transformation of 
his era and more generally in the collapse of an empire. In a matter of months, 
the current coronavirus crisis has brought an accelerated re-configuration of 
international, national, and local orders. It has tested not only the resilience of 
global health systems, but the entire social reality with its at times contradictory 
discourses and norms. For the MENA region, this global crisis is already high-
lighting palpable social, economic, and political shifts. The response to the crisis 
and associated developments mark intensive re-configuration process both on a 
discursive level (for example discourses of gender and religion) and in regard to 
power relations as they play out within societies (Alijla 2020) and between civil 
societies and ruling regimes (Grimm and Fehrenbach 2020).
Thus, the history of re-configurations in the MENA region does not end with 
the singularity of a popular uprising such as the Green Movement or the Arab 
Spring. The saga continues with the effects of the Covid-19 crisis. Here, the idea 
of re-configurations again serves as a conceptual foil, an analytical lens, and an 
epistemic tool for describing a region as permanently subject to processes and 
flux.
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In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the affected countries have been going 
through various transitions that are significantly re-configuring the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region. In this context, a number of new civil soci-
ety actors, political elites, and international norm entrepreneurs have been engag-
ing with the long histories of repression in these countries, as well as with the 
violence that occurred during the Arab Spring, in order to deal with the legacy 
of human rights abuses (Sriram 2017). As many chapters in this volume testify, 
these transitions to justice are not without their obstacles and challenges, how-
ever. Nevertheless, it is important to ask what processes of dealing with the past 
have been set in motion and how they relate to the search for justice and the quest 
for remembrance on a more global scale. The objective of this chapter is thus not 
to tell the stories of various transitional justice and memory projects in post-Arab 
Spring countries, but to situate the practice of doing so in time and space.
On a global scale, with the advent of a strong human rights discourse in the 
1990s and the initial triumph of liberal peacebuilding, including a strong dose of 
transitional justice, demands for memory and justice after human rights abuses 
have become more prominent and turned into an imperative, if not a mantra. 
Today, hardly conflict is ended without a quest to set up an institutional, legal 
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or civil initiative to develop transitional justice projects and to establish a mem-
ory discourse. In the MENA region, too, a variety of measures have been imple-
mented, including inter alia a truth commission and trials in Tunisia; two highly 
contested memorials by the Egyptian government (Barsalou 2017, p. 201) and 
impromptu murals on Tahrir Square in Cairo (Pannewick 2017); vetting measures 
passed by the Libyan parliament (Boduszynski and Wierda 2017); and the estab-
lishment of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (Fakhro 2017).
Importantly, the demand for justice and remembrance in response to past 
human rights abuses is no longer exclusively a domain of national governments 
or local initiatives, but has become part of a discourse on global responsibility 
and the “internationalization of the commemorative paradigm” (Bickford and 
Sodaro 2010). Commemorating human rights abuses has been enshrined in the 
UN Resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2005), which 
addresses symbolic reparations, international and national institutions, and the 
“global consciousness” in addition to citing “commemoration and tributes to vic-
tims” as an important means of retributive justice.1
The Arab Spring occurred during a period when the field of transitional justice 
was reflecting on “whether it is most appropriate to adopt readymade and tested 
approaches or rather to push for more creativity and advancement of locally gen-
erated solutions that draw upon other experiences” (Fisher and Stewart 2015, 
p. 4), a question that speaks to the tension between global and local approaches to 
dealing with the past of human rights abuses. Against this backdrop, and without 
going into empirical details, this chapter focuses on the global norm of remem-
brance and its local translation. The field of memory and justice lends itself to 
a spatial analysis as put forward by this chapter, given the significant body of 
 literature on the different phases of memory studies and commemoration as a 
practice, allowing us to trace the origin and spread of these ideas across time and 
space.
Memory and Justice from National to Global and Back 
to Local
Finding constructive ways of linking the past to the present and the future is cen-
tral to dealing with the past of human rights violations. Accordingly, the field 
of transitional justice has been devoting increasing attention to memory politics 
(Björkdahl et al. 2017). This is also highly pertinent to the transformation pro-
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cesses in the MENA region, as explored in this volume, where memorials to 
violence and repression, intended as symbolic reparations, play a particularly 
significant role (Buckley-Zistel and Schäfer 2014). Moreover, memory initia-
tives and commemorative events such as anniversaries may contribute to a wider 
public understanding of the past (ICTJ 2015) and educate civil society about 
the violence, which may prevent future aggression (Bickford 2009). For vic-
tims and their communities, moreover, remembrance might provide some form 
of acknowledgement—as implied by the UN Resolution—and thus contribute to 
some form of restorative justice. Whether and how these normative aspirations 
translate into practice is a matter of empirical research.
Conceptionally, although the practice of remembering past atrocities has quite 
local origins, it has gone global in recent years—while maintaining its local 
importance (Winter 2006; Feindt et al. 2014). This development can be deline-
ated into several phases (Erll 2011). Beginning with Maurice Halbwachs (1992) 
and others in the 1950s, memory studies was primarily concerned with the social 
and collective aspect of memory; debates revolved around how memory could be 
transmitted, constructed, and passed on by various societal groups ranging from 
family to nation. This focus on the social setting is important because remem-
brance, so one of Halbwachs’s key arguments, is always conditioned by the pre-
sent milieu in which we are situated. In other words, we remember as part of a 
collective, not as individuals. This is based on an understanding of a social envi-
ronment as fairly stable and extending over a limited geographic space, which 
leads to an understanding of social memory as confined by space and time.
Halbwachs’s viewpoint was expanded by thinking of memory in terms of 
material and non-material sites, as introduced by Pierre Nora (Erll 2011, p. 6). 
In his view, these sites of memory (lieux de mémoire) comprise “any significant 
entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or 
the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any 
community” (Nora 1996, p. xviii) and thus include places, objects, and ideas that 
are vested with historical importance for a particular nation or community. They 
may include references to past violence such as war memorials or commemora-
tion events, but also national symbols such as flags or national holidays. Impor-
tantly, they serve to create some form of bounded community, such as a nation, 
and thus a coherent identity.
The current thinking, in contrast, leaves behind the physical constraints of spa-
tial limitations, i.e. localized communities or sites, and suggests that memory has 
gone global, that it has moved beyond national borders to become transnational 
(Assmann 2014; Erll 2011). Proponents of this contend that while, until recently, 
memory work and the construction of memorials mostly developed within the 
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confines of nation-states, global conditions—or the conditions of globalization—
have had a strong influence on remembrance (Assmann and Conrad 2010; Levy 
and Sznaider 2002). In the words of Andreas Huyssen, “temporal boundaries have 
weakened just as the experience of experimental dimension of space has shrunk 
as a result of modern means of transportation and communication.” (2003, p. 1). 
Whereas there were solid communities in the past, as in Halbwachs’s idea of the 
social milieu or Nora’s notion of sites of memory, under this argument, time and 
space are compressed. Due to mass media, the internet, and activities such as 
the promotion of the mantra of transitional justice, memory practices are increas-
ingly going global. Levy and Sznaider (2002) argue that this has led to a global 
script that promotes a shared morality, the identification with distant others, and 
a desire, if not concrete efforts, to lessen their suffering. This builds a baseline of 
universal norms: a cosmopolitan morality, a cosmopolitan memory.
Nevertheless, despite the globalization (or transnationalization) of memory, 
memory remains tied to a locale. For “[a] politics of location does indeed pay 
rigorous attention to the local—starting from the intimate terrain of the body—
but it situates such attention in relation to other scales: from the regional to the 
national to the global” (Rothberg 2014, p. 652; Jebari 2018). For Rothberg, this 
can be referred to as multidirectional memory, through which different memory 
projects around the globe mutually affirming one another to their mutual benefit. 
The emergence of Holocaust memory, he suggests, has contributed to the pos-
sibility of other victims of mass violence articulating their demands, and even 
highlighting or enhancing their memories—and memory itself. Moreover, it has 
led to a more intensely shared memory—and a sharing of memory—that disen-
tangles individual from collective memory, links victims’ groups, and cuts across 
spatial, temporal, and cultural sites. This is exemplified by the Mothers of the 
Disappeared, for instance, an initiative which started in post-Dirty War Argentina 
and has been adapted to other local contexts such as in Morocco (Menin 2017, 
p. 36) and Egypt (Mhajne and Whetstone 2018, p. 57) where women use their 
status as mothers of disappeared political activists in order to keep the memory 
of their loved ones alive. Similarly, a central memorial to Germany’s socialist 
past—the former Stasi remand prison Gedenkstätte Hohenschönhausen—par-
ticipated in a two-year project entitled Against Forgetting, in which it engaged 
with Tunisian stakeholders on issues pertaining to transitional justice, includ-
ing how to construct a memorial to victims of repression (Stiftung Gedenkstätte 
 Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, n.d.). Moreover, the international NGO Sites of Con-
sciousness is operating the project Digital Mapping and Documentation in the 
Middle East and North Africa, which identifies sites of human rights abuses in 
the MENA region (funded by Germany’s Robert Bosch Foundation; International 
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Coalition of Sites of Consciousness, n.d.). These examples illustrate the entangle-
ment of actors, ideas, and resources across the globe when it comes to sharing 
memory and ideas about memorialization.
Since the Arab Spring, however, there has also been a very localized or 
regionalized approach, as expressed in cultural production on memory. This 
is, for instance, expressed in the form of prison writings, i.e. autobiographi-
cal accounts of torture and maltreatment in detention (Hachad 2018; Ghachem 
2018; Jebari 2018); documentaries and films about human rights violations 
 (Pierre-Bouthier 2018); and artistic and cultural formats (El Guabli and Jarvis 
2018). In contrast to other post-violence countries, these forms of memorializa-
tion seem to be more common than those used as transitional justice mechanisms, 
which mainly comprise memorials (Barsalou 2017).
Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory has not been without criticism, 
though. Critiques include that it neglects to take inherent power relations into 
account (Milich and Moghnieh 2018, p. 6) and leaves unquestioned the asym-
metries of a memory discourse that is always highly entangled in both local and 
global power structures (De Cesari and Rigney 2014, p. 10). Yet how can this 
entanglement be depicted conceptually? We shall turn to this critique of power 
structures in the next section by taking a spatial turn.
Spatializing the Entanglement of Local and Global2
The consciousness of the local has acquired relevance both as a backlash to glo-
balization and in regard to the dissemination of global norms and practices (as 
with memory practices), which are said to at the same time incorporate and 
marginalize the local. This has led to the local turning into a critical viewpoint 
from which to assess the contradictions of globalization. At its most basic, the 
local is often posited as meaningful and authentic in the literature on memory 
and beyond, and it is often accompanied by words such as “real,” “grounded,” 
or “lived” (Massey 2007, p. 4). It thus connotes life-worlds with relatively stable 
associations and relatively shared histories (Appadurai 1995, p. 215), and, from 
an anthropological perspective, signifies some measure of groundedness (albeit 
unstable), some sense of boundaries (albeit permeable), and some sites for con-
structing identities (albeit contingent; Escobar 2001, p. 140).
In current memory studies, the local has come to signify a site of resist-
ance against (global) power structures. It has been suggested that this wariness 
toward the global impact on local structures is often couched in post-colonial and 
 post-structural thought, which places great emphasis on the local while voicing 
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suspicion over grand meta-narratives accused of seeking to dominate prevailing 
discourses (Massey 2004, p. 9). A common concern of these approaches is to 
acknowledge contingency and particularity, to honor if not celebrate difference 
and otherness, and to stimulate local capacities (Massey 2003, p. 51). In this read-
ing, current discourse and practice start from the premise that global and local are 
mutually exclusive entities. Frequently, they understand “the local” either to be 
sealed off from the global by some form of boundary, or view it as at the mercy of 
external relations.
In this chapter, I would like to challenge this binary perspective and ask 
whether and how global and local constitute each other and how this can be con-
ceptualized theoretically. To this end, I will take a spatial turn. I argue that the 
scalar construction of global and local needs to be re-assessed and their mutual 
constitution through social interaction brought to the fore when analyzing tran-
sitional justice. Yet what does a spatial turn signify? The term space refers to 
areas around, within, and between objects; it marks the expanse in which objects 
occur. According to Henri Lefebvre (2009, p. 186 f.), space is always social, for it 
assigns more or less appropriate locations to social relations. Importantly, though, 
space itself is socially produced; it is a result of interactions and can thus be 
described as a complex social construction composed of social norms, values, and 
ascribed meanings (Lefebvre 1991, p. 26). It follows that space is both a complex 
social construction and the condition under which individuals and groups interact. 
In a circular way, space provides the structures that enable and constrain agency. 
There is thus a dialectic relationship between physical space and the societies that 
inhabit it: space is shaped by social interactions, and at the same time it shapes 
these interactions.
The term space thus points to the complex social constructions at the 
level of the local and global. In this sense, it designates not a container—a 
 de-historicized, largely homogenous, fixed and bounded entity in which interac-
tion occurs—but the materialization of social relations that have developed over 
time and are therefore contingent (Massey 2007, p. 154). Central to this line of 
reasoning is the assumption that there is a relationship between the local and 
global scales, which transcends their dichotomy as mutually exclusive concepts. 
According to Massey:
“if space is a product of practices, trajectories, interrelations, if I make space 
through interactions at all levels, from the (so-called) local to the (so-called) 
global, then those spatial identities such as places, regions, nations, and the local 
and the global, must be forged in this relational way too, as internally complex, 
essentially unboundable in any absolute sense, and inevitably historically chang-
ing”. (2004, p. 5 f.)
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In other words, if the local is only a congealing of social relations at a particu-
lar point and particular time, global and local are not mutually exclusive binary 
oppositions but rather related to and mutually constitutive of each other. This 
implies that the spatial combination of social relations that constitutes the unique-
ness of any locality is not confined to this place but stretches beyond its (penetra-
ble) boundaries, so that the global defines part of the local, the outside part of the 
inside (Massey 2007, p. 5). There is thus an intricate relationship between local 
and global, as mutually constitutive.
Consequently, the local is not simply the product, or victim, of the global, but 
there are also elements through which the global is constituted through the local. 
In other words, there is not only a global construction of the local, as argued by 
critics of the global influence of transitional justice at the local level, but also a 
local construction of the global (Massey 2006, p. 30). The local is therefore not 
simply a passive victim but also has agency of its own. Because if the local is 
productive of the global, it has some form of agency and thus transformative 
capacity. This implies that it is important to analyze how local action and local 
practices reflect back onto global structures, and vice versa.
This is apparent, for instance, in efforts to turn personal memory into public 
memory, a process through which such memory gains presence in a particular 
place. This personal memory is profoundly local, for it is internalized in a person 
who has experienced or witnessed an atrocious event. Nikro and Hegasy (2017, 
p. 3) illustrate this with the example of former political prisoner Fatna El Bouih 
who narrates her personal experience in her autobiographical monograph (El 
Bouih 2008), but in so doing has gone from being a target of repression into an 
agent of memory politics in Morocco. In the process, her individual memory is 
transported into a social memory by making it available in print as a book, and 
then into spatial memory by assigning it a particular (non-material) territory, i.e. 
incorporating it into institutions that deal with the legacy of the past. This institu-
tion is then transferred to a national and global level, at which it gains promi-
nence.
Despite arguments regarding the transnationalization of memory culture, 
memory thus also remains profoundly local. After all, importantly, the atrocities 
to be remembered took place in a particular locality, so they directly affect people 
who live in physical proximity to the events, who have to deal with the conse-
quences of the rupture, i.e. people for whom remembrance serves an important 
political function. Sites of atrocities that are turned into memorials or memorial 
museums, for instance, are composed of tangible local relics and material cul-
tural heritage (Mannergren Selimovic 2018) that root the site deeply in place. 
They give each site an idiosyncrasy that is unique and exceptional. There are thus 
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always local aspects of memory culture and locally vernacularized aspects of a 
global memory culture.
Conclusions
To return to the criticism of memory practice from a local perspective, we must 
ask whether current scholarship overly emphasizes the local as a product of the 
global, inadvertently denying the local of any agency and any potential to con-
tribute to the transformation of (global) structures. Determining whether and how 
this occurs within memory practices would require an in-depth empirical analy-
sis that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. From a conceptual vantage point, 
this chapter seeks to contribute to the critical literature on transitional justice and 
memory studies by offering an alternative understanding of how its key concepts 
travel. By tracing and assessing the influence of local practices—in all their het-
erogeneity—it endows local justice entrepreneurs with a degree of agency in 
academic discourses that often regard them as solely subjected to global forces. 
Hence, the argument has a strong emancipatory component, marking “an attempt 
to get out from under the position of thinking one’s identity as simply ‘subject to’ 
globalization” (Massey 2004, p. 12) and calling for a rethinking and a concomi-
tant redefinition of the spaces in which memory and justice occur. In this sense, 
a spatial turn not only serves as a critique but “as a project that is devoted to the 
creation and construction of new contexts for thinking about politics and the pro-




2. This section draws heavily on Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2015).
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Tunisia’s Re-Configurations 
and Transitional Justice in Process: 
How Planned Processes of Social 
and Political Change Interplay 
with Unplanned Political Dynamics
Mariam Salehi
Introduction
This chapter sheds light on the dynamics of the Tunisian transitional justice 
 process and its interplay with the political re-configurations after the fall of the 
authoritarian regime in 2011. Drawing on Norbert Elias’s thoughts on social 
 processes, this chapter argues that the dynamics of transitional justice processes 
cannot be understood solely in view of the international norms and the “justice 
industry” (Subotic 2012, p. 117) that shape institutionalized transitional justice 
projects, nor merely by considering the context and the political preferences of 
domestic actors. Rather, they are shaped by the interplay of planned processes with 
unplanned political and social dynamics, with a fluctuating political context, power 
shifts, frictions, and sometimes competing political efforts in other realms. The 
contribution also shows that a technocratic/institutionalized transitional justice pro-
ject can develop dynamics that are somewhat, but not entirely, independent from 
(continuous) re-configurations, power shifts, and changing political preferences.
The chapter first provides some historical background on Tunisia’s authoritar-
ian rule. It then briefly situates itself within transitional justice research and intro-
duces the heuristic framework for empirical analysis. Next, it presents selective 
empirical illustrations that are deemed suitable for understanding the dominant 
processual characteristics at play. It draws on almost half a year of field research 
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conducted across a total timespan of two and a half years, during which the 
author interviewed politicians, members and staff of the Tunisian Truth Commis-
sion as well as representatives of civil society, the government, and international 
organizations and NGOs; and conducted (participant) observation at formal and 
informal events of the Truth and Dignity Commission and elsewhere.
Background: What Past is Tunisia’s Transitional Justice 
Process Confronting?
To understand the nature of Tunisia’s transitional justice process and the fric-
tions surrounding it, it is useful to look at the sorts of repression and abuse Tuni-
sians suffered under authoritarianism. Tunisia was under authoritarian rule from 
its independence from France in 1956 until the revolution in early 2011. Both 
authoritarian rulers—the country’s first president Habib Bourguiba who was in 
power until 1987 and his successor Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali—had a “hard grip” 
on the country. Bourguiba’s focus was on the institutionalization of personal 
power. His ruling style and efforts to link state and society can be described 
using Philippe Schmitter’s notion of “authoritarian corporatism” (Chouikha and 
Gobe 2015, p. 20). This entailed the establishment of a single party and eradicat-
ing almost all official opposition. Ben Ali’s period of rule was also marked by 
massive human rights violations and significant limitations of civil and personal 
liberties. The repressive repertoire of the Ben Ali regime ranged from “arbitrary 
economic barriers to jailing, disappearances and torture” (Chomiak 2011, p. 72). 
While the military has historically not played a strong role in Tunisia and was 
formally banned from politics and even from voting (Grewal 2016), authoritarian 
rule relied on a strong secret police to exert repression and secure control. Thus, 
the regime spread a “net of fear” (Hibou 2011, p. 81) over the country.
Both rulers pushed forward the systematic marginalization in the political and 
economic spheres of their political rivals’ strongholds in the country’s southern 
and interior regions. However, Bourguiba was perceived as an “honest ruler” and 
was (or perhaps still is) reputed to be unconcerned with personal enrichment and 
focused only on leading the country to “modernity” and serving the best interests 
of the Tunisian people (Willis 2014, p. 52). In contrast, Ben Ali and his extended 
family built a predatory “quasi-mafia” state (Ayeb 2011; Cavatorta and Haug-
bølle 2012). Nepotistic structures, together with a heavy reliance on interpersonal 
control, made almost everyone at least indirectly complicit, leading to an elusive 
perpetrator that is “the system” (Fraihat 2016). Thus, victimhood stems from the 
ruling periods of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali.
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Moreover, the Tunisian security forces responded violently to the uprisings in 
2010− 11. The brutal crackdown on protesters may have startled many and fur-
ther motivated people who had not initially been part of the protests to mobilize 
(see for example Allal 2012). At least 132 people died and 1,452 were wounded 
in the revolution (Human Rights Watch 2015, p. 5).1 These people are commonly 
referred to as “martyrs and wounded of the revolution.”2 Injured survivors, their 
families, and the bereaved since have been seeking justice and accountabil-
ity. Thus, authoritarian rule in Tunisia produced victims of physical abuse, but 
also of socio-economic deprivation. Both violations demanded a response after 
the fall of the Ben Ali regime in 2011. Accordingly, in addition to initiating 
 re-configurations of the political system, Tunisia quickly started introducing jus-
tice and accountability measures to address violence, repression, and economic 
crimes under the dictatorship.
Introducing the “Process Gap” in Transitional Justice 
and a Framework for Analysis
Transitional justice is essentially about processes. However, the focus in the tran-
sitional justice literature is mainly on the goals, outcomes, and effects of transi-
tional justice efforts. The concept is accorded a strong goal orientation both in 
practice and in the scholarship. Efforts towards transitional justice, which are 
introduced after conflict or violent rule, usually have (explicit or implied) tele-
ological ends, such as societal reconciliation, peace, and democracy (Andrieu 
2010, p. 540 ff.). Thus, most of the research either explores, normatively, what 
transitional justice should deal with and how—or, empirically, assesses the extent 
to which certain goals have been reached. Examples of the former approach 
include Crocker’s (1999) normative framework for “reckoning with past wrongs,” 
in which he defines “eight goals that have emerged from worldwide moral delib-
eration” (Crocker 1999, p. 47); Orentlicher’s (2007) work that defines the goal of 
victims participation; and Miller’s (2008) assertion that transitional justice should 
address economic issues, inequality, and structural violence. Aside from this, 
there is also a wealth of scholarship that discusses outcomes and effects of transi-
tional justice measures for peace, human rights records, democracy, and political 
institutions from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. (For an overview 
of the literature, see Salehi and Williams 2016). However, the research has paid 
scant attention to how transitional justice interacts with the “transition,” the politi-
cal processes it ought to complement and render more just. Thus, although the 
processes are as important to analyze as the substance (cf. Autesserre 2014, p. 9), 
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there is a much stronger focus on the what of transitional justice processes than 
on the how and why of their processual development (cf. Elias 1977, p. 128).
Against this backdrop, I propose a heuristic framework to analyze transitional 
justice in process and thus aim to help close the “process gap.” The framework is 
based on Norbert Elias’ process sociology, since it is particularly suitable for the 
analysis of dynamic processes of social and political change (Elias 1977, 2006a). 
It identifies four characteristics that help explain the development of the transi-
tional justice process in relation to the transition, which is an in-between con-
dition with an unclear endpoint (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). This dynamic 
process is shaped by changing figurations and thereby changing actor and power 
relations (Elias 2006a). In short, transitional justice processes are characterized 
by the interplay of planned/institutionalized processes and unplanned/spontane-
ous political and social dynamics (cf. Elias 1977); by non-linearity and (some-
times simultaneous) trends and counter-trends (cf. Elias 2006a); by international 
interconnectedness (cf. Elias 2006b); as well as by conflict and friction that drive 
and define the process (cf. Elias 1978).
Additionally, in order to analyze transitional justice in process, I distinguish 
between three stages: initiating (2011–12), designing (2012–14), and performing 
(2014–16) transitional justice. Although these stages are temporally defined, they 
are analytically informed and named according to the dominant logic identified 
for the respective stage. Drawing on the characteristics identified in the heuris-
tic framework, the next section provides an empirical illustration of the political 
dynamics at play for each of these stages. Given the limited scope of this chapter, 
I will concentrate on a few instances that exemplify the processual developments 
in the respective stage.
Tunisia’s Transitional Justice in Process: Empirical 
Illustration
Transitional justice in Tunisia interplayed with the post-revolutionary politi-
cal and social re-configurations in the country, the development of both a “new 
political architecture”3 and new societal standards of behavior (cf. Elias 1977, 
p. 144) seeking to transcend the rule of violence and repression. In part, these 
affected changing power structures and helped determine who could play a part in 
 post-revolutionary politics. At the same time, the continuous re-configurations—
the fluctuating political context—influenced how the transitional justice process 
developed.
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Measures for seeking justice and accountability in post-revolutionary Tunisia 
were initially introduced ad hoc and only later within the framework of an insti-
tutionalized transitional justice project. Examples of ad-hoc measures included 
trials in military courts for the crimes of killing and wounding protesters dur-
ing the revolution and in civil courts for economic crimes; ad-hoc compensation 
measures; provisions for vetting/lustration; as well as the establishment of inves-
tigation commissions. For the development of the institutionalized transitional 
justice process, a “National Dialogue for Transitional Justice” was conducted, 
which was supported by international transitional justice professionals from both 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations.4 The dialogue 
was led by a technical committee composed of civil society representatives and 
a representative of the Ministry for Human Rights and Transitional Justice.5 It 
included nationwide consultations with victims and stakeholders, including more 
than 2000 participants in total (Ministry for Human Rights and Transitional Jus-
tice 2013, p. 18) who were asked about their understanding and expectations 
of transitional justice (Andrieu 2016, p. 282). A hundred of them received spe-
cific “training on transitional justice, on debate moderation, on writing reports,” 
etc., harmonizing their level of knowledge and equipping them with discursive 
resources.6 The technical committee then led the drafting of the Tunisian transi-
tional justice law. This was an unusually transparent and participatory process: 
“For the first time in Tunisia, we found ourselves with a law project that was not 
developed behind closed doors.”7
This participatory process with international support culminated in a quite 
 far-reaching transitional justice project, covering almost sixty years, from the last 
stretches of the independence struggle in 1955 until the passing of the transitional 
justice law in 2013. It furthermore covers both physical human rights violations 
and socio-economic crimes. The transitional justice law provided for the estab-
lishment of a Truth and Dignity Commission, specialized chambers within the 
Tunisian judiciary, as well as a reparations fund. Introducing such a far-reaching 
transitional justice process was possible due to the specific political configuration 
after the fall of the regime. The newly introduced electoral laws functioned as a 
way to vet those seeking public office since “in Tunisia lustration has been aimed 
at altering the electoral landscape” (Lamont 2013). Members of the old regime 
were banned from participating in the 2011 elections to the National Constitu-
ent Assembly, which also functioned as a legislative body until the end of 2014. 
Thus, the Assembly was essentially vetted, shifting power to those who had pre-
viously been powerless (cf. Elias 1978, 2006a) and opening up opportunities for 
anchoring transitional justice (and thereby also accountability) in the constitution.
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Initiating Transitional Justice
The first stage, initiating transitional justice, mainly deals with the ad-hoc justice 
measures introduced quickly after the uprisings8 as well as the first institution-
alization efforts. Since these initial steps were introduced so soon after the ouster 
of Ben Ali, when a new legal and political order was not yet in place, they were 
mainly based on “old regime” legislation and institutions. For example, trials of 
members of the police and other components of the security forces (for human 
rights violations during the uprising) and of Ben Ali’s wider family (for economic 
crimes) were conducted by pre-existing military or civil courts, respectively. The 
investigatory commissions were technically also a remnant of the old regime, 
since their establishment was introduced by Ben Ali “as a late attempt to appease 
public outrage” (Lamont and Boujneh 2012, p. 39).
While this stage was marked by a general willingness to pursue justice and 
accountability, this trend was countered with a lack of willingness to dismantle 
some of the deeper structures of “the system.” For example, there was no genuine 
effort to vet the judiciary, although it had been a cornerstone of Ben Ali’s rule. 
This is well illustrated by the two following quotes. While a civil society repre-
sentative commented that “Ben Ali was a dictator because of the judiciary. … So, 
the judiciary is important. One needs to reform the judiciary”, an international 
advisor to the transitional justice process remarked that “they screwed some mag-
istrates at some points, but there were no clear criteria. They had no clear idea 
whether they wanted to do a proper vetting.”9,10
This stage was furthermore dominated by a factionalist political logic that led 
to the perception that those newly in power were perpetuating the old regime’s 
practices of favoritism. For example, the ad-hoc compensation measures that 
were introduced were perceived as having mainly benefited the supporters of 
Ennahda, the moderate Islamist party that led the government after the 2011 elec-
tions, specifically those with access to people in power.11 These perceptions did 
not provoke a sense of justice, but rather fostered a lack of trust in justice and 
accountability efforts. Also, the initial institutionalization efforts created fric-
tion around the question of how best to institutionalize transitional justice. Civil 
society in particular was very skeptical about the establishment of a transitional 
justice ministry, as they were afraid “[t]he minister could instrumentalize the 
ministry for his political or electoral agenda.”12 In hindsight, a civil society rep-
resentative concluded that this skepticism had borne out: “Listen, regarding the 
transitional justice ministry—that was just a façade ministry.”13
To summarize, this stage was marked by a general trend toward justice and 
accountability that was, however, undermined by a lack of willingness to disman-
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tle repressive structures at a deeper level. This interacted with political polariza-
tion as well as frictions between the political sphere and civil society that shaped 
the further development of the transitional justice process.
Designing Transitional Justice
The second stage consists of designing the planned, institutionalized transitional 
justice project. International actors played a crucial role in this. They provided 
the socio-technological offering” by providing guidance and training on what 
transitional justice should mean and entail. This led to a harmonization of rhet-
oric among the Tunisian actors involved: “and they all went through the same 
training on transitional justice, on moderation of debate, on writing reports, on all 
of this.”14
However, there were still divergent opinions on what transitional justice 
should signify and entail among Tunisian political and civil society actors.15 
And while international advice was welcomed, it was not always followed. One 
example is the exclusion of civil society from nominating truth commissioners: 
members of parliament decided to keep that prerogative to themselves. This led 
to cross-cutting frictions. Civil society felt “discarded” and the perception of a 
partisan bias emerged, including within the parliamentary selection commission, 
as one member remarked: “We have reached the nomination of the [Truth and 
Dignity Commission] members with pain. […] There was one party that only 
wanted partisan members.”16
In this stage, one could furthermore observe an interplay between the planned, 
institutionalized transitional justice project and transitional political and social 
dynamics. In a volatile political situation, lawmakers did not prioritize transi-
tional justice and the transitional justice law was shelved. Thus, the paradigm of 
dealing with the past was questioned again (or at least not prioritized anymore) 
and a counter-trend of elite deal making and political compromise emerged: 
“[T]here is a lack of will to really seek accountability in these areas. There’s a 
kind of deal.”17 At times of conflict and unrest, the adversary political factions 
found themselves in a “balance of weakness”,18 marked by an “ineptitude at 
waging war” and an “impotence to organize peace” (Krichen 2016, p. 264). In 
this situation, stability was prioritized at the expense of transitional justice. For 
example, justice and accountability did not play a role in the National Dialogue, 
a conflict resolution initiative to avert political violence and break the deadlock 
of the  constitution-making process. The facilitating Tunisian civil society actors 
received the Nobel Peace Prize for this initiative in 2015:19
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And when the National Dialogue started, the quartet, the four organizations … 
that initiated the National Dialogue, did not make transitional justice one of the 
priorities. So … all deputies we met said “not now.”20
Thus, in this stage, one could see a further institutionalization of transitional 
justice that was strongly shaped by international advice and interconnectedness, 
but one could also observe an interplay between the planned transitional justice 
process and unplanned political dynamics. In a volatile and violent political cli-
mate, acute conflict resolution through political deal making was prioritized over 
justice and accountability, countering the political will for pursuing transitional 
justice efforts.
Performing Transitional Justice
The third stage, “performing transitional justice,” relates to the operations of the 
transitional justice institutions, mainly the Truth and Dignity Commission, in 
practice. This stage was shaped by flattening cleavages, the closing of the “revo-
lutionary window of opportunity” for accountability, and a “resurfacing” of “the 
system.” Political adversaries created external challenges, both subtle and direct, 
to the institutionalized project. The subtle obstacles included limited access to 
archives or delayed budget payments. These were used to create the impression 
that the truth commission was not working properly. As a civil society representa-
tive observed, “They will also continue to give the impression that the process 
continues, that the TDC continues. ‘Here, the TDC has problems, it is not us but 
the TDC that has problems … So, we may let [the commission] work, but it is not 
doing anything.’”21
More direct challenges included the introduction of competing legislation, 
the so-called “reconciliation law,” by President Essebsi. The bill aimed to offer 
amnesty to corrupt businessmen and administrative staff, and in its original form 
would have significantly curtailed the competencies of the Truth and Dignity 
Commission.22 Additionally, the transitional justice process was characterized 
by internal conflict and frictions among the commissioners as well as rumors 
surrounding them. The image of the commission was closely linked to its presi-
dent, Sihem Ben Sedrine, who was often portrayed in research interviews as a 
polarizing rather than reconciling figure: “She is no Desmond Tutu,” a member 
of parliament remarked. 23 And a defector from the Truth and Dignity Commis-
sion criticized the president’s leadership style as authoritarian: “[The truth com-
mission] is an authoritarian structure … effectively in the hands of Sihem Ben 
Sedrine.”24
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During this stage, political preferences were clearly shifting away from tran-
sitional justice, with a continuous trend of prioritizing political compromise and 
elite deal making. However, the transitional justice process visibly developed lim-
ited autonomy from these shifting preferences. The president’s competing draft 
legislation, aimed at undermining the process, was not easy to pass, and nobody 
had planned the altered version that eventually passed (from “economic” to 
“administrative reconciliation law”). Moreover, the Truth and Dignity Commis-
sion conducted public hearings against the preferences of the country’s political 
leadership. Thus, in this stage transitional justice was partially performed despite 
challenges. In this context, the testimony of prominent figures from the Tunisian 
political and cultural realm could lend some credibility to accountability/justice 
claims. One prominent example is the testimony of writer Gilbert Naccache, 
who recounted political imprisonment and torture during the Bourguiba years.25 
Another is Ben Ali’s nephew Imed Trabelsi, who gave testimony from prison and 
alleged that the nepotistic structures were still in place: “There was a revolution, 
but nothing has changed to my knowledge. I have my sources and the same sys-
tem [of corruption] is still operational.”26
Frictions between the truth commission and the political sphere continued 
and some factions in parliament tried to deny the commission an extension of its 
mandate that was provided for by law through a controversial vote that was both 
contested in procedure and in substance. The responsible ministry then granted 
an extension until the end of 2018, which still meant that the commission had to 
terminate its operations before it could finish all its tasks. Eventually, the Tunisian 
Truth and Dignity Commission published its final report in March 2019, present-
ing results from over four years of work.
To sum up, in the third stage transitional justice was driven and defined by 
conflict and friction from both inside and outside the truth commission. The 
political trend went against the pursuit of justice and accountability measure. 
However, the transitional justice process could develop a certain degree of inde-
pendence from political preferences and shifting power relations and perform 
their task despite the challenges.
Conclusion and Outlook
After the Truth and Dignity Commission ended its work at the end of 2018, the 
questions of whether and how the findings summarized in the report will be dis-
seminated and the recommendations implemented by the government are crucial 
for transitional justice. However, frictions have continued to grow. A recently 
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circulated draft bill aimed at terminating all cases before the specialized cham-
bers; this was widely perceived as an attempt at an amnesty law.27 Discussions 
with various experts all invited the same assumption: any steps towards imple-
mentation are very unlikely to be taken before the parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections in autumn 2019. Even afterwards, barely any imaginable political 
configuration would empower someone willing to take on that task. Thus, while 
the planned Tunisian transitional justice process was very comprehensive by 
mandate and design, it interacted with continuous political re-configurations and 
changing power dynamics in the transition. Conflict and friction across differ-
ent actor groups played a crucial role in transitional justice’s development within 
the volatile political context. While the political will for pursuing justice and 
accountability has been neither linear nor non-reversible, the current trend points 
to an abandonment of transitional justice. Thus, it remains to be seen whether 
a  counter-trend can develop that places transitional justice back on the political 
agenda.
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Algeria: Between Transformation 
and Re-Configuration
Rachid Ouaissa
Since February 16, 2019, millions of Algerians of all generations and from all 
regions of the country began protesting the regime that has governed the coun-
try since Algeria’sindependence in 1962. The protests began in soccer stadiums, 
in 2018, before reaching smaller urban centers. Of these, the first demonstration 
was held in the town of Kherrata, in the Kabylie region, best known as the site of 
the May 1945 massacres. The movement spread from there to all of the country’s 
forty-eight districts as well as Algerian diaspora communities in France, Canada, 
Austria, Belgium, UK, and the United States. (The diaspora’s involvement added 
a new element that had been largely absent from the events of the 2010–11 Arab 
Spring.) These mobilizations were spontaneous, non-hierarchical, unstructured, 
and they lacked a set ideology. Hirak, as Algerians call the February 16 Move-
ment, is a popular movement that transcends all party-political structures and 
crosses regional, ethnic, and ideological lines. Although it spans all social strata 
and age groups in Algerian society, Hirak is largely championed by students, 
lawyers, teachers, civil servants, and members of the liberal professions, which 
makes it a middle-class movement.
In its first stage, this protest movement arose in opposition to Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika’s candidacy for a fifth term as president, opposing his plans to hold 
onto power. Then, it went to denounce the whole political regime, demanding a 
new civilian republic based on the rule of law and democratic principles. The slo-
gan Yetnahaw gaâ [They All Should Go] was coined by a young Algerian in the 
local vernacular, who said it into the microphone of a news broadcaster from Abu 
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Dhabi on the day of Bouteflika’s resignation, insisting that Classical Arabic was 
not his native language. The slogan has become a rallying cry for the movement 
in its appeal for a complete overhaul of the system.
After the army forced President Bouteflika to resign on April 2, 2019, he was 
replaced by Abdelkader Bensalah, as interim president, and a new election was 
announced for July 4, 2019. On June 1, the Constitutional Council postponed 
the election. In September 2019, with protests ongoing, the army rescheduled 
it for December 12, 2019. The five candidates that remained in November 2019 
were figures from the regime. More than 60% of the population boycotted the 
election, which also had record numbers, 12,76% of abstentions and blank bal-
lots. Although Abdelmadjid Tebboune was officially elected in the first round 
of voting with 58.13% of votes cast, he remains a contested, illegitimate presi-
dent in the eyes of Algerians, and the protest movement has been unrelenting 
in its demands for a real democratic transition. And so, the conflict has height-
ened between the society and le pouvoir (literally “the power,” the political and 
military decision-makers de-facto ruling the country). Two contradictory politi-
cal projects, two visions of the state, and two perspectives on the relationship 
between the state and its citizens are in competition: on one side, a project to 
 re-configure le pouvoir with a few cosmetic changes, and on the other, a project 
to radically transform the foundations of the Algerian state and to undertake a 
genuine democratic transition.
This idea of re-configuration is inspired by the German sociologist Norbert 
Elias’s principle of “figuration,” (Elias 2003) which describes the crystalliza-
tion of mutually dependent relationships between actors, forming interdependent 
networks marked by an unstable balance of forces. The re-configuration of a 
political system designates a process of both conflictual and cooperative inter-
actions seeking to reestablish or uphold the old order. In this sense of the word, 
 re-configuration refers to the process of changing, co-opting, or eliminating actors 
in order to build new alliances: “changing everything so that nothing changes.” 
The disruptions that occurred in Algeria’s pouvoir starting in April 2019, including 
the choice of a new president, were thus no more than a re-configuration.
“Transition”, by contrast, denotes a shift from an authoritarian system to 
a democratic one. A democratic transition means leaving behind the old politi-
cal rules of the game and brings about the emergence of new political actors. In 
the words of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, “A democratic transition is completed 
when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to pro-
duce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct 
result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority 
to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and juridical power 
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generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies 
de jure” (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 3).
To understand two conflicting dynamics that have dominated Algerian politics 
since independence—transition and re-configuration—one must understand the 
internal mechanisms and logics of the Algerian regime. This requires understand-
ing the nature of le pouvoir, the workings of the state in Algeria, and the nature of 
the pact between state and society since the country’s independence in 1962.
This chapter will analyze the power structure of Algeria and discuss the back-
ground and different stages of the movement of February 2019. My main thesis 
in this chapter is that the Algerian regime generally outlasts crises of co-option 
thanks to its nature as a rentier state, but that this time, unlike during previous 
crises, the regime has lost the support of the middle classes. That has frustrated 
its efforts to re-configure the system and increased the likelihood of a democratic 
shift.
The Nature of the State in Algeria
The German political scientist Hartmut Elsenhans describes what Algerians 
colloquially call le pouvoir using the concept of the “state class.” According to 
Elsenhans, the state class comprises the people at the top levels of the bureau-
cratic hierarchy who, solely by virtue of their positions, extract a collective sur-
plus in the form of rent (Elsenhans 1996, p. 176). The state class reproduces itself 
out of its own ranks via nepotism, the education system, and bonds of patron-
age (Elsenhans 1996, p. 200). The members of the state class are organized into 
clans. These consist of small groups of actors bonded by underlying trust factors, 
which, by Khaldounian logic, can include parentage, regionalism, family, having 
attended the same zāwiyya or military academy, and so forth. A clan can include 
both civilians and military officers, apparatchiks and businesspeople, members of 
the independence war generation and members of younger generations. The dif-
ferent clans compete over influence, income, and prestige. They form coalitions 
with other clans in the state class, which often causes the state class to grow in 
number while increasing how many people are connected to those clans through 
organic, clientelistic relationships. As a function of their political clout, the clans 
position themselves at various distances from the central clan. The different clans 
of the state class, despite coming from basically oppositional ideologies, are con-
nected and united by rent and its distribution. As Mahfoud Bennoune has put it, 
they therefore reach a consensus to ensure “the equilibrium of stagnation” (Ben-
noune 1998, p. 17).
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Without delving into the ramifications and history of the economic notion of 
“rent,” I will build the rest of my argument around the concept of the rentier state. 
The lens of rent helps explain the nature of the cyclical crises of the Algerian 
regime as well as the crisis in the relationship between state and society in Alge-
ria. Algeria is a quintessential rentier state. Petroleum and natural gas comprise 
97% of exports, 35% of GDP, and 75% of budgetary revenue (Crisis Group 2018, 
p. 3).
Rent is the outcome of restrictions on competition, whether caused by natu-
ral monopolies or by politically generated restrictions to the market. It influ-
ences political structures and therefore actors’ strategies. Unlike profit, capital in 
the form of rent does not accumulate by market mechanisms. In rent-dominated 
economies, surplus financial resources are not necessarily invested productively 
in accordance with economic rules. Consolidating revenue from rent at the state 
level allows the regime to buy the masses’ loyalty while preserving a high level 
of autonomy from society. Through rent, other social groups and classes are 
linked to the state by bonds of clientelism, which makes it difficult if not impos-
sible for an autonomous civil society to take shape. Besides breeding clienteliza-
tion, rent enables the state to build up harshly repressive structures. For Michael 
Ross, states with large budgets funded by petroleum revenue are more likely to 
be authoritarian than states with relatively low taxpayer-funded budgets. Unlike 
other types of rent, petroleum rent calls for a strongly centralized state while 
encouraging diversity among the ruling elite (Ross 2001, p. 335). The true goal of 
the ruling class is not development, but a stronghold on maximum power.
The third effect of rent is the dismantling of economic structures, which pre-
vents the development of the capitalism’s historical prerequisites: the blossom-
ing of a productive middle class that would pose a social counterweight to the 
rentier state class. Compared to profit, the accumulation of rent demands different 
types of monopolies or political access. However, profits in free-market systems 
ultimately are reinvested because of market competition. As a result, the most 
powerful capitalists are threatened by any impediments to innovation and quickly 
leave the market. Businesspeople invest because they expect greater demand from 
consumers. The innovation-driven competition caused by investments brings not 
only technical superiority, but real wage growth. Under Keynesian dynamics, 
real wage growth leads to a rise in demand and therefore gives labor bargaining 
power. Labor’s attainment of autonomy prevents the supremacy of the powerful. 
It is also the basis of the bourgeois revolution, thus also a prerequisite for the 
establishment and of democratic structures and civil rights. Large segments of 
society benefit from the expansion of the market which leads to what Eric Hob-
sbawm described as the self-disempowerment of the aristocracy (Hobsbawm 
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1987) after Europe’s industrialization. Besides shaping the political behavior of 
the elites, capitalist structures also determine the cultural behaviors of society. 
The mobilization of labor via bargaining power—rather than any kind of eth-
nic, religious, or clan-based solidarity—becomes workers’ preferred conduit for 
asserting their interests. This is what Ferdinand Tönnies described as the transi-
tion from community (Gemeinschaft) to society (Gesellschaft) (Tönnies 2012).
In short, rentier societies are societies in which classes that obtain their privi-
leges by accumulating profit—i.e., from the market—are marginal or nonexistent. 
Protecting the accumulation of capital by market mechanisms—i.e., by compe-
tition and not via bureaucratic mechanisms or arrangements with the political 
class—would mean participating in the system of production and therefore in job 
creation. Algeria does not have a social class that accumulates its capital through 
production. Obtaining bourgeois status, or simply wealth, depends on relation-
ships between businesspeople and the political power.
After 1962, le pouvoir in Algeria was upheld by an alliance between the mili-
tary and the party, with its satellites and its bureaucracy, which made the democ-
ratization process twice as difficult. Since the economy opened up in the 1990s, 
compradors have joined these groups as economic actors. The alliance of these 
three groups of actors under the auspices of the military creates what the Brit-
ish anthropologist Ernest Gellner called “the neo-Mamluk state” (Gellner 1981, 
p. 64). Yet there are three necessary conditions for a transition: divorcing the 
army from politics, severing ruling parties from their satellite organizations, and 
wresting rent from the hands of le pouvoir.
Thus, like all state institutions, the Algerian army is dependent on rent from 
fossil fuels, but the army is also the institution that holds the monopoly on vio-
lence in the Weberian sense. For this reason, this institution has been the back-
bone of the Algerian state class ever since independence. That is why each of the 
different clans is grouped around military actors.
The ruling elite clientelizes social groups by creating jobs—the marginal 
workforce—and subsidizes most consumer goods. At the same time, social ser-
vices, free education, health care, and the like all lead to the emergence of large 
middle classes. However, these new marginally employed middle classes are not 
oriented to or associated with the market in the Weberian sense: their eyes are 
on rent. In the Algerian case, I have termed those the “trabendo1 middle classes” 
(Ouaissa 2018). They consume more than they produce, so their social status 
depends on the share of the surplus that the ruling class spends on consumption. 
These middle classes are not the result of an increased consumption dependent on 
production, but on consumption financed by rent. Meanwhile, they exert indirect 
pressure on the ruling elite to spend even more on consumption. It is those same 
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middle classes, which mostly consist of consumers dependent on rent, who have 
often played the rebels in Algerian history.
Given their dependence on the international price of hydrocarbons, rentier 
countries experience cyclical crises. Not only do these crises disrupt the power 
balance between the clans that make up the state class, and often trigger implo-
sions within that class, but they also cause distortions in the state class’s relation-
ship with the middle class.
The clientelistic relationship between the middle class and the state began to 
erode when oil prices dropped in the early 1980s. Algeria’s petroleum revenues 
fell by half between 1980 and 1992, and the budgetary deficit reached 13.7% in 
1988 (Nashashibi et al. 1998). The gross national debt ballooned from 19 billion 
dollars in 1980 to around 27 billion in 1988. Meanwhile, the Algerian population 
grew from approximately 18.7 million to 24 million, which corresponds to a very 
rapid growth rate of 3% p.a. Two other statistics can be seen as key indicators of 
the political disaster of the 1990s: the roughly 4.8% annual increase in the urban 
population from 1980 to 1990 and the large share of children under 15, which 
was about 40% of the national population (Nashashibi et al. 1998). This situation 
forced the government to launch austerity programs and budget cuts, including 
slashes to subsidies. Those measures increasingly impoverished the Algerian mid-
dle class and led to riots all across the country, culminating in the events of Octo-
ber 1988. The riots were spawned by the gap between the regime and society, 
but also by an inner split within the regime between the faction of le pouvoir that 
wanted to reform the system and those anti-reformers who wanted merely just to 
change the rules of the game.
The Algerian state class responded to the 1988 revolts with two different strat-
egies for revising the social contract between the middle class and le pouvoir. On 
one hand, the government adopted a policy of privatization and abandoned the 
discredited socialist model. On the other, it launched controlled political reforms 
that paved the way to party pluralism. This development was pioneered by the 
Islamist movement, which founded a party called the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS for short—here and below, I will use the French acronyms for names of par-
ties). The discontent of big swathes of the middle class played out in a growing 
support for political Islam, as seen in the legislative election of December 1991, 
when the FIS attained 47% of the vote and 188 of 430 parliamentary seats. The 
party became not only a mouthpiece for marginalized sectors of society, but also 
a gathering place for middle-class Algerians who feared for their status and felt 
that their progress was being thwarted.
The military reacted to the FIS victory by overthrowing President Bendjedid 
in a January 1992 coup d’état. The ban on FIS, the radicalization of its compo-
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nent groups, and the le pouvoir repression campaign led the country into a civil 
war that would last nearly ten years. The FIS split along sociological lines: the 
marginalized elements, who formed the GIA (Armed Islamic Group), and the 
religious middle classes, who founded the AIS (Islamic Salvation Army). A mer-
ciless war began between various factions. Besides the offshoots that seceded 
from the Islamic groupings, the war also gave rise to assorted resistance groups.
The civil war of the 1990s and the recourse to physical violence enabled the 
state class to restore itself. The regime shed its socialist and anti-capitalist ideol-
ogy and opened up the country economically. On a political level, the state class 
ended the longstanding monopoly of the FLN (National Liberation Front) as the 
civilian face of le pouvoir. The multiparty system increased the number of clus-
ters that the state class could co-opt. Besides the fragmented offspring parties of 
the FLN itself, such as the RND (Democratic National Rally), there were now 
Islamist parties such as the MSP (Movement for the Society of Peace) and secular 
parties such as the RCD (Rally for Culture and Democracy). The 1990s civil war 
permitted a self-re-configuration of the system.
When Bouteflika took power in 1999, sanctified by higher oil prices, the stage 
was set for a new economic elite and a new kind of politics. Under Bouteflika, an 
alliance between the military, the business community, and the political wing of 
le pouvoir turned Algeria into a “neo-Mamluk” state, Gellner’s term for a system 
dominated by an alliance of technocrats, the military, and politicians who are seg-
regated from society by their privileges and caste behaviors (Gellner 1981, p. 64).
From 1999 onward, more than a trillion dollars were spent: not on modern-
izing the economy, but on expanding clientelism networks and reestablishing 
peace. With Bouteflika’s rise to power, thanks to the lucky rise in oil prices on 
the international market, the religious and “trabendist” middle classes completely 
swung towards le pouvoir and became its base of support. The abundance of rent 
enabled a pragmatic alliance between le pouvoir and the religious middle classes. 
Across the import sector, a group of import barons gathered around the president. 
Profiting from the abundance of foreign currency, they flooded the Algerian mar-
ket with consumer goods. Surrounding those barons and benefiting from them, 
a stratum of small- and medium-scale merchants became active in the informal 
and formal sectors. They specialized in reselling imported products at a smaller 
scale. Thus, in addition to the traditional power centers (the army and the secret 
service), a new power center was born, this time around the president and the 
import barons. The country spends around 10 billion dollars per year on imported 
food products alone. The import sector is a lucrative business for certain circles 
close to power and plays a stabilizing role that, in times of high rent, keeps all the 
clans satisfied. According to the national press, 25,000 individuals have a stran-
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glehold on import licenses. In one of his first speeches, President Bouteflika him-
self claimed that 15 men controlled the entire country. In parallel, an important 
informal sector emerged. More than half of Algerian commerce is informal. Alto-
gether, the quantity of small shops and retail establishments more than doubled 
from 2001 to 2010 to reach around 1.5 million.
Thus, a new social contract between the state and society was drawn up that 
generated a new middle class. This middle class is rent-seeking, as before, but it 
has a commercial character; I call it the “trabendist” middle class. “Crony capital-
ism” laid the foundations necessary for an ideological “new deal” between the 
nationalist profiteers of le pouvoir. Unlike the middle classes of the 1970s, who 
acquired their economic status through the labor, housing, and education policies 
of the state-as-provider, the middle classes of the 2000s drew their status from the 
direct and indirect distribution of rent, through commerce and public programs 
such as the youth employment agency. Ideologically, the middle classes of the 
1970s took nationalist stances—a nationalism at times tinged with Pan-Arabism, 
or else Baathism—and were both pro-modernization and pro-development. Start-
ing in the 2000s, the Algerian middle classes went through an interesting ideolog-
ical mutation. On the one hand, there was a notable re-Islamization of day-to-day 
practices in a form clearly distinguishable from the traditional Islam as practiced 
by the previous generation. On the other, there was a rise in individualism and 
forms of consumption that mimicked Western styles.
This “trabendist” and profiteering middle class became an important 
actor in le pouvoir, forging a Trabendo-military-civil alliance in place of the 
 military-technocratic-administrative coalition of the’70 s. “Bouteflikism” 
(Ouaissa 2019a) denotes the initiation of a brand of Trabendo capitalism based on 
imports. The ideologies of development and socio-Baathism were replaced with a 
new ideological cocktail. Bouteflikism brought Islamo-Baathists, nationalists, and 
secular Berbers under the same big tent. It is a patchwork ideology, tailored to 
neoliberalism but combining modernists and conservatives. Henceforth, the presi-
dential coalition incorporates parties with mutually exclusive ideologies, such as 
the FLN, the RND, the Islamist TAJ (Rally of the Hope of Algeria), and the secu-
lar MPA (Popular Algerian Movement).
Besides erecting that civilian façade, President Bouteflika struck a wise peace 
deal with the institution of the military. By accepting his offer of greater finan-
cial autonomy, the army was overshadowed by politics. However, the budget of 
the Defense Ministry has seen astronomical increases since Bouteflika’s rise to 
power. The 2019 national budget allocated 12 billion dollars to the army: some 
320% more than in the year 2000. Military spending now comprises nearly a 
quarter of the national budget. According to a 2016 ranking by the Stockholm 
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International Peace Research Institute, based on its military spending, Algeria is 
the seventeenth strongest military power in the world and the strongest in Africa 
(Ouaissa 2019b). As such, the Algerian army is one of the institutions that ben-
efits most from rent on natural gas and oil. According to the French Centre de 
Ressources et d’Information sur l’Intelligence Économique et Stratégique, the 
Algerian army massively invests its resources in the development of its defense 
industry (Carol 2018).
Since mid-2014, the price of oil has fallen precipitously, and Algeria is now 
living through a moment comparable to 1988. Rent from oil is no longer enough 
to co-opt the deadlocked middle classes, nor can it buy the loyalty of different 
segments of society. The middle classes are witnessing a slow drop in their liv-
ing standards. They reject the neoliberal ideology, as it only widened the gap 
that divides the richest stratum from the middle and lowest strata of society. 
Once again, the cohesion between the clans in le pouvoir is falling apart. In 
the absence of a shared political ideology, rent is the only common denomina-
tor among the clans of the state class. Since February 2019, a recomposition and 
 re-configuration of the structure of the clans of le pouvoir has been underway 
(Ouaissa 2020). And as it has in every rentier crisis, the army has taken control 
of the political system; its staff has been the political decision-making body ever 
since the coup that overthrew President Bouteflika on April 2, 2019. As in the late 
1980s, the middle classes are turning their backs on le pouvoir; they have become 
the driving force behind the Hirak protest movement.
The interim president, under orders from the military arm of le pouvoir, is 
attempting to simulate a transition. In fact, it is merely a re-configuration of the 
state class. Yet this time the prospect of re-configuring the system seems trickier 
because the middle classes of Hirak are determined to push through a real transi-
tion.
Hirak: A New Kind of Protest Movement
Hirak is a new, atypical kind of social movement that defies traditional theories 
of social movements (Volpi 2019). Over a few months of protests, Hirak over-
turned not only the political order of state and society as established after 1962, 
but also the structure of the clans in le pouvoir. What is more, Hirak successfully 
rewrote Algerian society’s collective memory to establish itself as a precursor of 
a new society to come. Hirak has provoked what Frantz Fanon termed a “double 
rupture” (Fanon 2002). In the first rupture, Algerians reject the hatred and distrust 
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that le pouvoir had sown among them. In the second, they redirect that hatred 
against le pouvoir itself.
Unlike the base of the previous protest movement during the 1980s, which 
mostly consisted of culturally and economically marginalized groups such as 
the “hittists”2 and “trabendists,”3 Hirak’s base is made up of middle-class people 
whose progress had been deadlocked. The actors involved in the movement are 
linked to the modes of consumption prevalent among the middle strata of society, 
although this position is more subjective than socioeconomic: by all accounts, the 
protesters are economically unstable. Thus, the Algerian middle classes seem to 
be wedged into the space between precarity and individualistic trends (Estanque 
2015). The middle classes can be broken down into three identifiable segments: 
the new middle class, generally employed in nonproductive sectors of the econ-
omy; relics of the old middle class (farmers, traders, artisan producers, public 
sector employees); and a “peripheral” population composed of people with little 
involvement in the labor market (students, homemakers, and retirees).
Characterized by spontaneity and its lack of structure, this movement has 
managed to bypass the authoritarian regime’s attempts at security measures, 
manipulation, infiltration, and co-option. Distinguishing itself from conven-
tional protest movements that are organized by opposition political parties and 
organizations, Hirak put the regime on the defensive. Moreover, the political elite 
was unable to regain legitimacy by organizing elections because the movement 
sweepingly rejects the whole system and all its past practices, including the elec-
toral system. The movement represents a form of collective action, and its reper-
toire of novel protest methods (songs, poetry, street theater, dance, and humor) 
paves the way for a flourishing of individual creativity and the popular genius. 
The middle-class movement frames problems in terms of values, reflecting the 
cultural context of its adherents. Unlike the movement of October 1988, whose 
actors were guided by dreams of personal advancement and confronted le pou-
voir head-on, Hirak embodies goals and categories of actions stemming from 
middle-class culture, imbued with a certain professionalism. Though dominated 
by the middle classes, the movement is pursuing objectives that are more univer-
sal and global and transcend class boundaries. This reflects values associated with 
 middle-class culture and education levels.
Unlike traditional social movements, Hirak’s cohesion does not rest on serving 
individual interests. The group is rooted in a collective identity that cuts across 
specific ethnic, religious, or regional affiliations. Hirak recreates Algerianness 
in its diversity and all its historical dimensions. In reclaiming historical figures 
from the war of independence, in depoliticizing religion, and in proclaiming the 
Amazigh identity of the Algerian people across the country, the movement strips 
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le pouvoir of the narratives that once legitimized its authoritarian rule for a long 
time. Hirak has endowed Algerian society with a national identity that is the 
outcome of change, negotiation, and communication among citizens. Collective 
action and shared experiences are constructing a new consciousness. As an inher-
ently anti-establishment and anti-hegemonic social movement, Hirak is fight-
ing not only to take back the material structure of production, but also to wrest 
control over socioeconomic development. In other words, it is seeking to reclaim 
individuals’ day-to-day control over their time, space, and relationships (Melucci 
1982, p. 219). Unlike the agendas of older movements that have existed in Alge-
ria since 1962, Hirak’s stated objectives cross class and regional lines.
Spontaneity lends autonomy and flexibility to the actors of Hirak, making 
it hard for le pouvoir to exert its habitual mechanisms of control or to measure 
the true force of the movement. The movement is decentralized, with neither a 
declared leadership nor a declared ideology, so that each citizen, across social 
networks, feels a personal sense of responsibility and concern. Participation is not 
tied to a centralized hierarchy. This explains the maturing self-image of the Alge-
rian people and its rejection of Zaimist (elitist) culture. The movement’s fluidity 
enables anyone to take part, to introduce themselves, or to propose slogans. At the 
same time, this spontaneity fits into weekly rituals that close out the Friday and 
Tuesday marches: ululations, the sounds of the mahraz (mortars and pestles),4 
and “casserole”5 sessions on Thursday evenings. This is “ritualized spontane-
ity,” formalized mass responses to the week’s events or to decisions by le pou-
voir. Hirak has inaugurated a new form of political dialogue between le pouvoir 
and the protesting masses: a dialogue across different spaces that is reminiscent 
of Frantz Fanon’s topology of the colonial city,6 built around a spatial and psy-
chological binary. Since February 2019, Algeria has been a compartmentalized 
realm, bisected into two different living spaces— the world of the incumbent 
pouvoir and the world of the people—which follow different logic and hold dif-
ferent visions of Algeria. Neither of these two worlds knows or recognizes the 
other: le pouvoir in their barracks and palaces, “the people” in their streets and 
public spaces. The institutions of the state are pitted against the will of the people 
and against the fulfillment of that will. The parliament, conceived to represent the 
people, absurdly keeps out of the conflict. The army, having missed the oppor-
tunity to play a nobler role, cut its umbilical cord to the people with the actions 
of its late leader. The president, who is nothing but a figurehead of the system’s 
continuity, emerged out of the surrealism of a theatrical election. Faced with this 
political backwardness, Hirak is attempting to reconstruct the society it desires: a 
society built on tolerance, justice, and modernity.
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Endnotes
1. Designates informal economic activities und black market goods in Algeria.
2. The term “hittists,” whose literal Arabic etymology means “those with their 
back against the wall,” refers to unemployed teenagers clustered along an 
alleyway: marginalized youth.
3. This word designates social actors with professional qualifications who, seek-
ing a share of the rent, rebel against the state—which is no longer capable of 
co-opting them—and turn to the informal sector instead.
4. A mortar and pestle are used to crush a substance into a paste or a powder. 
During the French colonial period, Algerian women used them to symbolize 
their solidarity with Algerian prisoners.
5. A cacerolazo, or casserole, is a form of noisy protest popular in Venezuela, 
Chile, Argentina, and Catalonia and practiced predominantly by the middle 
class. This form of demonstration also drew international attention during the 
last major economic crisis in Argentina. The name comes from the Spanish 
word cacerola, meaning stew pot, because a key element of these demonstra-
tions is making noise using pots and pans. The message is often that “the pots 
are empty”: there is nothing to eat. This form of protest can be traced back to 
the discontent of middle-class Chilean women under the socialist administra-
tion of Salvador Allende, when it was used in protest against food shortages 
and the ensuing rationing.
6. Frantz Fanon: Les damnés de la terre, p. 70.
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The International and the Construction 
of Opposition in Iran
Thorsten Bonacker and Tareq Sydiq
Iran has a long and storied tradition of protest and revolution. This tradition has 
been characterized by a range of diverse oppositional activities. The “Tobacco 
Protests” of the late nineteenth century, for example, brought together a success-
ful alliance of clergy and bazaaris against the state (Moaddel 1994). Similarly, 
the beginning of the twentieth century saw a mobilization of socialist, femi-
nist, and ethno-political groups as well as regionalist and nationalist politicians 
(Cronin 2007; Najmabadi 2007; Sharifi 2013; Atabaki 2003). The 1979 Iranian 
revolution once again brought the diversity of these opposition forces to the sur-
face when a diverse alliance, united in its desire to see the end of the regime, 
proved capable of overthrowing the Shah (Foran 1994; Kurzman 2004). During 
the first years after the revolution, this oppositional diversity was reproduced 
within the political elite. This soon became a problem for the new rulers, and 
groups that differed from the new state ideology were quickly persecuted and 
marginalized (Schirazi 1998).
Nevertheless, the Iranian political elite continues to be characterized by plural-
ism, as do opposition groups beyond state institutions. Successive waves of protest 
since the 1990s have revealed myriad oppositional positions. These target a diverse 
range of issues, including socio-economic problems, the liberalization of public 
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morality, or enhanced rights for minorities. The Arab Spring witnessed an equally 
diverse array of groupings unified by aversion to autocratic governments, even if 
this diversity did not necessarily lead to the overthrow of the president, as was the 
case in Tunisia and Egypt. Collective protest of this kind has been described as 
a paradigm of contentious politics. Since the end of the Cold War, autocracies in 
eastern and south-eastern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Africa have not 
been spared from these “waves of popular discontent” (Gerges 2015, p. 10).
With good reason, political and regional research in this area has traditionally 
shown a particular interest in the dynamics of regime change. However, the initial 
euphoria for democratization and regime change has given way to an interest in 
the resilience of autocracies and the re-configuration of patterns of domination 
(Carothers 2002). At the same time, there has been an appreciable increase in the 
number of studies dealing with the diversity of political opposition (Harders and 
König 2013). For some time, political opposition in autocracies was considered 
a marginal phenomenon. Since the 2000s, however, a growing body of schol-
arship has highlighted the role of opposition forces in autocracies. As before, 
there has been a particular focus on questions around democratic transition and 
political organizations, such as parties, civil society groups, and social move-
ments. This has resulted in the development of new terminology, such as the term 
 “non-movement” (Bayat 2013), along with the extension of existing civil-society 
terminology far beyond its original scope (Aarts and Cavatorta 2013).
In autocracies, however, opposition can involve a broad range of different 
actors, forms, and issues. It can be linked to various demands: for greater political 
and social participation, for changes in the corridors of power, or for constitu-
tional reforms. However, none of this necessarily has to follow the assumed logic 
of a democratic transition characterized by greater inclusion and comprehensive 
participation. Such developments could well proceed according to a rhetoric of 
exclusion or aggressive nationalism. They may even be embedded in clientelist 
or nepotistic patterns of social relationships. Likewise, the forms of opposition 
vary. They may range from parliamentary activity to civic engagement to pub-
lic or virtual forms of protest. But they might also include private and everyday 
forms of opposition that are not necessarily limited to what is publicly visible and 
articulated.
Obviously, depending on its context in an autocracy or democracy, political 
opposition follows different rules, is subject to different conditions, and has a dif-
ferent function for the regimes in power. All the more intriguing, then, are the 
manifold ways of constructing opposition in autocracies. So far, this has received 
little scholarly attention, especially from a conceptual point of view. This article 
therefore focuses on the construction of opposition by political actors. How is a 
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critical attitude toward the regime explained? How are demands for reform jus-
tified? On what basis does a person identify as “oppositional”? As these ques-
tions indicate, we are not as concerned here with the institutional role of political 
opposition in a given system or the role played by this opposition in systematic 
change. Instead, we are interested in how actors mark their oppositionality and 
construct it as a social identity. This does not necessarily happen in public—that 
is, in the context of contentious politics. Indeed, it often occurs in everyday inter-
actions that take place at the fringes of, or even beyond, the public spaces con-
trolled by the autocracy. This is precisely the focus of our chapter. In particular, 
we place a special emphasis on internationalism as a symbolic resource for the 
construction of opposition. To date, this element has generally been neglected in 
research.
Overall, then, this essay aims to outline a conceptual perspective on the 
comparative exploration of social and discursive constructions of opposition in 
autocracies, emphasizing the role of everyday interactions in this process. The 
next section looks to anchor our perspective in the existing body of contempo-
rary autocracy research. We will then develop the thesis that the development of 
opposition is in no small part due to externalization—that is, to different refer-
ences to the “international” real. Next, we will distinguish between three types 
of international reference points that can be used to mark opposition. We use the 
example of Iran in order to illustrate these international reference points for the 
construction of oppositionality. This case study is based on research conducted as 
part of a dissertation project on everyday politics and participatory mechanisms in 
autocracies. Data was collected during three research visits in 2017 and 2018 in 
the form of participant observations, field notes, and semi-structured interviews. 
Additionally, impromptu drawings and maps were employed to complement 
field notes where appropriate. Our research interest in everyday interactions and 
private or semi-public discourses resulted in a focus on participant observation 
in particular, as well as an embeddedness of the researcher in the context being 
researched, because they allowed for field access based on trust and interpersonal 
relations. This paper employs data collected during that research in order to illus-
trate dynamics of opposition construction.
Opposition in Autocracies
Opposition cannot be taken for granted in any political system. It is by nature 
relative: “opposition can only be spoken about in the context of distinctions. An 
opposition differs from what it opposes” (Luhmann 1989, p. 13). Opposition is 
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thus a socially constructed form of political communication. It is distinguished 
by whether it aligns with the government’s position or, in fact, sees itself as an 
alternative to that position. As Luhmann suggests, this simple coding of politi-
cal communication allows for a very high degree of complexity and diversity. It 
also gives rise to some particularly interesting questions. How is opposition con-
structed in the context of political discourse? How do actors situate their identity 
in this context, while modifying that identity on a case-by-case basis? Clearly, 
oppositionality is by no means a fixed subjective position. It is established by and 
updated in the course of continuous political communication, and it is closely 
connected with the idea of political alternatives.
Formal and informal rules about the distinction between government and 
opposition differ according to the political system. For autocracies, Albrecht has 
stated that opposition can be understood as a “political institution with decisive 
organizational capacities whose interactions with the regime are of a competi-
tive nature, yet are based on a minimum degree of mutual acceptance” (Albre-
cht 2005, p. 379). However, this definition applies only to an authorized and in 
some ways already incorporated form of opposition, which sometimes can also 
be  co-opted by the government (Buckles 2019). From a broader perspective, how-
ever, it is possible to distinguish between different levels of opposition based on 
what they advocate, from reform to a change of government to a systemic change.
The political science of autocracy research has repeatedly pointed to the vari-
ety of institutionalized and informal forms of opposition in non-democratic sys-
tems. This applies in particular to the variant of competitive authoritarianism. In 
such a system, elections play an important role in the legitimation of political rule 
and the co-option of political elites (Levitsky and Way 2002). To be sure, demo-
cratic institutions are circumscribed or damaged in electoral or competitive autoc-
racies. But these institutions must still be taken seriously by incumbents if they 
wish to avoid a crisis of legitimacy (Burnell 2006).
Iran’s political system is this type of competitive autocracy. Elections are cen-
tral to the legitimacy of the regime, and they are anchored in the constitution, 
even though the conditions governing them were altered in the regime’s favor 
after the revolution (Schirazi 1998). Moreover, elections in Iran provide an instru-
ment for subsuming various political currents within the system in a way that 
contributes to the stabilization of that system. “The factional characteristic of the 
Iranian party system is of more relevance to the electoral process, as the results 
can balance the power struggle toward more ‘reformist,’ ‘conservative,’ ‘radical,’ 
or ‘pragmatic’ factions in legislative, presidential, or Assembly of Experts elec-
tions” (Zaccara 2014, p. 158).
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In recent research on autocracies, there has been a general shift towards ana-
lyzing how such regimes legitimize themselves. The period from the 1990s to the 
early 2000s was dominated by a paradigm of transition. However, the obvious 
consolidation of central elements of authoritarian rule in the years after the Cold 
War gave rise to a new question: how was it possible for authoritarian regimes to 
secure legitimacy? This body of scholarship has been mirrored by other studies 
emphasizing the oppositional role of civil society and activist groups in autocra-
cies. As Lewis (2013) has shown, their significance is apparent not least in their 
capacity to produce “counter-hegemonic” and alternative narratives that chal-
lenge the regime’s legitimacy. In this context, research has also focused on spheres 
beyond official politics, such as “shadow markets” (Dukalkskis and Gerschewski 
2017; Joo 2014) or sites of cultural and literary production (Elseewi 2011). Mean-
while, works such as those by Scott (1990) or Bayat (1997) have shown that, in 
autocracies, opposition in the sense of resistance often occurs beyond the public 
sphere, taking both private and informal forms (Vinthagen and Johansson 2013).
There thus exists a gamut of studies on everyday politics in autocracies and 
on the role of counter-discourses that explore actors’ maneuvering room beyond 
formal channels of communication. But this body of scholarship raises numerous 
questions around how oppositionality in autocracies is constructed in practice. 
Lewis (2013), for example, speaks of strategies of “re-imagination”—the opposi-
tional process of re-articulating particular narratives. This opens up alternatives to 
official definitions of problems and the associated policies promulgated in order 
to tackle them. In effect, these are the kinds of discursive practices that produce 
opposition to the incumbent regime. Such practices are associated with demands 
for reform. These demands may be more extensive or less so, and they may be 
linked to very different political—and indeed, anti-democratic—positions.
Below, we present a conceptual proposal that focuses on a particular form of 
discursive practice for the construction of political opposition, which consists of 
making reference to an external, international environment. This international 
dimension— “the International”—is invoked in order to articulate demands for 
reform, to frame political alternatives, and thus to mark an oppositional stance. 
Undoubtedly, constructions of political opposition frequently—perhaps even 
primarily—draw their discursive repertoire from national discursive traditions. 
Indeed, they are to some extent compelled to do so in order to resonate with a 
domestic audience. Yet they also refer extensively to the international realm in 
order to establish opposition within a national political context. In this respect, 
the International acts as a framework for interpretation and discourse. It serves to 
render more contemporary the distinction between government and opposition in 
a national context.
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The International and the Construction of Political 
Opposition
Of course, autocracies are generally characterized by regulation of and restric-
tions on political communication. Nonetheless, except for in extreme cases, 
autocracies are not closed political spaces in which politics draws exclusively on 
narrowly national discourses. In fact, both autocratic governments and the opposi-
tions that confront them use external sources in order to articulate their political 
programs and positions. They do so within the prevailing conditions of a global 
political system (Albert 2016). To some extent, such governments are required 
to invoke such reference points if they wish to avoid the risk of a crisis of legiti-
macy. Indeed, precisely those states that have arisen out of or are based on a nar-
rative of anti-colonial mobilization frequently anchor their claim to legitimacy in 
an international dimension. In such cases, the goal of a better state and social life 
is often based on an international comparison.
Yet an opposition can also legitimize its reform proposals, and its criticism of 
the government, by pointing out domestic divergences from international stand-
ards. This comparison can focus both on wealthy states and on countries in a sim-
ilar stage of development. The international dimension thus serves as a symbolic 
resource for justifying political positioning in the domestic domain. Of course, 
this can happen in many different ways. In autocracies, the degree of asymmetry, 
in terms of a particular actor’s ability to publicly promote certain political posi-
tions, is variable.
The apt term “externalization” has been used by Schriewer in the context of 
his research on the diffusion of education policies. Externalization relates to the 
fact that domestic policies use international references in order to formulate and 
justify the demands for reform that underpin them. The International thus serves 
as a reservoir for generating political positions in the national context. A typical 
example of this can be seen in reform programs and demands in education pol-
icy. In this realm, political actors often refer to international standards in order 
to legitimate and implement their reforms. Such references to an external inter-
national environment are “expected to serve as ‘lessons’, to provide ‘stimulative 
ideas’ and ‘new impetus to policy definition,’ or to outline a ‘frame reference’ for 
the specification of reform options” (Schriewer 2008, p. 97).
It seems reasonable to assume that there is a partly structural need to external-
ize policy in this way, especially in competitive and electoral autocracies. It is 
precisely this need which creates an opportunity for the government, but above 
all for the opposition, to legitimize and even to articular their political ideas. Both 
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oppositional and loyalist forces define themselves not only in national, but also in 
international, contexts: as anti-authoritarian, modernist, ecological,  anti-globalist 
or feminist actors. Moreover, there exist limited international forces, such as 
cross-border ethno-nationalist or religious actors. The International is therefore 
not necessarily constructed and imagined in a uniform manner. These processes 
undoubtedly transpire in unique national environments traversed by particular 
government and opposition forces, which will be highly selective in their invo-
cation of the International, endeavoring always to reflect national political dis-
courses (Kluczewska 2019). The purpose of externalization, however, is primarily 
to avert legitimacy crises, or to gain legitimacy by invoking the International in 
the context of national political conflicts (2004, p. 204).
In summary, references to an international environment serve to establish 
oppositionality in several key respects. Above all, they legitimize demands for 
reform, whether limited or more far-reaching. In so doing, they facilitate the con-
struction of an opposition to the government by formulating political alternatives 
that can be deemed both nationally and internationally acceptable. In the next 
section, we will draw on the relevant literature in international relations and trans-
national policy diffusion in order to distinguish three modes of externalization. 
These modes are used to construct opposition in the light of different “reference 
horizons” (Schriewer and Martinez 2004, p. 32) of the International.
The International as a “Generalized Standpoint” 
and Provider of Norms
The socio-constructivist literature of international relations has furnished us with 
the argument that states acquire and develop their identity, at least in part, through 
socialization (Finnemore 1993). For international relations, Mead’s sociologi-
cal perspective (1934) is adopted here. Mead argued that identity is developed 
through the engagement with significant others who convey norms of appropriate 
behavior. In this respect, the International appears as a normative referent hori-
zon for actors to draw on in order to develop their identity and related political 
positions through the internalization of internationally institutionalized norms. It 
is well known, especially from human rights research, that this applies not only 
to states, but also to social actors. These actors behave as “norm entrepreneurs” 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998).
Oppositionality can thus be constructed by externalizing international norms 
that serve as the basis for a negative assessment of national governance. Clas-
sic examples of this include human-rights-based demands for political reform, but 
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they also include demands that extend to the fulfilment of international standards 
in different policy fields, such as education or health. In this context, the Inter-
national acts as an external “generalized standpoint” (Mead 1934, p. 138) from 
which reform demands appear legitimate. For example, the Khatami govern-
ment’s (1997–2005) conception of civil society was characterized by the norm 
that such a phenomenon is accompanied by political liberalization and demo-
cratic opposition. However, the promotion of such an ideal was brought to a halt 
after it turned out to be too regime-critical (Rivetti and Cavatorta 2013).
The Revolution of 1978 marked a turning point in Iranian politics. In the 
revolution’s immediate aftermath, various models of collective living were heat-
edly discussed and differentiated (Schirazi 1998). Democracy, democratization, 
modernization, and social justice remained hot topics long after the consolida-
tion of the Islamic Republic, even as discussion of more fundamental change was 
increasingly eliminated from the formal system and relegated to oppositional cir-
cles within civil society. The promotion of democratization through the strength-
ening of civil society became a concrete policy goal for loosely organized, 
intellectual oppositional circles. The prospect that this might develop into a more 
formal opposition to Khatami was one practicable strategy for keeping democ-
ratization systemically relevant even though it was a largely discredited political 
issue.
One of the main reasons for the success of this strategy was the broader estab-
lishment of a civil society in favor of democratic processes as an international 
norm. This was agreed upon by both moderate informal oppositional groups and 
by the reformist, institutionalized opposition (Rivetti and Cavatorta 2013). Both 
the formal and the informal opposition invoked international norms in order to 
articulate and legitimize their political goals. The formal opposition hoped to 
mobilize large groups of voters through such international legitimacy. Conversely, 
the informal opposition appealed to international norms in order to circumvent 
government attempts to delegitimize them.
However, the Iranian opposition was riven with profound disagreements over 
the envisioned nature of their reformed society. The opposition encompassed sec-
ular atheists and radical Islamists, pro-market capitalists and communists alike. 
Some looked to a reformed Islamic republic, others to a re-establishment of the 
Shah dictatorship, and still others to the establishment of a  Western-oriented 
democracy. Within this normative melting pot, international norms offered a 
possibility for formulating content-related goals beyond ideological differences. 
Moreover, by referring to such “established” international norms, it seemed pos-
sible to avoid small-scale and ostensibly trivial discussions over details.
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The International as a Space of Belonging
In the case described above, oppositionality relates to a generalized reference 
horizon. But the difference-constructivist literature of international relations has 
also mapped out an alternative mode of identity construction. According to this 
literature, identity does not come about through identification with a general-
ized other. Instead, identity is constructed through the “discursive necessities that 
make identity dependent on difference” (Rumelili 2004, p. 33). What this means 
is that identity results from the construction of an otherness defined in negative 
terms.
Said (1978), for example, pointed out that stereotypes of the “Orient” have 
historically been essential to the construction of Western identity. The Orient 
serves as the cultural Other for the enlightened, liberal societies of the West. For 
the construction of European identities, the significance of a discursive juxtapo-
sition of geopolitically or culturally defined outgroups has often been empha-
sized. Such outgroups might include the “East,” “Islam” or even “America” (Diez 
2004). Moreover, research on collective enemies has shown that identity can be 
based on the devaluation and securitization of others (Hansen 2006; Hagström 
2015).
The International appears in this context as a reference horizon for the con-
struction of specific, often transnational, “imagined communities” (Anderson 
2006). Oppositionality can be built up through acts of identification with such 
imagined communities as opposed to the state’s hegemonic identity construc-
tions. This gives rise to cultural conflicts over the symbolic definition of national 
unity and belonging. These often play out between culturally defined groups, and 
between majority and minority groups.
A typical example of this are transnational religious communities. The narra-
tives of such communities provide a source for opposing the state’s hegemonic 
identity constructions. In Iran, such internationally informed constructions of 
identity often intermingle with ethno-national constructions to form oppositional 
identities. A clear example comes in the form of Sunni opposition to the predomi-
nantly Shia state. This is incorporated into Arab, as well as Kurdish and Afghan 
political identities. Indeed, such oppositional identities can be actively promoted 
by external patronage states. This is particularly the case if such identities are 
constructed through a sense of belonging to external collectives, and if these 
external imaginative spaces come to replace the formal state as the central point 
of reference. Consequently, demands for a re-imagination of the state are charac-
teristic of such oppositional identities, as are demands for autonomy or secession.
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In conversations with Iranians, frequent references are made to Iranian peculi-
arities and to Iran’s similarity with Western states. Phrases such as “Iran used to 
be like France” are commonly heard in taxis, for example (Field Notes).
A sense of connection to France or Germany is common among those Irani-
ans who have lived there or have family members who migrated there. Indeed, 
remittances from these émigré Iranians often stabilize the socio-economic status 
of those family members who remained in Iran. As such, the social background 
of the speaker comes into play, as those with access to international travel and 
family networks are disproportionally better off socio-economically. At this point, 
a differentiation of the international reference horizon is already apparent. Some 
of those Iranians we spoke with made concrete references to their own (interna-
tional) family history; to a sister in the US or an uncle in Sweden, for example 
(e.g. female student, September 4, 2017; male student, March 16, 2018). Such 
linkages seemed to enable explicit political comparisons, with the aforementioned 
countries serving as concrete points of reference.
However, in cases where a personal relationship to a specific country became 
more remote or non-existent, the political comparison was correspondingly more 
abstract. Instead of the Swedish social system, for example, “Western culture” 
served as a node of comparison. In a loyalist narrative, such references served 
to accentuate Iranian peculiarities (and thus the impossibility of implement-
ing “Western” policies). Conversely, in a dissident narrative, “Western culture” 
became a basis for drawing similarities with Iran, and thus for identifying politi-
cal goals.
Equally striking among those Iranians we conversed with was the evident lack 
of personal and discursive reference to neighboring countries. To be sure, those 
who had made pilgrimages to or had family links with Iraq made comparisons to 
it. Similarly, Afghanistan served as a notable benchmark, partly due to the pres-
ence of Afghan refugees, as well as the researcher’s own Afghan roots, which 
prompted questions and guided conversations towards Afghani comparisons. 
However, Central Asian countries, or peripheral regions of the Near and Middle 
East, were rarely mentioned or scarcely present in conversations.
These communicative processes are more complex at Iran’s periphery, where 
membership in the Iranian state is not necessarily a settled political issue. Ideal 
reference spaces can take the form of national and international communities, 
neighboring states, or other non-state communities. At the peripheries, distance 
from and affiliation to the nation-state is used to develop and articulate agency 
within a locally defined identity. This creates much more striking lines of conflict 
than in Teheran.
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For example, a basic conflict confronts the Kurdish communist who is in 
favor of centrally organized schooling, but at the same time approves of greater 
regional autonomy. This conflict can be resolved by referring to Iraqi Northern 
Kurdistan and the political model which prevails there. The availability of media, 
such as PKK/YPG television broadcasters, promotes such affiliations with neigh-
boring countries. In such settings, then, oppositionality becomes multi-scalar and 
addresses the abstract nation-state through a local or trans-regional (e.g. Kurd-
ish) identity. Meanwhile, it is also directed against local rulers who are consid-
ered excessively nationalistic or reactionary. There are the places where European 
political practices, or practices in a neighboring country, are most often invoked.
The International as a Comparative Horizon
A third reference horizon of the International is the focus of discussion in the lit-
erature on policy diffusion. As we have seen, the first such horizon presents the 
international as a kind of universalized empty canvas on which the internal social 
construction of opposition is projected. The second, meanwhile, takes specific 
international or transnational affiliations as the point of departure for opposition. 
The third, however, concerns itself with inter-societal comparisons.
As early as the 1960s, Bendix (1967) pointed out that the implementation of 
modernizing policies was closely linked to the fact that, since the nineteenth cen-
tury, industrialized societies such as France and Britain have served as “reference 
societies,” in Europe and across the world. In essence, these were examples to 
be followed. According to Bendix, in certain societies, such international com-
parisons gave rise to a perception of local backwardness. Consequently, the pol-
icies of the reference societies were increasingly adopted in order to achieve a 
similarly successful outcome. As a result, Bendix argued, this frequently led to 
externally induced social change in the “follower societies”: “However, once the 
two eighteenth century revolutions had occurred, subsequent social changes were 
characterized by a precipitous increase in the speed and intensity of communi-
cation. Ideas and techniques have passed from ‘advanced’ to ‘follower’ societies 
…. Within a relatively short historical period there are few societies which have 
remained immune from these external impact upon their social structures” (Ben-
dix 1967, p. 331).
Reference societies thus provide other societies with role models for for-
mulating domestic political objectives and appropriate measures. Research on 
policy transfer has adopted his idea. Scholars working in this area have shown 
that the adaptation of policies in particular societies can be explained with refer-
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ence to their role models. But determining which societies function as reference 
societies requires taking many societal and cultural factors into consideration. 
 Cross-border, seasonal migratory movements in the Caucasus, for example, 
caused particular groups in Iran (especially in the northwest) to be especially 
influenced by Russia—first the Tsarist Empire, then the Soviet Union. However, 
these influences diminished significantly after the establishment of Iran’s national 
borders (Atabaki 2003).
Schriewer and Martinez (2004) have pointed out that, in the context of social 
change, the models of reference societies can lose their plausibility and give 
way to processes of reorientation whereby new role models are established. In 
the follower societies, references to such external models can underpin the artic-
ulation of reform demands and alternatives to the status quo across a range of 
 socio-political fields. This applies both to the government, which can orient its 
policies toward such models, and to the opposition, which uses such comparisons 
to plausibly legitimate its calls for reform. Such comparisons frequently point to 
the perceived “success” of the reference societies.
In this respect, the otherness of the reference societies serves as an attrac-
tive reference point for the construction of opposition. The perceived political, 
cultural, or economic superiority of the reference society is used to construct 
opposition to a regime that appears woefully backward by comparison. And it is 
precisely the open and subjective nature of such perceptions that allows the oppo-
sition to draw on the reference society in order to formulate supposedly objec-
tive policies which are in fact riddled with preconceptions and assumptions. One 
of the earliest examples of this phenomenon was the Nahḍa cultural movement, 
which translated an often distorted image of European societies and European 
modernity into its own agendas and demands (Kurzman 2002; Kassab 2010).
However, such references need not be detailed or realistic. In fact, the invoca-
tion of reference societies as a comparative horizon for one’s own political goals 
positively invites the idealization of these same societies. This can be with respect 
to, for example, the reference society’s true economic power or the capacities of 
the state. In recent years, this tendency has been buttressed by the ostentatious 
display of luxurious lifestyles in social media. A few snapshots of a life in Los 
Angeles uploaded to Instagram are not infrequently taken as somehow represent-
ative of life in “the West.” But when such images originate from the “Rich Kids 
of Tehran,” they generate not exaltation but disapproval over their displays of 
conspicuous luxury.1 Iranians from beyond elite circles perceive this as offensive 
and unfair (Faghihi 2018). Yet little is changed with respect to the fundamental 
perception of the reference society.
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The otherness of reference societies is thus of considerable utility for opposi-
tional constructions. Furthermore, however, especially radical opposition can be 
based on especially radical reference societies. The painting of an Israeli flag on a 
Tehran street was one such reference to an Other that is perceived as radically dif-
ferent. One actively reformist Iranian woman we conversed with remarked to me 
that she knew some especially radical (and thus, in her opinion, dubious) Iranians 
who exalted Israel as the most radical alternative to the existing regime. Members 
of these circles would hope to see a bloody overthrow of the Iranian regime, com-
plete with “the hanging of the clergy,” prompting a positive view of the USA as a 
possible interventionist power (female activist, March 17, 2018).
However, it is not only a reference society’s difference that is relevant; its per-
ceived “progressiveness” is also highly significant. Arab reference spaces hardly 
exist here. This is despite the fact that, as neighboring societies with historical, 
ethnic, and religious overlaps, Arab states positively invite comparison with Iran. 
In the West, such parallels are indeed drawn within the parameters of Middle 
Eastern Studies. But in Iran itself, such comparisons are marginal. Similarly, Cen-
tral Asia provides yet another obvious ethnic and religious point of comparison. 
Yet hardly any of the Iranians we spoke with referred to this region. In fact, the 
mere mention of it tended to provoke surprise or indifference.
I discussed this later with some left-wing students at the University of Tehran. 
According to them, the “Sunni world” is taken into consideration only as a kind 
of supplicant (students, October 30, 2017). Otherwise, it hardly plays a role as a 
point of reference—in contrast to Western states. A telling example comes in the 
form of a reference to Turkey made by a family from the southwest of Iran whom 
we spoke to. They all agreed that they had once looked down upon Turkey, but 
that this was gradually changing because Turkey has become more progressive, 
more “European” (family conversation, March 8, 2018). In fact, the decisive fac-
tor here was not Turkey as an independent reference point, but the alleged prox-
imity to a much more important reference point: Europe.
Summary
In autocracies, oppositionality can be constructed in various ways. Using the 
example of Iran, we have tried to show that international relations play an impor-
tant role in allowing opponents of the regime to construct themselves as “oppo-
sitional” without resorting to institutionally prescribed mechanisms. A domestic 
context of acute authoritarianism provides few resources for the construction of 
opposition. In such circumstances, the International seems particularly important. 
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Against this backdrop, we have distinguished three reference horizons that can be 
used by opponents in order to differentiate themselves from the regime in their 
communication. These include the construction of affiliations, references to inter-
national standards, and comparison with reference societies whose model they 
want to follow. Furthermore, these reference horizons are actualized via differ-
ing international communities and reference societies, with perceived proximity, 
progressiveness and otherness influencing who makes use of them and how. To 
what extent this translates into differences of program and practice, and whether 
the chosen points of reference impact these political programs, remains subject to 
future research.
In autocracies, these processes especially play out in everyday situations, 
beyond the realms of official political discourse. In this respect, the International 
provides symbolic resources for the articulation of reform demands not only 
within but beyond public space, in private or semi-public discourses. Research 
on opposition in autocracies has generally focused on conspicuous and spectacu-
lar examples of opposition, or on its integrative and stabilizing role. However, an 
exploration of the everyday construction of opposition is equally important for 
grasping the political dynamics of autocracies beyond the more glaring questions 
of regime change or regime consolidation. The article has attempted to outline a 
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Tangier’s Current Re-Configurations 
from a Multi-Scale Spatial Perspective: 
Emerging Transregional Ties and Local 
Repercussions
Steffen Wippel
Introduction: Local and (Trans-)Regional 
Re-Configurations
The northern Moroccan urban agglomeration of Tangier has experienced rapid, 
spectacular changes over the last decade, mainly as a result of urban megaprojects 
and the expansion of transport infrastructure. Not only has this effectuated impor-
tant local transformations, but it also holds wider repercussions and fits within 
larger re-configurations, each playing out on several spatial scales. The enhance-
ment of far-reaching regional and transregional links is an important aspect of 
this.
This chapter presents a few insights from a research project within the 
research network “Re-Configurations: History, Remembrance, and Transfor-
mation Processes in the Middle East and North Africa” at  Philipps-Universität 
Marburg from late 2015 to early 2019. Accordingly, the chapter views 
 “re-configurations” as complex, varied, and open-ended transformation processes, 
which are not necessarily purposive1 and are sometimes fragmentary, inconsist-
ent, and conflictual. These processes are indicative not only of changes to one 
particular element in a given setting, but in fact reflect entire constellations of 
actors, structures, spaces, and flows. In particular, I will endeavor to show the his-
toricity of current developments that go beyond the widely observed and analyzed 
ruptures in the aftermath of the 2011 “Arab Spring.” Concurrently, the afore-
mentioned project integrated the research field on “transregional entanglements” 
© The Author(s) 2021 
R. Ouaissa et al. (eds.), Re-Configurations, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen 
Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-31160-5_6




 during the network’s first stage, then merged into the analytical axis on “space” in 
the second stage. This perspective recognized that ongoing re-configurations also 
encompass important spatial aspects. Just as the entire network sought to chal-
lenge prevalent research practices, this particular study set out to scrutinize con-
ventional spatial and scalar preconceptions in established systematic disciplines 
and area studies by understanding space and scale as historically produced and 
continuously changing geographies and by looking beyond established contain-
ers, such as the “MENA region” or the “national” methodological approach.
Hence, this chapter will adopt a predominantly spatial perspective on impor-
tant current re-configurations of a specific city and the development of (trans)-
regional entanglements emanating from this place; more generalized results of 
the same research have been published in a separate edited volume (Wippel and 
Fischer-Tahir 2018). The chapter begins with a brief overview of Tangier’s devel-
opment and the current projects. It will then shed light on five aspects related to 
the ideas described above, which transcend the purely local dimension: actors, 
programs, entanglements, positionings of the city, and, in a return to the local, the 
city’s fragmentations. The conclusion will present a more conceptual outlook and 
sum up the findings.
Contemporary Mega-Projects Re-Configuring Tangier
In the distant past, Tangier was already an important transshipment center con-
necting trans-Saharan (overland) and trans-Mediterranean (maritime) trade. In 
the nineteenth century, the city increasingly came under international administra-
tion and evolved into Morocco’s main trading port (Stuart 1955). Major  European 
shipping lines began to call at Tangier on their way to Africa, Latin America, 
and even the Dutch East Indies (Fig. 1). During this period, the city prospered, 
and its population was a cosmopolitan mixture of Moroccan Muslims and Jews, 
Spaniards, and other Europeans. After Moroccan independence, King Hassan II 
deliberately neglected Morocco’s northern provinces for political reasons. Tangier 
stagnated and lost its exceptional position. Only when Mohamed VI ascended to 
the throne in 1999 did existing plans and new programs begin to be physically 
implemented. Since then, new economic and transport infrastructure has been 
established, and Tangier has undergone a considerable urban restructuring process 
(Figs. 2  and 6).2
The most visible result was the 2007 opening of the enormous 
 Tanger-Méditerranée Tangier-Mediterranean container port east of the city, 
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which has the capacity to process three million standard containers a year (see 
also Barthel and Planel 2010; Ducruet et al. 2011; Mareï 2012). It is currently 
being expanded to more than triple its capacity.3 The TangerMed platform also 
encompasses cargo, oil, vehicle and passenger terminals, as well as free trade 
zones, logistical areas, industrial parks, and an important “automotive city” scat-
tered across the Tangier Peninsula. The second large project, Tanger Ville Tangier 
City, is focused on transforming the old inner-city port area into a luxurious tour-
ism, leisure, and consumer-oriented waterfront (cf. also Benabad 2012). This is 
supplemented by the Tanger Métropole Tangier Metropolis plan, which supports 
local efforts to enhance urban social, cultural, and environmental infrastructure. 
The most recent large-scale project is a gigantic technological, industrial, and 
residential complex called Cité Mohammed VI TangerTech. Likewise, other new 
towns on the city’s southern periphery are expected to help improve the pressing 
housing shortage.
Fig. 1  Tangier as a Transport Hub during the International Zone Period (1923–1956); 
Source: Propaganda and Tourism Section of the Tangier Zone. 1929. Tangier: Winter 
Resort, Summer Resort. Paris: Horizons de France, 32. Retrieved from http:/interactive-
worlds.blogspot.com/2006/12, 16 April 2019.
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These major projects have been supplemented by the construction of numer-
ous integrated tourism complexes and luxury hotels along the Bay of Tangier and 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. Transport infrastructure within and lead-
ing to the Tangier Peninsula has been extended, is under construction, or is being 
planned. This includes a regional airport, several motor ways and expressways, 
and new railway lines, including a high-speed rail TGV, in French parlance link 
to Casablanca. These Tangier-centered projects are embedded in larger programs, 
networks, and corridors pursued by a wide range of actors on and across different 
spatial scales.
Fig. 2  Major Projects on the Tangier Peninsula since the Late 2000s; Concept and English 
legend: Steffen Wippel; cartography: Sabrina Henschel 2017.
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Intervening Actors and Institutions
First, various outside individual and institutional actors, with their respective 
interests, ideas, and strategies, intervene in the planning, financing, construction, 
and usage of diverse locally implanted projects.
At the national level, superordinate project planning and realization mostly 
fall to central government departments and their specifically established spe-
cial agencies.4 In a kind of public-public partnership, such agencies group sev-
eral state and para-state entities. Among them, the Agence pour la Promotion et 
le Développement économique et social des provinces du Nord (APDN, Agency 
for the Promotion and the Economic and Social Development of the Northern 
Provinces), under the direct control of the Prime Minister’s office, gives finan-
cial and technical support to projects such as the Tanger Ville program, the 
TangerMed industrial and logistic platforms, and the high-speed rail link. The 
TangerMed Special Agency (TMSA) and its affiliates exercise state preroga-
tives in the planning, implementation, and management of the entire Tanger 
Méditerranée project. At the same time, the TMSA acts like a private company 
without the constraints of public administration, and represents several minis-
tries including the APDN. Several state institutions also jointly own the Société 
d’Aménagement pour la Reconversion de la Zone Portuaire de Tanger Ville 
(SAPT, Planning Society for the Conversion of the Tangier City Port Zone), 
which is exclusively responsible for piloting the reconstruction of important 
inner-city areas surrounding the old port. In addition, further public development 
agencies are supporting and marketing several major investment projects for resi-
dential and tourism purposes. A young guard of highly educated technocrats with 
experience in private and international business is centrally placed in such public 
entities to implement the neoliberal, pro-business urban development agenda.
Beyond the spin-offs and partnerships of the public sector, we also observe an 
increasing shift of responsibilities and competencies for local projects and infra-
structure to transnational and private actors. Affiliates of the  above-mentioned 
agencies involve additional private companies. Internationally important opera-
tors, among them APM Terminals and Eurogate, have assumed the management 
of TangerMed container and oil terminals. The world’s biggest container-shipping 
lines (such as Mærsk Line and CMA CGM), partially under the ownership of 
the same holding companies, are using the new port facilities to establish glob-
ally integrated transport networks. Foreign companies also control ferry services 
between Europe and the ports of the Tangier Peninsula. International planning 
and architecture offices, developers, and sales companies (notably of Spanish and 
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Gulf Arab origin) design, build, and market exclusive tourism and real estate pro-
jects. To construct TangerTech City, the regional administration has established 
a joint venture with a major internationally operating Moroccan bank and a Chi-
nese holding company.
In addition, several European, Euro-Mediterranean, African, and Arab regional 
organizations and development funds as well as national and subnational coopera-
tion agencies from Western Europe, the Gulf states, and Japan provide financial 
support and planning expertise for numerous infrastructure projects. In particular, 
diplomatic representatives from the EU and its member states hold seats on the 
APDN’s advisory board.
Integrating Policies, Programs, and Infrastructure 
Networks
The projects and programs for Tangier listed above are embedded in much larger 
and overlapping infrastructure schemes, development plans, and economic strate-
gies conceived with various geographical reaches.
Hence, new infrastructure largely results from a number of national agen-
das to enhance the Moroccan transport systems by 2030 or 2040, such as sev-
eral national highway initiatives that have been expanding since the mid-1990s; 
national programs to modernize the conventional rail network and to build a 
 high-speed rail system; and, finally, a series of port extension and construction 
projects within the national port strategy. Overall, these plans and other projects 
fit into a wide range of mid- to long-term national development plans aimed at 
boosting logistical competitiveness, integrated industrial platforms, emerging 
industries, and notably trade and tourism.
In a wider context, Tangier’s new infrastructural links are considered parts 
of transnational schemes and corridors established by regional institutions and 
arrangements in order to facilitate regional trade and mobility (Wippel 2012a; 
Fig. 3). Accordingly, infrastructure centering on Tangier immediately connects 
northward to the EU’s expanding Trans-European Networks for multimodal sea, 
road, and rail transportation. In the context of the Euro-Mediterranean coopera-
tion, these networks have already been extended southward with supplementary 
trans-Mediterranean transport links. Among them, the construction of the Rocade 
Méditerranéenne (National Route 16) from Tangier to the Algerian border was 
the EU’s biggest infrastructure funding project outside Europe. At the same time, 
road and railway infrastructure integrates Tangier into trans-Maghrebian transport 
schemes adopted by the Arab Maghreb Union. Tangier also constitutes the north-
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ernmost end of Pan-African traffic corridors, which converge towards the city 
along the Atlantic coast from the south and along the Mediterranean coast from 
the east. Notably, the Tangier-Dakar Highway integrates the larger Cairo-Dakar 
route and connects to further trunk-road projects in western Africa (cf. also Mar-
faing and Wippel 2005). Several bilateral as well as Mediterranean, African, and 
UN programs also include the long-planned tunnel across the Strait of Gibral-
tar to connect Tangier directly to Spain (cf. also Wippel 2000). Furthermore, 
Morocco intends to develop the Tangier Peninsula into an energy hub. The power 
lines and gas pipelines with Algeria and Spain connect to larger European grids 
and, in the future, are intended to integrate Pan-Arab, circum-Mediterranean, and 
West African networks.
Fig. 3  Tangier at the Intersection of Multiregional Transport Systems; Concept and car-
tography: Steffen Wippel, 2019.
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Last but not least, current development efforts, which open Tangier to interna-
tional capital and spark far-reaching connections, are an excellently fit for larger 
national macro-policies related to foreign trade and regional integration (Wip-
pel 2012a, 2012b). Hence, during the Euro-Mediterranean rapprochement in the 
1990s, Morocco rediscovered its long-neglected “Mediterranean façade” (Zaïm 
1990). Accordingly, the city’s transformation integrates the government’s endeav-
ors for a privileged partnership with the EU. In parallel, the kingdom started to 
intensify its African policy, including a strengthened economic presence, notably 
in the field of strategic investment and firm cooperation. This is part of an institu-
tional turn towards a “multidirectional regionalism” that allows for membership 
in several overlapping free-trade agreements and regional economic organizations 
and also includes enhanced transatlantic cooperation. Morocco’s foreign trade 
relations, still very much concentrated on European markets, are likewise diver-
sifying. These largely correspond to Tangier’s developing links, presented in the 
next section, but are not fully congruent with them.
Emerging Connections, Entanglements, and Flows
Based on the current infrastructure megaprojects, Tangier has become a hub for 
important border-crossing entanglements and circuits of various scopes. Notably, 
the new TangerMed port promoted the deployment of new regional and transre-
gional traffic flows. Starting from zero in 2007, ten years later 430 weekly ship-
ping lines connected the existing container terminals with 174 other ports in 74 
countries worldwide (Tanger Med Port Authority 2017; Fig. 4). Europe is still 
the most important destination, but now nearly a quarter of all connections lead 
to ports along Africa’s Atlantic coast, from Mauritania to Angola; a decade ago, 
Morocco’s lack of maritime links to sub-Saharan Africa was still frequently 
lamented (cp. Wippel 2012b, p. 1131 f.). The Mediterranean constitutes another 
regional focus, alongside further noteworthy links with the greater Middle East, 
Latin America, and southern and eastern Asia. In contrast, passenger traffic from 
Tangier travels nearly exclusively to European, and mainly Spanish, ports. The 
vehicle port terminal also ships cars as far as Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and 
Australia. Logistic firms at TangerMed primarily serve European markets but 
have also started to transport goods overland via the new road to West Africa.
More than six hundred foreign companies, among them internationally pres-
tigious firms (such as Renault-Nissan, DHL, Lear, Huawei, Siemens, Danone, 
and Decathlon) have established a base in the TangerMed industrial and logis-
tics platform. Most of these enterprises come from the European Union, with 
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more than one third being of Spanish origin, but there are also firms from the 
US, Arab states, and, more recently, China. From here, they are mostly explor-
ing European and increasingly sub-Saharan and North African markets—such as 
the  Renault-Nissan plant, which exports nearly its entire car production, mostly 
to European countries, but also to African and Arab countries. The new tourist 
infrastructure aims at attracting international visitors, especially from Europe, 
including Moroccans living abroad, and from Arab Gulf states (Berriane 2011). 
Correspondingly, with increasing attractiveness, international tourism figures in 
the Tangier region have increased steadily in recent years.
In addition, Tangier remains a central departure and transit point for intercon-
tinental migration. Every year, about five million passengers to and from Europe, 
mostly Moroccan expatriates during the holiday season, cross the Tangier Penin-
sula. At the same time, the region has become an important transit hub for irregu-
lar migrants from Morocco, sub-Saharan Africa, and recently South Asia and the 
Middle East (e.g. Alioua 2007; Mouna 2016a, 2016b). Conversely, the economic 
crisis in their home country temporarily caused Spaniards to look for work in the 
boom town across the Strait.
Various regional delimitaons
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Fig. 4  Container Shipping Links from TangerMed (Import and Export, June 2017); 
Source: TangerMed Port Authority 2017. Author’s calculations.
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Besides being an established platform for the trade in cannabis from the 
nearby Rif Mountains, Tangier has become a hub for hard drugs arriving from 
Central Asia and Latin America and destined for European markets.5 In the other 
direction, the informal import of consumption goods from the nearby Spanish 
enclave of Ceuta constitutes another lucrative business, and the trans-Saharan 
road has given West African customers access to used European vehicles via 
Tangier.
Strengthened Competition and Strategic Positioning
In accordance with neoliberal logic, Tangier is being regarded primarily as an 
economic project and has entered fierce national, regional, and global competi-
tion with other places for port traffic, investment, tourism and overall attention, 
notably in the Western Mediterranean, but also on the African continent. Actors 
strategically exploit Tangier’s exposed geographic position on the northernmost 
tip of Morocco and Africa at the edge of Europe as well as its location along the 
world’s most important shipping lane, connecting East Asia through the Medi-
terranean and the Atlantic to the American East Coast. This motif of the city’s 
advantageous location is repeatedly invoked in the multi-level branding of pro-
jects, firms, and the city. Responsible persons and institutions—from local 
authorities and associations, national tourism, and investment agencies to inter-
national companies and developers—explicitly emphasize Tangier’s continuing 
role as a “gateway to Europe” as well as its emerging position as a “gateway to 
Africa.”
The TangerMed container port rapidly became the busiest Moroccan harbor. 
It is about closing ranks with Algeciras, a regional forerunner of container trans-
shipment at the opposite side of the Gibraltar Strait, and has now advanced to 
rank 46 worldwide in annual throughput (Lloyd’s List 2018, p. 12; Fig. 5). In 
2017, it was the busiest container port in all Africa and the fourth in both the 
MENA region and in the Mediterranean. It will be the largest port in the Medi-
terranean region after completion of phase II. The opening of the new terminals 
will push the port to the Top 20 worldwide compared with current volumes. 
Also, the world’s biggest shipping lines have made Tangier a major hub in their 
global networks; for example, CMA CGM uses it this way for its  Euro-African 
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 connections. Simultaneously, this has contributed to a great increase in Moroc-
co’s global connectivity.6 Tangier now hosts Africa’s biggest car production plant, 
and its large free zone was recently rated the most competitive on the continent 
(fDi 2015). The agglomeration, with about one million inhabitants, has become 
Morocco’s second economic pole, and the World Bank (2015) listed Tangier as 
one of six model cities for economic growth and competitiveness in the “Global 
South.” Among African cities, Tangier received the third-most foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and experienced the fourth-highest FDI growth in the years 
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Fig. 5  TangerMed in the Global and Regional Port Hierarchy (2017); TEU: twenty feet 
equivalent unit (standard container). Note: Ports with annual throughput greater than 2.7 
million TEU. Source: Lloyd’s List 2018, p. 12 f.
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Increasing Fragmentation, Territorialization, and Other 
Problems
However, Tangier’s current development increasingly exhibits problematic 
aspects. Not all projects have been completed on schedule, and many are still in 
the planning stages. Harsh political realities, notably international conflicts and 
issues of security and migration, have impaired many transport schemes. Other 
projects face geophysical and financial challenges. From international trade to 
tourism, current strategies involve sectors reacting rather sensitively to political 
and economic crises elsewhere in the world and to fierce competition from other 
emerging places. For example, political and economic calamities in the investors’ 
home countries, such as Spain and the Gulf, have delayed several tourism and 
real-estate projects.
Some of the major local consequences of these new outward-oriented 
 mega-projects and entanglements have included the reinforcement of territo-
rial and socioeconomic fragmentation inside the urban agglomeration. Thus, 
the new port and export-oriented free zones are typical examples of locally dis-
embedded fragments that are much more closely connected to international eco-
nomic hubs and circuits than to their immediate urban and national hinterlands. 
Accordingly, about 95 percent of the container throughput at TangerMed is pure 
transshipment between different container vessels, one of the highest shares 
worldwide. The free zones, too, predominantly work on an import–export basis, 
and interlinkages with the local and national economies are developing only 
gradually.
The institutions established by the central state have far-reaching execu-
tive (and even legislative) powers over important areas of the metropolitan area 
to the detriment of local competencies, interests, and needs. This is despite a 
process of “advanced regionalization” adopted in recent years to devolve more 
decision-making power to subnational entities. The TMSA alone was allotted a 
550 square-kilometer special zone near the port for infrastructural extension and 
socio-economic development (Fig. 1). Similarly, the SAPT has at its disposal a 
contiguous planning area in the city center, where it can act mostly autonomously 
(Fig. 6). At the same time, the numerous megaprojects are characterized by an 
“ad-hoc urbanism,” with project-related master plans largely overruling compre-
hensive and structured urban planning.
The projects also have led to the spread of territorial exclaves across the pen-
insula. Large sites like the TangerMed port complex, the special economic zones, 
gated communities, and all-inclusive tourism complexes are surrounded by walls 
and fences, accessible only through guarded gates or with special permits. They 
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block access to hitherto open spaces, like formerly popular beaches and agricul-
tural land. Other projects, such as the new shopping malls and the upgraded old 
port district with its marina, luxurious residences, shopping, and leisure facilities, 
are under private control. Large portions of society simply cannot afford to take 
advantage of them—despite repeated public declarations aiming to “return the sea 
to the city.”7
Workplaces in central parts of the city have been displaced to the periph-
ery or replaced by highly automated processes. This also creates huge transport 
Fig. 6  Major Urban Projects in the Inner City of Tangier since the Late 2000s; Concept 
and cartography: Steffen Wippel, 2018.
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 problems. Simultaneously, in the medina, gentrification has set in as more and 
more wealthy foreigners settle there (Chattou 2011; Peraldi 2007, p. 116). Mean-
while, the established population does not benefit much from increasing cruise 
tourism based in the old city’s adjacent port. Consequently, large segments of the 
local society do not seem to be benefiting sufficiently from the current processes, 
and even its elites feel excluded from the current planning processes and develop-
ment opportunities.
It is therefore unsurprising that the tendency to ignore local concerns and 
social needs, even while integrating the city regionally and globally, has triggered 
repeated protests over the last decade, from demonstrations against land expro-
priation, socio-ecological impacts and working conditions related to the new 
port (Mareï 2012, p.7 f.; Planel 2011; Barthel and Planel 2010) to protests 
against the high building costs of the high-speed rail line (Lahlou 2016) and the 
 displacement of firms from the inner city. Therefore, it is probably no coincidence 
that, two years after the 2011 demonstrations, the king announced the Tanger 
Métropole program, which focuses much more on local progress than the more 
prominent mega-projects did.
Conclusion: Re-Configurations of an Emerging 
“Secondary City” with Transregional Links, Embedded 
in Multiple Scales
Purposefully “developing” Tangier is part of a long-term strategy which started 
at the turn of the millennium and integrates much wider national, regional, and 
global re-configurations. The advancement of some projects was impacted by the 
2008–09 international financial and economic crisis, mostly due to its effects on 
partners’ countries, notably in the tourism and real estate sectors. This effect was 
much more visible than that of the politically and socially motivated demonstra-
tions in 2011 and the years after, despite strong participation of the local popu-
lation. These events did not fundamentally alter the Moroccan political system, 
including the opaque dual structure of official state administration and the paral-
lel makhzen system surrounding the royal court. Compared to pre-2011 Tunisia, 
for example, Moroccan authorities already had retained more power on project 
execution in relation to Gulf investors and paid more attention to the local con-
textualization of megaprojects (Barthel 2014). But since then, more formal civil 
society participation in urban development has not really come about. In fact, 
a series of centrally installed project agencies is still shaping pivotal urban and 
infrastructural developments, catering the interests of global actors as well as 
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transnationally oriented middle- and upper-class segments of the national soci-
ety. As Beier (2016) demonstrated, Tunisia turned to more inclusive urban devel-
opment strategies after the events of 2011, whereas Morocco remains caught in 
the dilemma between the megaproject based creation of world-class cities and a 
counteractive “urbanism of urgency” for the urban peripheries. Consistently, in 
Tangier, large-scale projects still dominate (or at least shape the cityscape) while 
targeted small-scale interventions remain too tentative and are generating insuf-
ficient results. Nevertheless, the 2013 Tanger Métropole program can be inter-
preted as one conciliatory response to widespread discontent in the city.
Conceptually, there are various ways to grasp the current development 
of a city such as Tangier. This chapter shows that, first, like many MENA cit-
ies, Tangier has experienced significant neoliberal development (e.g. Heeg 
2019; Al-Hamarneh et al. 2019). This extends beyond pure laissez-faire liberal-
ism, which would leave urban development exclusively to the private sector, as 
indeed happened during the International Zone period (Nieto and El Idrissi 2009). 
Instead, state institutions have strongly committed to developing a competitive, 
outward-oriented city, to following the logic of the market, and to actively lay-
ing the groundwork for the strong involvement of global firms. Extended islands 
of neoliberal transformation and postmodern development have at the very least 
penetrated the agglomeration and are contributing to a “splintering urbanism” 
(Graham and Marvin 2009). This goes along with additional postmodern endeav-
ors to attract worldwide attention through distinguished landmarks and extensive 
marketing (Soja 2000).
Second, it is not only established and emerging “global cities” (Sassen 1991) 
or “world cities” (Friedmann 1986) that achieve central positions in global net-
works. Tangier is not yet included in this new meta-geography of global cities, 
and it is even not listed in the most inclusive of such rankings (GaWC 2018). But 
even such a “secondary city” by national, regional, and global standards is inten-
sively globalizing and neoliberalizing, increasingly integrating far-reaching net-
works, and occupying a central position in specific circuits, for example as a major 
transshipment hub in maritime world trade.8 Moreover, we find characteristics of 
contemporary port city development, with the main port activities shifting outside 
the city proper, whereas the old port’s premises are undergoing exclusive water-
front development and upgrading (Hoyle 2000). Tangier also exhibits some spe-
cific features of a border city, formerly between different colonial zones and today 
between states, continents, and institutionalized regional blocks. It therefore con-
fronts all the challenges, opportunities, and obstacles such a border position entails 
for human and material mobility and urban and economic development (e.g. Sohn 
and Licheron 2015). Accordingly, these borders act as barriers and impediments 
98 S. Wippel
to human and material cross-border flows and, in the past, they exacerbated socio-
economic marginalization and political neglect. But, at the same time, the border 
situation has lent itself to creative exploitation for establishing (formal and infor-
mal) types of mobility and exchange and for fostering economic progress as a 
showcase to the outside world and a gateway for  border-crossing connections (see 
also Flynn 1997; Becker 2005). It can also be used for branding the city to the 
wider world to attract visitors, investors, and others.
While the multiple facets of urban development require a multi-conceptual 
approach, they all show important spatial dimensions. Consequently, the focus 
here has been on a spatial perspective. In this regard, from an urban perspective, 
“globalization” does not mean that the city is equally connected to all parts of 
the world. Rather, we observe regional densifications of contacts and exchange. 
Tangier is often placed into spatial containers such as the nation-state and the 
Maghreb, Arab, or MENA world regions. Accordingly, it has developed a mul-
titude of translocal, transnational, and transregional links that transgress the 
established spatial configurations and segmentations that are widespread in the 
political, academic, and public realms.9 Indeed, based on material infrastructures 
and actors’ strategies, Tangier’s own city-centered regionalizations have emerged. 
They mostly display rhizomatic and archipelago-like (Veltz 1996) forms with 
fuzzy limits and oscillating extensions along threadlike lines of transport and 
mobility, connecting to other specific places and hubs, rather than corresponding 
to spatially and temporally contiguous areas. Conversely, these links transgress-
ing urban and other borders are not developed from all places in the city equally. 
Rather, heavily globalized—or better, “regionalized”—enclaves are intensively 
linked to the “outside world,” specifically other global places and regional hubs. 
This kind of uneven urban development creates severe spatial fragmentation 
across the cityscape, while participating in a “fragmented globalization” repro-
duced across several spatial levels from the local to the global scale (Scholz 2004, 
p. 221 ff.; see also Robinson 2002).
Finally, this chapter has also demonstrated that actors, infrastructures, pro-
grams, flows, networks, and positions on different scales are what make and 
shape the city:
1. Individual and institutional actors from several spatial levels intervene, pursue 
their policies and strategies, and contribute to the city’s development, often 
bypassing local interests and competencies.
2. Tangier’s local infrastructure and urban development is integrated into much 
wider and overlapping schemes, programs, visions, plans, and policies con-
ceived on several spatial scales and with different geographical reaches.
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3. Tangier has become a hub for important trade, transport, investment, tourism, 
and migration flows that crisscross national, macro-regional and global levels, 
in trans-Mediterranean and trans-Saharan North–South directions as well as 
along a maritime East–West axis.
4. Finally, this positions Tangier in several regional and global networks of 
places in close cooperation as well as fierce competition, making purposive 
use of its location, and emphasized by diverse rankings and strategic commu-
nication alike.
In sum, there is an important multi-scale dimension in Tangier’s current urban 
 re-configuration with interventions, connections, and repercussions that jump 
across scales. Like regions, scales are socially constructed. This entails a contin-
uous rescaling of relevant actors, activities, and flows as well as competencies, 
responsibilities, and effects. But as transnational actors act on a local level, cit-
ies form direct regional networks beyond territorial hierarchies. At the same time, 
locally oriented measures push transregional infrastructures and mobilities (cf. 
Sassen 2003). Thus, different scales are not sharply separated, but increasingly 
interpenetrate, progressively blur, and become difficult to distinguish analyti-
cally.10 Hence, although Brenner’s focus (e.g., 1997) is still primarily on global 
metropolises, he understands cities in the course of continuous reterritorialization 
and rescaling processes as interfaces between multiple, overlapping spatial scales.
In the end, a predominantly spatial perspective on Tangier’s current 
 re-configurations is more than an academic exercise. It reflects important politi-
cal, social, and economic processes that take shape through several spatial scales 
and embed Tangier within multi-scalar networks.
Endnotes
 1. This observer perspective may considerably contrast with actors’ norma-
tively loaded visions of linear growth and unidirectional development. But as 
the terminology blurs, I also employ “urban development” and similar terms 
in the following. I understand them, like in most social and cultural disci-
plines today, as a non-linear and non-teleological process of recurrent trans-
formation, re-configuration, change and evolution covering a broad range of 
closely interrelated material and societal aspects.
 2. For information that is more comprehensive and more details on Tangier, cf. 
Tafersiti Zarouila 2012; Haller et al. 2016; Haller 2016; Wippel 2019 in the 
following.
 3. One of the two new terminals opened in June 2019 disposing of an annual 
capacity of 5 million containers; the second will follow in late 2020.
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 4. On the general “agencification” of urban development in Morocco, cf. Ama-
rouche and Bogaert 2019; on planning policies in Tangier, Kanai and Kutz 
2013; Planel 2011.
 5. For the development of manifold informal flows, cf., for instance, Abderrah-
mane 2013; Mouna (2016b); Peraldi 2007.
 6. According to the UNCTAD’s global connectivity index, Morocco advanced 
from place 78 (2004) to 16 (2014). Cf. UNCTAD: Liner shipping con-
nectivity index, annual, 2004–2016. https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/
TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=92. Accessed: 13 Feb 2016.
 7. Tanja Marina Bay International. Reconversion du port: Objectifs. https://
www.tanjamarinabay.ma/fr/presentation-projet-reconversion/. Accessed: 16 
April 2019.
 8. The term was first introduced by Rondinelli 1983. Cf. also, e.g., Roberts and 
Hohmann 2014; on “ordinary cities”, Robinson 2002; on “globalizing cit-
ies”, Marcuse and van Kempen 2000.
 9. On the transregional transgression of such “meta-geographies”, cf. Lewis 
and Wigen (1997); in the MENA region, Wippel and Fischer-Tahir (2018); 
on translocal entanglements, Freitag and von Oppen (2010).
 10. This aspect was intensely discussed at a conceptual workshop on 
 “Re-configuring Space and Representations: Theoretical approaches, empiri-
cal findings, conceptual reflections” of the research network in December 
2017.
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Anniversaries motivate and invite reflections and interpretations of events after 
the fact, regardless of how many years, decades, or centuries have passed. The 
1960s, and particularly the year 1968, are no exception, as seen once again in 
Germany in 2018, the fiftieth anniversary of that legendary year. Numerous pub-
lications have reflected on the events of the year 1968 in ten-year intervals, with 
essays demonstrating contested understandings of who possesses the prerogative 
of interpretation and which legacies are to be appreciated or discarded (Bührer 
2019a, b for the case of Germany). Colvin and Karcher (2019, p. 1) call 1968 
an annus mirabilis, quoting from Gilcher-Holtey’s view of that year as one that 
“marked the climax of protests, capturing almost all Western industrialized 
countries simultaneously” (2014, p. 2, cited in Colvin and Karcher 2019, p. 1). 
Attempts at historicizing “sixty-eight” started in the late 1980s, relating the events 
to meta-theoretical concepts of modernization, revolution, and liberation (e.g. 
Arrighi et al. 1989). On balance, the 1960s in general and 1968 in particular are a 
codeword for social, cultural and—at least to a certain extent—political change in 
Western European societies, the USA and some countries of the “Global South,” 
such as Mali, Mexico, El Salvador, Tanzania, and Bolivia. We might see the 
period as one of re-configurations as defined by the  Re-Configuration Network 
(see the Introduction to this volume). In historical perspective, the predominant 
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connotation of the said change or re-configurations is positive, associating change 
with progress, political liberties, liberation from constraining moral norms (e.g. 
norms regulating sexual orientation and behavior), emancipation from oppressive 
social structures, an almost glorified revolutionary sheen exemplified by the stu-
dent movements, and an equally romanticized peace movement (“flower power”) 
on the other. Crackdowns by government forces on reform movements, such as 
the response to the Prague Spring, do not perfectly fit the narrative of liberaliza-
tion, but in retrospect, the upheavals in  then-Czechoslovakia are at least signs of a 
transnational mood in which dissenters were taking to the streets for change and 
reform. Ideologically and politically, left-wing affiliations figured prominently in 
the discursive narrative (sometimes overshadowing  non-leftist developments that 
drew less attention, as we will discuss below).
Perhaps the still-dominant view of the 1960s as a decade in which civil society 
actors organized and pushed for similar goals in numerous countries around the 
world is what provoked the notion of “the global sixties.” Moreover, the shared 
belief in the power of international solidarity added to the feeling of belonging 
to a mass movement that rejected all sorts of imperialism for the sake of national 
liberation—particularly nations in postcolonial states of the “Third World.” The 
movement against the US-led war in Vietnam (1965 to 1973) is emblematic of 
this impression and expression of international solidarity. Photographs taken dur-
ing that war became iconic;1 music and literature addressed the theme as well. 
The year 1968 saw student protests against the Vietnam War that culminated in 
oftentimes-militant clashes with state police and security forces. Besides anti-war 
sentiment, national issues such as coping with the fascist past in West Germany, 
building solidarity between students and labor unions in France, struggling for 
civil rights in the USA, and denouncing the oppressive regime of Iran’s Shah 
(though only from outside the country) figured high on protest movements’ agen-
das (Ali 2005).
Historians are thus pondering the valorization of “the global sixties” as a heu-
ristic concept (Klimke and Nolan 2018). While the concept has been framed as 
“an inevitable by-product of the trend toward global history that has captured 
the profession [of historians; C.D.] in recent years,” the category of “global” has 
itself been problematized: “Was it a native category and if so which actors used 
it and how?” (Klimke and Nolan 2018, p. 3 f.). This question leads us to expand 
the view beyond the default landscapes of movements of the sixties. How about 
the 1960s in the Arab world or the wider MENA region? How about the “long 
1960s” as a period of events and phenomena that were formative for important 
developments in later decades—phenomena that drew less attention than the pro-
test movements of the political left? How about transregional connectivities based 
1071968 and the “Long 1960s”: A Transregional Perspective
on movements that originated in MENA countries? The subsequent sections offer 
some entry points into an empirically driven and conceptually under-analyzed 
notion of the global sixties and the peak year of 1968. However, a disclaimer is 
in order. Neither the term “global sixties” nor the term “long 1960s” is meant to 
denote a precisely delimitable period. The sixties did not begin sharply with the 
year 1960, nor did they end in 1969. Rather than demarcations by decade, the 
boundaries of this time interval appear flexible, for some beginning as early as 
1954 and ending as late as 1975, while others confine the era more narrowly from 
the late 1950s to the early 1970s (Klimke and Nolan 2018, p. 5; Hodenberg and 
Siegfried 2006). Whatever periodization is preferred, we will not arrive at reliable 
inferences by limiting the sixties to a numb and rigid timeframe.
Deciphering the “Long 1960s” and 1968
Let us start out by asking whether “sixty-eight” would resonate in the MENA 
region, and if so, how? Certainly, there was an active “Arab Left” on the region’s 
political stage. Intra-regional and, increasingly, international solidarity move-
ments mobilized for the liberation of Palestine. Pro-Palestinian activist groups 
(Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP]; Popular Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine [PDFLP], and others) enjoyed solidarity from 
other countries overseas, including Germany. Currents of the New Left in Europe 
aligned themselves with the Palestinian struggle, with some spin-off activist 
groups opting for militant training in the Middle East in order to prepare for an 
envisaged (imagined) revolutionary battle. Regionally, the establishment of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, 1967 −19 90) symbolized the 
widespread affection for Marxist ideas on the government level. Nonetheless, the 
PDRY was and remained the only Marxist state in the Arab world. Civil society 
struggles for both the liberation of Palestine and the Dhofar revolution in Oman 
coincided with the peak period of the Arab Cold War between Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt (1962–1967) and the guerilla warfare in Southern Yemen (Matthiesen 
2018, p. 96 f.). In Bahrain, a major uprising “centered on the national oil com-
pany was cracked down upon heavily, leading to several casualties” in 1965 (Mat-
thiesen 2018, p. 97). In the course of the battle for breaking Israel’s power over 
occupied Arab territory, Egypt (together with Syria and Jordan) was defeated in 
the Six-Day War of June 1967—a blow that also heralded the end of the regional 
rivalry between Saudi Arabia’s monarchy and Nasser’s republic. The Naksa, or 
the defeat of Arab forces in the war against Israel in 1967, signified frustration 
if not disillusionment on the Arab side. Ever since, 1967, not 1968, has been the 
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year that captured many Arabs’ collective memory. In view of what Toby Mat-
thiesen calls the Red Arabia (2018, p. 94), the years 1965 and 1967 resonate com-
paratively strongly in the regional collective memory. There is thus not much to 
put forward in terms of a “revolutionary sixty-eight” in the MENA region, since 
the critical junctures date back to preceding years.2
If this were all that merits reflection in regard to the long 1960s in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa, we could end here and thank you for your kind atten-
tion. However, there is more to the story, and a critical conceptual assessment 
should dig deeper and take a closer look. Two vantage points come to mind when 
we shed light on specific dimensions of the 1960s on a regional level. One is 
informed by the Cold War constellation that affected the non-Western parts of the 
world as so-called proxies for the two polarized Eastern and Western powers. In 
this regard, I want to refer less to the MENA region but more to Southeast Asia as 
a case in point—notably not primarily because of the war in Vietnam, but because 
of a massacre (some call it genocide) in neighboring Indonesia, which caused up 
to a million deaths and has the sad reputation as the most brutal massacre since 
the Second World War (Cribb 2001; Farid 2005; McGregor 2009). The other is 
inspired by currents of Islamic and Islamist movements that unfolded consider-
able mobilizing strength in the “Muslim world” (please pardon the pragmatic use 
of this label here). The two vantage points speak to each other in that the Islamist 
Movements reached out to Southeast Asia and Indonesia in particular after the 
said massacre of 1965. If the subsequent “Islamization” of Indonesia’s public life, 
academic institutions, politics, the economy, and other spheres of human interac-
tion were to be traced back to its ideational sources, the international branches of 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood had a vast influence on this development (cf. Fealy 
and Platzdasch 2005; Hefner 1987; Fuller Collins 2007; van Bruinessen 2002; 
Platzdasch 2009; Machmudi 2008; Derichs 2017). The Brotherhood exerted a 
clear political appeal as a repressed movement struggling against an authoritar-
ian regime. Indonesia’s post-1965 system incorporated all the ingredients of an 
autocracy, making it similarly difficult for opposition forces to organize there. 
Although the Brotherhood’s direct influence gained momentum in the late 1970s 
and early’80s rather than during the decade of 1960, its appeal forms a concrete 
transregional link between Muslim activists. Similarities in forms of organiza-
tion, repertoires of actions, and the study of guiding scripts were the result of 
enhanced transregional mobility (e.g., Indonesian students studying in the Mid-
dle East), the consolidation of a widespread international network of Brother-
hood branches, and an increasing number of occasions that allowed for meetings 
of individuals from various regions (e.g., international Qurʾān recitation contests 
and events sponsored by the Muslim World League and the like). A faith-based 
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identity was fostered in Indonesia by two Muslim mass organizations, Muham-
madiyah (approx. 40 million members) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU; approx. over 
60 million members). The latter had played a significant role in the crackdown on 
communists in 1965 (McGregor 2009; Feillard and Madinier 2011, p. 26).
Considering the tremendous international wave of solidarity that was trig-
gered by the Vietnam War, during which many leftists favored the northern Viet 
Cong over the South Vietnamese forces, it is puzzling why the brutal elimina-
tion of communists in Indonesia, in 1965, hardly moved the world’s left. Was it 
because of Indonesian president Sukarno’s tainted image among overseas leftist 
activists (Ali 2005, p. 125 ff.)? Or was it because of a smart cover-up of Western 
(especially US) support for the systematic purge of communists?3 In the logic of 
the Cold War, human-rights violations apparently did not matter much when the 
noble cause of impeding the “domino effect” was at stake.4 A few hundred thou-
sand deaths seem to have been regarded as collateral damage rather than a worri-
some fact. Until today, it is open to speculation why the political genocide (Cribb 
2001; Marching 2017) in Indonesia caused so much lesser outrage in the rest of 
the world than the fight against pro-communist forces in Vietnam.
Equally puzzling, we might say, is the considerable neglect of the flipside of 
international solidarity with the struggle in Vietnam and Palestine, which was 
shaped by the almost parallel movement activities of Muslim activists around the 
globe. Again, the transregional relations between Muslim Indonesia and MENA 
are cases in point.
Trans-MENA in Southeast Asia—The “other 1960s”?
“The main ideological weapon used against the leftists, political Islam, had 
proven successful as an anti-Communist ideology not just in the Middle East but 
also in Africa and Central, South, and Southeast Asia,” Matthiesen notes (2018, 
p. 102). I fully agree with this assessment, including the author’s assertion that 
it was mainly the administrations of the United States and the United Kingdom 
pulling the strings in exploiting political Islamic movements for  anti-communist 
goals. Yet the reference to Western powers is a limited view, and perhaps one 
informed predominantly by classical international relations (IR) theories. Attend-
ing to Muslim civil society organizations and social movements in various coun-
tries of the MENA region and Southeast Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
it appears that focusing too strongly on inter-governmental relations glosses over 
the importance of non-state actors in the course of the “long sixties.” By way of 
example, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Indonesia’s Masyumi party merit 
110 C. Derichs
closer attention. In the pivotal year of 1965, Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser executed an unprecedented arrest of high numbers of Brotherhood mem-
bers in Egypt, legitimating this act with the “discovery of conspiracy” of the 
Brotherhood against him (Kepel 1995, p. 75). While the mass arrest reduced the 
strength of the Brotherhood considerably, its ideational appeal among common 
people only grew stronger. Two years later, after the defeat of the Six-Day War, 
Nasser’s regime gave in to the mounting pressure of “the street,” realizing that 
the nation’s patience had reached a limit and reforms were overdue. On univer-
sity campuses, students supporting the Brotherhood had organized clandestinely 
and were able to quickly mobilize fellow students, forming a remarkable political 
force (Kepel 1995, p. 141; Rosefsky Wickham 2013, p. 27 ff.). The subsequent 
vicissitudes of the Brotherhood’s appearance on the political stage under differ-
ent national presidents’ rules and regimes are well documented and do not require 
further attention.5 What is more interesting for my argument here is the similarity 
of events in Egypt and in Indonesia (and in Malaysia, albeit less so because of the 
Malaysian government’s much more liberal stance towards political Islam).6
After the 1965 massacre, the “forces of political Islam entered the New Order 
(the government of President Suharto, 1966–1998) with similar hopes: to be rec-
ognized for their role in the elimination of the communist threat” (Feillard and 
Madinier 2011, p. 24). Their hopes were swiftly dashed; the leaders of the Masy-
umi movement remained in prison.7 Sukarno had banned the Muslim Masyumi 
party in 1960, trying to contain political influence by faith-based forces. The 
considerable “help” of NU members in the hunting and killing of communists in 
1965 had raised expectations among the Muslim population to be acknowledged 
as credible supporters of the new regime. Hence, the jailed Masyumi activists also 
hoped for their release. However, Indonesia’s new regime was far from favoring 
any inclinations of political Islamic activism and curbed attempts at organizing 
such immediately. It appreciated “cultural Islam” instead, introducing compul-
sory Islamic education in schools as early as 1966 (Feillard and Madinier 2011, 
p. 27 ff.). As in other post-conflict contexts, religious identity was appropriated 
for regime-stabilizing purposes. Typically for an authoritarian system and akin to 
the situation in Egypt under Nasser, the post-1965 military government in Indo-
nesia sought to prevent any challenges by political Islamic and Islamist forces. 
“To this end,” Feillard and Madinier recall, “the party system had to be changed 
and Islam depoliticized without, however, reining in its growth as a religion” 
(2011, p. 27). Not surprisingly in this situation, a new generation of Muslim intel-
lectuals emerged and encouraged a revival of Masyumi ideas in a format besides 
party politics. They founded the Indonesian Islamic Propaganda Council in 1967 
and promoted efforts that would inspire vast numbers of students in the years to 
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come: “With Islamization via politics henceforth impossible, the leaders of Masy-
umi thus decided to engage in politics via Islamization” (Feillard and Madinier 
2011, p. 32). With propaganda activities—legal and illegal—on the agenda, this 
was the period within the 1960s when transregional linkages between Muslim 
youth in general and Islamist youth in particular flourished across national and 
regime boundaries, a trend that would only grow in later decades.
Propaganda or dakhwah activities (from the Arabic daʿwa) in Indonesia spread 
during the New Order period. Elizabeth Fuller Collins has traced some of these 
activities, and shows that dakhwah leaders gradually built a network of Islamic 
study circles, known initially as usroh (nuclear family or cell), and later as ḥalaqa 
(Arabic for a circle of students and their teacher) or tarbiya (the Arabic word 
for education under a teacher who provides moral guidance). She recalls what 
Hermawan Dipoyono, an early activist of Salman Mosque, told her: “I myself 
started the first usroh in Salman Mosque, maybe the first usroh in Indonesia. I 
was sent to Malaysia by Imaduddin, where I found books by the Muslim Broth-
ers. I brought them back and started translating them into Indonesian. This was 
in 1976–1977. It was a dangerous time to do dakhwah. I would translate a few 
pages, and they would be copied and passed around. We studied these in our 
usroh” (quote from Fuller Collins 2007, p. 156).
The transregional outreach of Brotherhood ideas is patently obvious in the 
activist’s quote. It underscores the remarkable international mobilizing capaci-
ties of the Muslim Brothers in the 1960s and beyond. Southeast Asian students 
became familiar with the works of Sayyid Qutb, Hassan Al-Banna, Mustafa 
Mashhur, and Sa’id Hawwa (Fuller Collins 2007, p. 156).8 Study-abroad pro-
grams for Southeast Asian students in Arab countries, particularly Egypt, pro-
vided the language skills to read and translate this literature into their respective 
native languages. Writing often made its way to Indonesia via Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia, where politically inclined Muslim organizations enjoyed a com-
paratively liberal and tolerant climate (as long as certain “red lines” were not 
crossed). The early secret dakhwah activities of the 1970s expanded in the 1980s, 
when the tarbiya movement gained mobilizing power on secular campuses. The 
transmission of Muslim Brotherhood influence into Indonesia occurred in two 
stages. According to Yon Machmudi, the first stage took place in the 1970s with 
the translation of Brotherhood literature into Indonesian language. The second 
evolved in the 1980s, when increasing numbers of students returned to Indonesia 
and combined their dakhwah ideas with Brotherhood training and organizational 
hardware (Machmudi 2008, p. 180).
The example of transregional connectivities between the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia may showcase the argument that Islamic movements in the 
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MENA region and elsewhere established contacts that were similar in strength to 
those of their leftist counterparts. Legal as well as semi-legal or illegal organi-
zations managed to communicate across huge geographical distances and instill 
a sense of belonging in a particular faith-based community. The “Sufi links” 
(Machmudi 2008, p. 169) allowed for the use of a particular vocabulary (e.g. 
usroh/usrah for the activists’ cells) and identification with a particular exegetic 
tradition. Mona Abaza (1994) believes that the increased student mobility of the 
1960s and 1970s exposes an indirect result of the Islamization of Indonesian 
society, whereas others would view the Islamization of Indonesian society as a 
result of more mobile students.9 Regardless of one’s preferred chronology, it is 
quite apparent that Islamic political activism produced numerous cross-national 
and cross-regional offshoots of well-organized movement organizations, includ-
ing the Muslim Brotherhood, which became “local expressions that follow the 
 socio-political and religious dynamics of their respective countries” (Machmudi 
2008, p. 170). Can we apply this observation as we reflect on re-configurations of 
the legacy of the “long 1960s”?
Re-Configurations
Browsing through pieces of scholarly literature that offer a “non-Western 
view” on the decades since the 1960s, it appears that the dominant codeword 
of  “sixty-eight” must be put into perspective—maybe even “provincialized” 
(to borrow Dipesh Chakrabarty’s prominent term). In non-Western contexts, 
it is stunning how often the year 1965 brought about a critical juncture in poli-
tics and society.10 However, there is little heuristic value in exchanging one year 
for another in the pursuit of broadening signal words such as the long or global 
sixties. The re-configuration I am seeking refers to the calibration of the move-
ment landscape of the sixties (and seventies). The movements of the period are 
conventionally studied against the backdrop of a left–right, religious-secular, and 
 progressive-conservative matrix. Such dichotomies and binaries are to my mind 
not always helpful for comprehending similarities, differences, distinction, and 
connectivity. When we conceptualize the Islamic political movements and net-
works of the mid-sixties as actors rising up against authoritarian national regimes 
on faith-based ideological platforms, their commonality should not be reduced to 
“Islamic/Islamist,” but rather should be seen as shared political motivation, one 
they oftentimes share with movements designated as politically left/leftist. The 
left–right and the religious-secular lenses lose their bite. Equally worth attending 
to are the incidents and occurrences that preceded and triggered the emergence 
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of organized Islamic political protest, or, as Ayesha Jalal has dubbed it, “Islam’s 
second globalization” (Jalal 2010, p. 326). What were the windows of political 
opportunity? What kind of resources for mobilization could be drawn on? What 
characterized the repertoires of action, organizational structures, symbolic inte-
gration, and so on? In sum: Applying the analytical toolbox of social movement 
research, irrespective of the above matrices and binaries, would probably reveal 
much more than the codewords of the long/global sixties and “sixty-eight” con-
note at first glance. The mid-sixties formed critical junctures for many soscieties, 
even if they were sometimes overshadowed in international attention, and these 
trends had context-specific trajectories that converged into something we now 
view, quite one-dimensionally, as an “Islamic resurgence” or “Islamic revival” in 
the years to follow.
Endnotes
 1. The picture “napalm girl” from the Vietnam War is one of the most famous 
photographs of this time.
 2. We might mention here the successful struggle for independence in Algeria 
(1962), the founding of OPEC (1960), or the formation of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM 1961) as earlier events exposing something like a “victory 
of south against north”. The genesis of the NAM can indeed be traced back 
to the Bandung Conference of 1955, which was hosted by President Sukarno 
in Indonesia.
 3. Documents in US American archives revealing the cooperation of Western 
powers in the 1965 purge are only gradually declassified. It takes further 
patience before solid analyses may continue.
 4. The “domino effect”.
 5. See Kepel 1995 or Rosefsky Wickham 2013 for detailed accounts in Ger-
man/English.
 6. For a comprehensive account of political Islam in the nation-states of South-
east Asia see Means 2009.
 7. Masyumi was Indonesia’s main political party and movement on an Islamic 
platform until Suharto assumed power. Sukarno (1945–1966) banned Masy-
umi in 1960, claiming that the party’s ideology went against state interests.
 8. They also read more “left-leaning” authors such as Ali Shari’ati, i.e. litera-
ture consumption was not confined to Brotherhood or Sufi texts.
 9. See Platzdasch 2009; van Bruinessen 2002; Hefner 1987 for detailed studies 
of Islamization in Indonesia.
 10. Aside from the examples of Indonesia and Bahrain, the Indo-Pakistan war of 
1965 is another one. Cf. Jalal 2010.
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The Survival of the Kurdish Chicken: 
Uneven Development and Nationalist 
Discourse in the Kurdistan Region 
of Iraq
Andrea Fischer-Tahir
Research Question and Positionality
In the spring of 2016, the Iraqi government banned the sale of poultry from the 
Kurdistan Region to the center and south of the country. Some months before, 
Baghdad had already banned the import of poultry from more than twenty coun-
tries after reports on the outbreak of avian influenza in other parts of the world. 
In the same vein, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) banned poultry 
imports, including from other parts of Iraq, and repeated this ban in January 2017 
after cases of avian influenza had been detected in the Iraqi province of Diyala.1 
A colleague of mine, living in the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya, keeps chickens on 
the roof of her parent’s house. Her birds were highly affected by the influenza, as 
she writes: “Initially there were twelve, but the bird flu took half of them. Now 
I’m crossing my fingers that others survive.”2
After the long years of economic crisis, poultry production in Kurdistan has 
grown over the last decade, including an increase of 40% in just the last five 
years (Abdullah 2018). According to official statistics, more than 1300 poultry 
farms produced 108,000 metric tons in 2017, and experts believe that the region 
“could technically sustain its own demand” (Abdullah 2018). However, the Kurd-
ish Regional Government (KRG) promotes food imports; in 2017, it imported 
an additional 60,000 metric tons.3 Foreign companies, above all from Turkey, 
sell their goods for lower prices while being legally protected as international 
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businesses. As a result, Kurdish producers are forced to sell their poultry to other 
parts of Iraq. Thus, Kurdish chickens have three major enemies: humans, viruses, 
and the capitalist mode of production. In this chapter, I will proceed to discuss the 
following questions: In which ways are uneven development and neoliberalism 
inscribed in the Kurdish project of independence? Is foreign trade with Turkey at 
odds with Kurdish nationalist sentiments? Finally, why do people raise chickens 
on their rooftops?
This chapter deals with political, economic, and social re-configurations 
and their interplay with representations of identity and taste. In using the term 
 “re-configurations” according to the conceptual framework of this volume, I am 
referring to reproductive, cumulative, and transformative processes that are both 
interdependent and overlapping (Boudon 1979). A notion of human experience 
that involves spatial and temporal dimensions makes it possible to highlight 
the dynamics of change (Koselleck 2000, p. 12 f.). The chapter’s argument also 
builds on a notion of “representation” that refers to the cultural practice of con-
structing meaning (Hall 1997). “Representations” can be understood as resources 
for action and forms of organized knowledge that shape how social systems of 
interaction are re-configured; at the same time, representations are subject to 
change (Baberowski 2009). This applies to more than abstract political sym-
bols, narratives, power structures, and economic concepts and performances. It 
also extends to the modes of dressing, eating and drinking, furnishing, gardening, 
or of consuming art that comment on political and economic change (Newcomb 
2006; Deeb and Harb 2013; Dimitova 2013). Hence, this chapter will consider the 
act of “keeping chickens on the roof” as a performance from the realm of every-
day life so as to reflect on order and disorder in the Kurdistan Region.
I must admit that this chapter was written without conducting formal field 
research on the particular topic of “urban farming.” However, my argument is 
grounded in long-standing research experience in Southern Kurdistan since 
1993. Apart from that, I have had the chance to work in Kurdistan with foreign 
and local NGOs and as an employee and scholar in the higher-education sector. 
These activities, as well as my social relationships there over the last twenty-five 
years, have shaped and reshaped my political position on Kurdistan. Therefore, 
my academic writing on Kurdistan is far from any kind of imagined objectiv-
ity, but is instead guided by empathy and the spirit of critical solidarity. The idea 
for this paper was born after a friend of mine, another researcher in the field of 
Kurdish Studies, returned from Sulaimaniya and told me about “chickens on 
the roof.” This provoked me to ask Kurdish friends and family about this on the 
phone or by email, and I began searching for more information in Kurdish media. 
 Well-structured field work informed by practice theory (Bourdieu 1977) that 
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involves participant observation, interviews, conversation, and reflexivity would 
lay better groundwork for discussing localized, positioned, and situated knowl-
edge, as advocated by Donna Haraway (1988, p. 589; see also Sultana 2007). 
However, for personal reasons, I have not been able to visit Kurdistan in recent 
years to see and observe, to ask questions and to listen. Therefore, my chapter 
appears as a sort of “family-and-friends paper” written from a privileged spatial 
distance.
The Chicken on the Roof
Across class and spatial divisions, contemporary Kurdish households tend to con-
sider chicken an integral part of their diet.4 In addition to kebabs made of minced 
lamb meat, fried chicken is one of the most popular dishes in restaurants and is 
routinely served to guests in private homes. However, the dominance of chicken 
is rather new: it results from modernist development and globalized commodity 
exchange. Thus, Henny H. Hansen’s account of Kurdish Woman’s Life suggests 
that, by the late 1950s, mutton was slightly preferred to fowl such as chicken or 
turkey (Hansen 1961, p. 49), and when asked what they consider to be “typical 
Kurdish food” (čêşt-î kurdî), Kurds in Iraq tend to mention several dishes involv-
ing lamb or mutton in some form (cf. 2009, p. 164 ff.). It was the “moderniza-
tion” projects of the 1970s pursued by the Iraqi Arab-nationalist Baath regime 
that introduced industrialized poultry farming. “Poultry farms” (abbreviated as 
dawājin) were state-owned enterprises located in small towns or the outskirts of 
cities, whereas in villages they were quasi-socialist co-operation projects accord-
ing to the agrarian reform law of 1970 (Gabbay 1978; Dzięgiel 1981; Genat 
2017). These cooperations were, however, abolished by 1988, when the regime 
launched its genocidal Anfal campaigns against the Peshmerga and village popu-
lation (Middle East Watch 1993).
During the 1970s and 1980s, the agrarian sector underwent contradictory 
transformations. Thus, the oil boom of 1973 facilitated an expansion of food 
imports to Iraq. However, this led to the neglect of the domestic agrarian pro-
duction. Based on food imports, the regime and welfare state established a food 
distribution system aimed at courting the support of low-income households and 
approval of the government’s policies, but when expanded to the whole popula-
tion the system became a means of discipline and control. At the beginning of 
the 1980s, tendencies to liberalize the economic sector emerged and intensified 
with the continued war against Iran (2003, p. 74 ff.; Springborg 1986; Leezenberg 
2006). Due to the international embargo of Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait in 
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1990, poultry production declined as the whole Iraqi economy collapsed; prices 
of major commodities such as flour, rice, sugar, tea, meat, gasoline, and kero-
sene exploded (Natali 2010, p. 29 ff.). The success of international humanitarian 
aid and rural reconstruction proved limited due to the embargo, Baghdad’s ban 
on Kurdish insurgents, and the persistent climate of insecurity (Ofteringer and 
Bäcker 1994; Winter et al. 2002).
Since 2003, the reintegration of the Kurdistan Region into the Iraqi oil econ-
omy led to growing international capital investment and a multitude of business 
opportunities, which significantly improved the availability of basic food and 
meat in the market. Even eggs on sale in the new supermarkets often stem from 
poultry production in other countries, especially Turkey and Iran. Shops located 
in the old bazaars, the urban periphery, or small towns also sell eggs and chicken 
from local and national producers as well as from individual farms. At the same 
time, people pursue alternative ways to obtain eggs and “white meat.” Thus, 
the city of Sulaimaniya is witnessing a revival of chicken-raising in courtyards 
and on the roofs of single-family dwellings. Recently, the above-mentioned col-
league of mine from Sulaimaniya sent me pictures of these friendly animals on 
her roof and in the courtyard of her parents’ house, a middle-class household with 
 well-educated daughters. She wrote:
We keep them for their eggs and for our happiness.[…] I feed them cucumbers 
and bread in vegetable soup.[…] I feed them whatever scraps of food are left over 
from us. We never throw food away. … We always find it hard to kill them to eat, 
but once or twice a year […] my sisters ask someone to kill a chicken and they 
eat it while they speak of its happy days.5
This is interesting on four levels: nutrition, care for animal welfare, responsi-
ble use of resources, and the appropriation of nature for human pleasure. When 
discussing this specific practice with other Kurdish friends and relatives living 
in Sulaimaniya, I heard several statements of validation, approval, and further 
explanation. For example, “Kurdish chicken tastes better than imported frozen 
chicken; the eggs are healthier than those of the dawājin.” Another said: “This 
is our culture.” Within this context, I also remembered elderly women from my 
husband’s family saying at various occasions over the last twenty-five years: 
“Kurdish chicken (mirişk-î kurdî) tastes better than any other chicken in the 
world.” Of course, they were referring to chicken raised by relatives in the vil-
lage. This is “Kurdish chicken” as a marker of quality, taste, and identity. Accord-
ing to Bourdieu (1987), taste preferences are a result of social practice; they 
are  class-based and represent cultural capital. Taste not only marks one’s place 
in social hierarchies but it also reproduces social difference. Embedded in other 
performances of lifestyle, taste also can be displayed as a comment or critique 
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of social hierarchies and injustice. This conceptual link raises the question: What 
kinds of hierarchies and injustices is this specific case referencing?
Nationalism, Uneven Development, and Neoliberalism
Since the popular uprising of March 1991, the Kurdistan Region underwent 
major political re-configurations. Today, it is a semi-independent territorial 
entity. This “unrecognized state” (Caspersen and Stansfield 2011) is ruled by a 
democratically elected government enacting domestic sovereignty over the four 
governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaimaniya, and Halabja. In September 2017, a 
referendum for independence showed that 92.7% of the voters supported separa-
tion from Iraq.6 The regional elections in September 2018 showed approval of 
the ruling parties: 44% for the Barzani-led Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
and 20.5% for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Among the parties who 
had formed a governing coalition with these two in 2014, it was 12% for the 
Sulaimaniya-based Change Movement (Gorran), 7% for the Islamic Group, and 
5 for the Islamic Union of Kurdistan.7 Kurdish nationalism is still the dominant 
ideology in the region, and these three oppositional forces were incorporated into 
the previous government in order to silence resistance and to avoid armed conflict 
among Kurdish parties. In regard to international relations, the KRG maintains 
diplomatic ties and negotiates military arrangements with foreign powers; it also 
contracts with oil companies from such countries as China, Russia, the United 
States, Norway, and Turkey.8 At the same time, Kurdish factions have been part of 
the Iraqi parliament and government since 2005, and the appointed president of 
post-Baath Iraq has always been a Kurd from the PUK leadership, from Jalal Tal-
aban and Fuad Masum to Barham Salih. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
Baghdad and Erbil remains fragile. In particular, disputes over territory and the 
control of hydrocarbon resources have caused serious conflicts and led to armed 
confrontation. Thus, Haidar al-Abadi’s government reacted to the referendum by 
re-conquering the oil-rich area and the city of Kirkuk, which the Peshmerga have 
controlled since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.9
When Kurds transformed their decade-long struggle for self-determination 
into a semi-state, they had to cope with the experience of war and genocidal per-
secution (2003; Mlodoch 2014). After 1991, the climate of violence persisted 
due to invasions of the Turkish and Iranian neighbors, the Kurdish militia war, 
the intervention of the Iraqi regime, the US-led invasion, and, recently, the war 
against the quasi-fascist “Islamic State” (IS). Nevertheless, the Kurdistan Region 
has managed to implement some sort of “late-modernist” development, focusing 
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not only on the oil sector, but also on urban reconstruction, transport infrastruc-
ture, communication, international trade, higher education, leisure, and tourism. 
As in other parts of the world, this development has resembled a sort of “mega-
lomania,” and the ruling elites established the narrative of Kurdistan as the Iraqi 
Dubai (Sama 2015). In this transformation, government investment is hardly dis-
tinguishable from private domestic capital. Leading political figures and their rel-
atives also perform key roles in the economy and are financial sponsors of media, 
art, and higher education. At the same time, there is no transparency at all about 
the state’s financial plan. Harsh measures against journalists investigating corrup-
tion and maladministration exemplify the increasing authoritarianism of the rul-
ing parties (Watts 2014, 2017).
Since 2003, the Kurdistan Region has been witnessing the disintegration of the 
post-revolutionary distribution system that had been partly based on the old Iraqi 
welfare state. The government supports the neoliberal transformations through 
legal regulations. The Law of Investment issued in 2006 was designed to advance 
economic change; its articles pledge to facilitate economic activities such as capi-
tal transactions and buying or leasing land while exempting international inves-
tors from all taxes (except tariffs) for the first ten years.10 Economic experts stress 
that the implementation of the law has successfully promoted integration into the 
global economy (Heshmati 2010). The Kurdistan Region, with its booming center 
of Erbil, became “a place to see” attracting foreign capital as well as tourists. The 
former periphery of Iraq transformed into a center of development. However, it 
is uncertain how long Kurdistan will remain attractive for capital investment; 
today’s privileged situation is mainly due to lasting insecurity in the “rest of 
Iraq.” In addition, development is not equally “distributed.” Instead, spatial dif-
ferentiation between governorates is growing. As the most powerful parts of the 
political elites (KDP) reside in Erbil and Dohuk, these cities are most favored, 
whereas Sulaimaniya and Halabja benefit less from the “boom”—even though 
Halabja is widely recognized in Kurdish discourse as the most powerful symbol 
of genocidal persecution (2012; Watts 2017). These inner peripheries greatly suf-
fered between 2014 and 2018, when the KRG repeatedly ordered the suspension 
of public-sector salaries, presenting the war against IS and the uncooperative gov-
ernment in Baghdad as justifications. Meanwhile, business seemed to be proceed-
ing as usual for the political-economic elites.
Peripheralization is not a new phenomenon in Kurdistan. European colonial-
ism and Iraqi inner colonialism put the region at the margins of both the global 
and the national socio-economic and political orders. The novelty is the concur-
rence of the Kurdistan Region’s de-peripheralization on the national scale (of 
Iraq) with re-peripheralization on a sub-national scale (Kurdistan). However, 
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neither the old nor the new forms of peripheralization should be seen as a mis-
match for (late) “modernization.” Rather, as critical geographer Neil Smith 
(1984) would say, they result from the logic of capital accumulation and “normal” 
capitalist development, which is uneven in space and time.
According to the re-configurations outlined so far, neoliberalism’s “pervasive 
affects … on ways of thought and political-economic practice” (Harvey 2007, 
p. 23) are also true for other sectors as health care and higher education. Over the 
past decade, a growing number of private hospitals have opened, reinforcing a 
notion that health care is tied to social class. At the same time, medical treatment 
became more costly in state-run hospitals and dramatically exceeded a house-
hold’s monthly income and savings especially in cases of cancer or renal dis-
eases. Kurdistan had three universities in 2003. Today, there are fifteen more, half 
of them private, among them two American universities, one controlled by the 
Barzani family, the other by Barham Salih. Private universities require tuition fees 
denominated in US dollars and the “right” social and political contacts. Due to 
the focus on commercial and business studies, the use of English as the language 
of instruction, and staff comprised of “Westerners” and highly qualified Diaspora 
returnees, their degrees are more valued than those of state universities, which 
improves private students’ prospects. Thus, the re-configuration of higher educa-
tion has led to new social injustice while reproducing older social hierarchies.
Neoliberalism also affects other spheres of life. For example, neoliberal tech-
niques have changed patterns of media production and journalistic representation 
with significant effects on political and social discourses. Interestingly, Kurd-
ish nationalism remains the hegemonic narrative in the media (2017). Similarly, 
Schluwa Sama’s (2015) research on shopping malls shows that the neoliberal 
ideology of success, exclusivity, and self-presentation is perfectly compatible 
with Kurdish nationalist narratives of moral superiority over “the Arabs” and 
migrant workers. In addition, another aspect of urban reconstruction indicates 
that nationalism is not a contradiction to neoliberalism. As elsewhere in West 
Asia and North Africa, “late-modernist” development can be combined with the 
desire for celebrating cultural heritage. Thus, selected historical sites and build-
ings (most prominently the citadel of Erbil) have become subject to revaluation, 
restoration, and integration or interconnection with other projects such as luxury 
hotels or shopping areas. At the same time, the cities have seen a proliferation of 
cafés and restaurants offering “Kurdish food” at “Western” prices, to be enjoyed 
in new buildings or in renovated old city houses, both with folkloristic interior 
decoration. These are exclusive spaces for consumption, social networking, 
political discussion, business, and self-presentation. During my last visit to Kurd-
istan, in spring 2016, I was in the courtyard of such a re-functioned city house 
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in Sulaimaniya when I had the opportunity to meet an unexpected coeval—the 
free-range chicken. When I asked why chickens would be kept in such places, the 
answer was “This is part of our culture.”
Change, Continuity, and the Chicken
The Kurdistan Region’s two major functions within contemporary global capital-
ism are as a market and as a supplier of natural resources. As indicated earlier, 
this has serious effects on Kurdistan’s domestic production. In 2015, for exam-
ple, government officials stated that about 90% of food available in the local 
market was imported, while at the same time the government allocated only two 
percent of the annual budget to the agricultural sector (Abdullah 2015). As for 
poultry production, local enterprises as well as individual farmers face difficul-
ties selling their chicken in local markets because companies from Turkey, Iran, 
France, China, South Africa, and elsewhere sell chicken and eggs at lower prices. 
The import business in Kurdistan is in the tight grip of Kurdish merchants who 
are entangled with ruling elites, explaining the lack of legal measures to regulate 
prices in a way that would strengthen the position of local “meat producers” (Han-
dani 2017). The neglect of the agricultural sector while pinning all hopes for a 
great future on oil and gas reflects a sort of rentier-state mentality, partly inher-
ited from Iraq and partly adopted with Kurdistan’s increasing integration into the 
global economy. As far as I could observe on previous visits, public opinion in 
Kurdistan considers dependence on imported goods to be a threat to domestic 
food production. In the media, agricultural experts and other economists criticize 
the lack of proper planning and warn of consequences for the domestic agricul-
ture. Farmers and city dwellers make similar arguments, as Katharina Lange 
(2016) has shown for the province of Dohuk. However, interviewees several years 
earlier were already pointing to the dangers of oil dependency, and specifically 
United Nations the “oil-for-food” program implemented in 1997 to absorb the dra-
matic effects of the embargo against Iraq. Whereas humanitarian aid after 1991 
had aimed at rebuilding villages and rehabilitating agriculture, the “oil-for-food” 
program partly stopped this process and reanimated the Iraqi food distribution sys-
tem (2011). Hence, dependency on food imports is not new. What has changed 
are the major players in food imports, and in general the economic dominance of 
Turkey. In recent years, I have often heard rhetorical questions such as “Why do 
we allow the Kurds’ enemies to flood our bazaar with their goods? Don’t we have 
our own tomatoes, potatoes, eggs, and meat?” Such questions merge a critique of 
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dependency with Kurdish nationalist discourse. At the same time, the prevailing 
dependency shows that re-configurations involve both change and continuity.
Turning to the level of food consumption, chicken presents more evidence that 
change and continuity are simultaneous. In comparison to the “Kurdish chicken” 
from the village, frozen animals delivered through transnational commodity 
chains seem to offer advantages besides their lower prices. For one thing, they are 
easier to get—for example, when driving home from work, passing by a shop in 
the neighborhood, or one of the new supermarkets. This avoids a time-consuming 
visit to the central bazaar in the heavily trafficked downtown where fresh meat 
and local goods are sold. Women in particular prefer not to go to the “meat mar-
ket,” as it is considered “dirty,” “unhygienic,” and “male.” Interestingly, the stand-
ardized chicken also changes cooking and eating habits. As far as I observed in 
the past, Kurdish women used to cook the feet for little children; this not only 
provided them with extra calcium, but also kept them busy and silent for a while. 
However, the standardized chicken arrives in Kurdistan without its feet. In addi-
tion, due to the destructive character of capitalist “meat production,” imported 
chickens are female, and so men miss the cock that is considered a delicacy. Last 
but not least, relations of commodity circulation affect the ways chicken is con-
sumed: either on the table or on a table-cloth spread on the floor. The parts of a 
chicken used to be distributed according to social hierarchy, the cultural value of 
innards and outer parts, and socially defined needs. Accordingly, taste preferences 
were constructed und justified in social discourse (2009, p. 164 ff.). The standard-
ized chicken disturbs this order because of the specificity of the chicken’s body in 
terms of proportions, inner organs, head and feet, but it does not lead to abolish-
ing inequality at the table under male domination. Either way, special guests will 
be served a “Kurdish chicken,” for it seems to be consensus that the village-based 
chicken is much better. Moreover, “Kurdish chicken” is said not to be contami-
nated with antibiotics or biogenetic amines, defects predominantly to be found in 
imported chicken (Murad 2013).
My colleague in Sulaimaniya who keeps chickens on the roof confirmed the 
concern for healthy food, referring to “frequent media and private conversa-
tions about the nutritional value of fresh free-range eggs and meat.”11 She thus 
addresses one of the multiple reasons for urban people to keep their own chickens 
instead of being very dependent on imported food that might be a threat to health. 
Indeed, this health discourse is influenced by global discourses on healthy and 
organic food as well as the revaluation of “the natural” and moves of re-turning 
to nature. In connection with these discourses, middle-class city dwellers have 
rediscovered the urban garden or begun to buy plots of land outside of town for 
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planting vegetables, fruit trees, and flowers. These people seek rest and relaxa-
tion from the city, which they see as overloaded with traffic, construction noise, 
noxious substances, a hectic pace, and political struggles. I often heard relatives 
and friends justifying these “returns to nature” by referring to village and agrar-
ian society as genuine aspects of Kurdishness. In the same vein, an agrarian sci-
entist published an encyclopedia of herbology aiming at preserving knowledge 
about the nutritional value and healing powers of herbs in general, particularly 
those growing in Kurdistan (Ghefur 2012). In addition, my colleague stressed that 
keeping chickens in the city is a tradition, and writes:
[I]n our neighborhood on the upper side of town (known as the traditional 
neighborhood), families have always kept animals. I remember seeing some of 
neighbors and others closer to the mountain of Goyzhe even keep sheep and goats 
until the late 1990s.12
Later this practice disappeared somehow, but “lately it has become trendier … 
perhaps due to the financial crisis,” that is, the suspension of salaries when Erbil 
and Baghdad quarreled over the budget of the Kurdistan Region. Past, present, 
and future have a pervasive influence. Meanwhile, coping strategies merge with 
narratives of Kurdish identity to produce critical comments on what the ruling 
elites promote as “development.”
The (A-)Political at the End
The return to nature—be it the chicken on the urban roof and courtyard, the urban 
garden, or the urban part-time farmer—also seems related to structural prob-
lems with the political culture in Kurdistan. The KRG is well-trained in chan-
neling political opposition. Long before the Arab Spring, Kurds in Iraq regularly 
took to the streets to protest maladministration and corruption. A strong civil 
society developed that includes a broad spectrum of social, political, economic 
and cultural interest groups. However, two main structural aspects of Kurdish 
society and political culture have so far prevented successful social revolution-
ary upheaval. First, there is the incorporative power of the post-revolutionary 
system and rentier-state; in one way or another, the individuals are placed within 
the system through kinship and other social networks. This helps them survive 
and improve their own situations and positions. Secondly, Kurdish narratives 
of victimhood and the historically grounded legitimacy of the Kurdish right to 
 self-determination have persistent mobilizing power. Thus, conflicts with external 
forces (outer enemies) are invoked to activate the Kurdish anti-colonial reflexes. 
To give an example, the referendum of 2017 was widely considered a success by 
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the ruling elites and international media; as mentioned, more than 90% voted in 
favor of separation. However, the referendum for independence was held primar-
ily in order to postpone regular elections in Kurdistan, to prolong Masud Barza-
ni’s presidency and power, and strengthen Erbil’s position in relation to Baghdad. 
Even though Kurds have been aware of this, relatives I have heard criticizing the 
KRG often voted “yes” or even volunteered as polling clerks. Apart from that, 
a closer look at numbers is revealing: the referendum was characterized by a 
total voter turnout of 72%, with Halabja only 55.6% and Sulaimaniya city only 
47%.13 A longtime friend of mine, herself a left-wing activist since the 1970s, 
said: “I cannot vote ‘yes’ because it is all in the interest of the Barzanis. But nei-
ther can I vote ‘no’ because I am a Kurd. I have struggled my whole life for our 
 self-determination.”14
During my most recent visit three years ago, this friend was also very much 
concerned with her garden, and we both agreed that planting and caring for flow-
ers is a perfect escaping strategy in a disordered world that seems impossible to 
change in a profound, and not only superficial way.
At this point, let me return to the initial question: Why are there chickens on 
the roofs of houses in a Kurdish city? As I have tried to show, the answer lies in 
the dynamics of economic, political, and social re-configurations and in various 
discourses at work in these processes that involve both change and continuity. I 
would interpret this particular practice as an appropriation of nature, a comment 
of transformation processes, and a critique of “megalomania,” alienation, and 
dependency on “the enemies of the Kurds”. At the same time, this practice is in 
dialogue with global discourses on healthy nutrition, sustainability, and protec-
tion of the planet. It represents an attempt to change something in this disordered 
world, if only on a small scale.
Endnotes
 1. “Iraq bans poultry imports from 24 countries over avian flu threat,” Reuters, 
10 Jan. 2016; “Kurdish poultry sales continue to decline after Iraqi import 
ban”, Rudaw, 21 April 2016; “KRG bans chicken imports from 39 countries 
and amid bird flu epidemic”, Rudaw, 31 Aug. 2018. See also Linden 2016.
 2. Email exchange of the author with Shenah Abdullah, 2 Sept. 2018; quoted 
with her permission.
 3. “KRG bans chicken imports …”, Rudaw, 31 Aug. 2018.
 4. Kurds in Iraq distinguish between goştî spî (“white meat”) referring predom-
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 5. Email exchange with Shenah Abdullah, see footnote 2.
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The Infantilization of the Colonized: 
Medical and Psychiatric Descriptions 
of Drinking Habits in the Colonial 
Maghreb
Nina S. Studer
French doctors and psychiatrists traveling through or working in the colonial 
Maghreb during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries commonly reported in 
their publications that the colonized they encountered reminded them of children.1 
They also described practically every aspect of the behavior of the colonized as 
childlike in some respect. While this equation of the colonized with children was 
by no means restricted to the medico-psychiatric source material and can be found 
in a variety of different colonial publications,2 this chapter will focus on publica-
tions by doctors and psychiatrists, as their status as widely accepted experts and 
as alleged pillars of science and modernity made their statements, in the eyes of 
their French readership, more authoritative than those of other authors. Though 
this is usually not stated explicitly, the children imagined in these comparisons 
were presumably European, which accords with a long tradition of European 
medical and psychiatric experts comparing the colonized to an imaginary Euro-
pean normality. Yet comparisons of the colonized with children in the publications 
of French doctors and psychiatrists were more than just colorful and anecdotal 
descriptions of life in the colonies; they were part of an implicit, ongoing process 
of diagnosing the behavior of the colonized as intrinsically different from French 
behavior. These comparisons implicitly suggested that colonized adults and Euro-
pean children were roughly on the same developmental level,3 and concluded that 
both groups had a similar relationship to French adults: that is, receiving educa-
tion from them, following their lead, and letting them make important decisions 
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on their behalf. The framing of the colonized as children highlights the colonial 
understanding of there being a clear power imbalance in the colonies—with 
France as the undisputed paterfamilias, so to speak, and with the colonized unable 
to reach French levels of reason and modernity on their own.
The conceptualization of the colonized as children was connected to the Euro-
pean notion that the colonies represented, as Joseph Massad put it in his 2007 
book Desiring Arabs, “an earlier stage of Europe, the childhood of Europe itself, 
which European colonialism would shepherd to adult maturity” (Massad 2007, 
p. 55).4 French colonial doctors and psychiatrists often explained this childlike-
ness of the North Africans using contemporary theories about a clear hierarchy 
of races, implying that the colonized were on a lower evolutional level than the 
French colonizer, or, applying Massad’s vocabulary, that the region as a whole 
was roughly at the stage of France’s childhood.5 While the colonies as a whole 
were described as childlike, many of these comparisons of the colonized with 
children were gendered and applied with varying degrees to men and women. 
Even though there are a variety of casual descriptions of Muslim men as chil-
dren in French publications, such descriptions, both implicit and explicit, were a 
nearly constant feature when it came to Muslim women. French colonial authors 
described Muslim women as childlike and compared their intellectual capaci-
ties, reasoning, and behavior to those of children (Lemanski 1900, p. 94; Ibid. 
1913, p. 19, 166; Igert 1955, p. 651).6 This gender bias in the infantilization of 
the colonized should also be seen in the context of hysterical women often being 
described as “child-women” in Europe and America in the nineteenth century, 
and in view of the widespread nineteenth-century theory of women in general 
being closer to children than to adult men (Smith-Rosenberg 1972, p. 677; Pick 
1989, p. 105). Hence, these comparisons of colonized women with children cor-
responded to the broader paternalistic views of the colonial doctors and psychia-
trists studied for this chapter.
While such descriptions might appear, at first glance, to be run-of-the-mill 
indications of colonial paternalism, this tradition of comparing the colonized to 
children had more harmful consequences. Some twentieth-century colonial psy-
chiatrists openly diagnosed the colonized in the Maghreb with puérilisme men-
tal (mental infantilism). The psychiatrist Sextius Arène, for example, stated in 
his 1913 dissertation on criminality in Tunisia: “The Arab has a (psychological) 
foundation of mental infantilism,” before further explaining that this “mental 
infantilism” manifested as, among other things, a “taste for fibbing” and a joy 
in storytelling. He concluded: “In short, he is a great child, lazy and improvi-
dent” (Arène 1913, p. 137). This notion, that the childlike nature of the colonized 
was so intense that it made sense to claim all colonized people were affected by 
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“mental infantilism” (or sometimes just “infantilism”), became widely accepted 
in 1918, when the famous psychiatrist Antoine Porot, the founder of the 
 influential school of psychiatry known as the École d'Alger, adopted “mental 
infantilism” as a useful diagnosis for the colonized in what would become the 
founding text of French colonial psychiatry in the Maghreb, Notes on Muslim 
Psychiatry (Porot 1918, p. 383).
While “mental infantilism” was an accepted psychiatric diagnosis in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, describing a European adult with pathologi-
cally childlike behavior in speech, gestures, and mindset,7 colonial psychiatrists 
like Arène and Porot did not apply it in this sense to the colonized populations.8 
In the context of the colonies, “mental infantilism” was not an individual diag-
nosis applied to a specific person suffering from a mental problem, but instead 
a generalized description of the behavior of all the colonized. Using the term 
“mental infantilism” to define the colonized was a form of pathologization of nor-
mal, everyday behavior and a cornerstone of colonial psychiatry in the Maghreb 
(Studer 2015, p. 31 ff.).
Thus, under the auspices of Antoine Porot, French colonial psychiatry had 
come to apply a very specific clinical diagnosis (“mental infantilism”) to the 
healthy masses of colonized people. This chapter analyzes the process that led 
to this outcome and investigates earlier, colonial, medico-psychiatric comments 
about all North Africans being childlike, a pejorative attitude which clearly influ-
enced the psychiatrists of the École d’Alger and was the principle underlying 
mechanism that led to their generalized diagnosis. Arène and Porot’s sweeping 
diagnosis can only be understood against the backdrop of generation after genera-
tion of French doctors and psychiatrists in the Maghreb discussing and reinforc-
ing the trope of the childlike behavior of the colonized.
This chapter contextualizes both the specific diagnosis, by proponents of the 
École d’Alger, of North Africans suffering from “mental infantilism,” and the 
more general descriptions of the colonized as perpetually and habitually child-
like, by looking at one context in which the medical and psychiatric source mate-
rial regularly described the colonized as children: the consumption of alcohol. 
This context is particularly interesting because French sources assumed that the 
introduction of alcohol into the region and the conversion of formerly abstinent 
Muslims into alcohol consumers and alcohol abusers amounted to a profound 
transformation of the region initiated by the French—not a direct goal of the 
French “modernization project” in the colonies, but rather a necessary side effect, 
as French modernity was unimaginable without alcohol. This chapter seeks to 
demonstrate why descriptions of alcohol consumption, a French everyday habit 
adopted by some of the colonized, provides a case study of three different layers 
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of infantilization: the first apparent in descriptions of the habit itself, the second 
related to theories about the physical reactions of the bodies of the colonized, and 
the third present in regulations proposed by the French. This chapter will examine 
these three layers in the French colonial sources and present specific examples 
for each. It will also examine how French officials reacted to the alcohol con-
sumption of the colonized and analyze the deep colonial power imbalance behind 
the equation of alcohol-drinking Muslims with children, which culminated in the 
psychiatrists around Antoine Porot diagnosing a whole region with “mental infan-
tilism” in the first half of twentieth century.
Levels of Infantilization
French colonial doctors and psychiatrists described the alcohol consumption of 
a very specific group—colonized adult Muslim men—as childlike in their pub-
lications.9 These descriptions only concerned actual adults, as colonial doctors 
and psychiatrists almost never commented on the drinking habits of colonized 
children or adolescents. Even though references to childlike behavior and atti-
tudes can also be found in some medical and psychiatric descriptions of North 
African Jews,10 childishness was never associated with their drinking habits. 
While colonized women were more commonly compared to children than men, 
 alcohol-drinking Muslim women were rarely reported on in the colonial sources. 
In those exceptional cases when their alcohol consumption was described, their 
behavior was not compared to that of children.
The infantilization of these colonized adult Muslim men in the colonial source 
material operated on three general levels: 1) French colonial doctors and psychi-
atrists argued that the colonized drank alcohol “incorrectly”: in ways that were 
deeply and problematically childlike and for childish reasons. This “incorrect 
consumption” had various alleged manifestations. French authors claimed, for 
example, that the colonized only enjoyed sugary alcoholic drinks such as absinthe 
(Coudray 1914, p. 47) and described the spread of alcohol among the colonized 
Muslims as not being motivated by adult reasoning. Additionally, French doctors 
and psychiatrists often did not concede that the colonized turned to alcohol for 
reasons of taste or company. Rather, they viewed it as a case of the colonized 
childishly mimicking the behavior of the colonizers, but without possessing the 
necessary maturity to copy French habits productively. 2) The second layer of 
infantilization concerned the reaction of the bodies of the colonized to alcohol, 
139The Infantilization of the Colonized: Medical and Psychiatric …
which was in many ways likened to that of people who had not reached full adult-
hood. The French colonial doctors and psychiatrists analyzed for this chapter saw 
these alcohol drinkers among the colonized as being in a metaphorical state of 
childhood, as it was believed that Muslims had not consumed any alcohol before 
the French military conquest of the region. In the French worldview, the colo-
nized had only just been “won over” by alcohol and French observers assumed 
that, like French children of the time, they were at the very beginning of a life 
with alcohol. Due to this “newness,” or lack of habituation, the bodies of the col-
onized were believed to react differently to alcohol than French bodies. 3) The 
final level of infantilization did not concern the alcohol consumption of the colo-
nized itself, but the French reaction to it. A variety of colonial doctors and psy-
chiatrists argued that, like children, the colonized had to be taught how to drink in 
a civilized and responsible way by the French.
These different levels of infantilization were, of course, interconnected in 
colonial publications and allusions to several levels can often be found in one 
single report. For example, one doctor, Édouard-Adolphe Duchesne, exclaimed 
in 1853 how, in the first twenty years of French rule, the Algerian colonized had 
only adopted France’s bad habits. According to him, the consumption of alcohol 
was foremost among them. He bemoaned that, when it came to the colonized 
sex workers whom he studied in his monograph, it was alcohol that guaranteed 
their ultimate corruption. In his eyes, these women had been introduced into 
the “refinements of debauchery” by European sex workers, but “Wine, rum and 
absinthe did the rest.” He then went on to describe the habits of all the colonized, 
claiming: “Similar to our young children, who remember with such excellent 
memories the bad words that they hear, and who practice with such ease the bad 
examples that are given to them, it seems that the Muslim population [of Alge-
ria] readily took from our civilization only that which is vicious and troubling” 
(Duchesne 1853, p. 83 f.). Duchesne clearly believed that the colonized consumed 
alcohol incorrectly (as he described the sex workers turning to spirits, such as rum 
and absinthe, rather than “hygienic” drinks, such as wine and beer) and that by 
starting to drink alcohol, they had copied the worst behavior of the French. He 
believed this had only begun after the colonization of the region by France. In 
the colonial worldview, this meant that, like French children, colonial subjects 
were still relatively unused to the substance. While Duchesne did not allude to the 
French teaching the colonized how to drink correctly, his framing of the situation 
clearly suggests that he believed France to have been neglectful in its duties as 
teacher and guardian by “allowing” the colonized to begin drinking alcohol.
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Drinking Incorrectly
Like Duchesne, many French authors were of the opinion that Muslims in the 
Maghreb favored strong spirits over wine. One doctor P. Remlinger, for exam-
ple, wrote a 1912 article about the spread of alcoholism in Morocco, in which he 
claimed that “Arabs display a preference for absinthe, cognac, whisky and gin.” 
According to him, this penchant for strong liquors was due to Europeans drinking 
“in general for the pleasure of drinking, despite the intoxication which may result 
from it,” while “the Arab never or almost never drinks by taste. It is drunkenness 
that he looks for. The more easily it is obtained, the more satisfied he is. […] 
The ideal, evidently, would be for him to be drunk without drinking” (Remlinger 
1912, p. 750). However, it was not just this preference towards particularly strong 
drinks that was seen to be problematic and deeply immature: in the eyes of the 
French observers, colonized Muslims also drank too much altogether. The French 
doctors and psychiatrists described the colonized as lacking rationality and mod-
eration in all aspects of their lives, which led to the claim that the colonized were 
incapable of a normal, reasonable level of alcohol consumption as allegedly prac-
ticed by French adults.11 Directly after the passage cited above, Remlinger simply 
stated that “the Arab does not know any moderation in the consumption of alco-
holic beverages.” According to Remlinger, this fact made it easy to spot alcohol 
drinkers among the colonized Muslims. “He [the Moroccan Muslim] drinks or he 
does not, and if he drinks, he is drunk” (Remlinger 1912, p. 750).
A very similar sentiment about the lack of moderation in the colonized can be 
found in Pierre Pinaud’s 1933 medical dissertation on alcoholism in Algeria. He 
explained this connection between excessive consumption and, so to speak, exces-
sive non-consumption of alcohol, by writing that, upon starting the research for his 
dissertation, he was immediately struck by the “immoderation” of consumption 
among Algerian Muslims. He claimed: “With him [the Algerian Muslim], there 
are no half-measures: either he respects the wise precepts of the Qur’an and will 
abstain all his life from lifting any fermented beverage to his lips; or, if he starts 
drinking, he will soon exceed fair and reasonable measures. There are only very 
few Arabs who follow a rational and moderate consumption of alcohol akin to that 
of many Europeans” (Pinaud 1933, p. 11). Although they are not comparing the 
colonized to children in these passages, both Remlinger and Pinaud clearly interpret 
rationality and moderation as adult characteristics that Muslims lacked. The implicit 
conclusion of such statements is that, in the minds of these French commentators, 
colonized adults’ alcohol consumption proved they were “not quite” adults.
Finally, the vocabulary used to describe this notion of the spread of alco-
hol being not an act of adult self-determination, but a mere consequence of the 
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 growing influence of France in the region, provides further insight into how colo-
nial publications both infantilized and dehumanized the colonized. In 1907, for 
example, the psychiatrist Camille-Charles Gervais stated in his dissertation on the 
treatment of mental patients in Algeria that “the Arab” is “easily won over by the 
vices of our civilization” (Gervais 1907, p. 47), before specifying alcohol as one 
of these vices. Similarly, Jean Coudray described this whole process in his 1914 
medical dissertation about the state of surgery in Tunisia as follows: “Indeed, 
since the natives [started to] mingle with the life of the Europeans, since our mor-
alizing civilization has flooded them with its benefits, they gradually let them-
selves be won over by the sweetness of absinthe imported from France” (Coudray 
1914, p. 47). In both cases, the colonized could not help themselves: alcohol 
“won them over.” In this context, the habit of drinking alcohol was framed as hav-
ing greater agency than the Muslims who consumed it. We can therefore conclude 
that the alcohol consumption of the colonized was fully attributed, by popular 
belief, to the spread of French influence and not to self-determination among the 
colonized. It was out of childlike obstinacy, French observers claimed, that this 
French influence only included emulation of potentially detrimental French hab-
its, such as alcohol consumption, and not what they judged to be nobler Western 
ideals and behaviors.
The beverage choices of the colonized, their motivation for starting to drink, 
and the amounts they consumed were all infantilized by the colonial doctors and 
psychiatrists. Lack of agency, rationality, and moderation were all symptoms of 
the “mental infantilism” that the French doctors and psychiatrists of the École 
d’Alger diagnosed in all Muslims they encountered in the Maghreb. Antoine 
Porot himself defined the “mental infantilism” of normal Muslim adults in 1918 
as being dominated, like the minds of European children, by “credulity and stub-
bornness,” before adding that, unlike European children, they lacked both curios-
ity and a real “scientific appetite” and were therefore only capable of arriving at 
simple conclusions (Porot 1918, p. 382 f.). These mechanisms of infantilizing the 
consumption of alcohol by the colonized allowed French observers to artificially 
distance the colonized from the “French” habit they had adopted.
Immature Bodies
While the French authors believed that most, if not all, of their compatriots con-
sumed alcohol regularly, just like their parents and grandparents before them, the 
colonized were perpetually understood to have just been “won over” by alcohol, 
as seen in the quotes by Gervais and Coudray discussed above (Gervais 1907, 
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p. 47; Coudray 1914, p. 47). Each generation of alcohol-drinking Muslims was 
described by French observers as being among the first to have turned to alcohol. 
This also meant that each generation was treated as unused to alcohol and, conse-
quently, as metaphorical children.
Based on this assumption, it was perpetually expected that the physical and 
emotional reactions of the colonized to alcohol drinking would be fundamen-
tally different from those of the French. The aforementioned French psychiatrist 
Antoine Porot described in his 1918 article his personal experiences with Muslim 
Algerian soldiers during World War I by claiming: “Alcoholism has caused much 
havoc on these virgin organisms and these men, who, for the most part, have 
never tasted fermented beverages and liquors before [military] service, sometimes 
indulged in it with that immoderation specific to the primitives” (Porot 1918, 
p. 383 f.). Porot’s term “virgin organisms” implied that these soldiers had only 
been introduced to the pathological behavior of alcohol-drinking and alcohol-
ism by copying the actions of the French soldiers, while also suggesting that their 
reaction to alcohol was biologically different from that of the non-virgin French. 
By additionally calling them “primitives,” he turned their alcohol consumption 
into something inherently different from that of the French.
Antoine Porot expanded on this idea of alcohol consumption having biologi-
cally different effects on the North African soldiers versus other soldiers in a 
1932 article. In this article, Porot and his student Don Côme Arrii repeated this 
articulation and then added: “The native is hypersensitive to alcohol because of 
his individual or ancestral non-habit [of drinking]” (Porot and Arrii 1932, p. 600), 
in other words, alcohol produced a stronger reaction in the colonized because 
they had only recently been “won over” by it. According to Porot and Arrii, this 
lack of generational acclimatization regarding alcohol had serious physical con-
sequences. Those Muslims who started to drink lacked the supposed beneficial 
genetic experience of generations of alcohol-drinking ancestors, which made their 
reactions to alcohol supposedly more violent.
The same argument was also made by Doctor Pierre Pinaud in his 1933 medi-
cal dissertation, “Alcoholism amongst Arabs in Algeria.” Pinaud described the 
considerable amount of anisette consumed by both European settlers and Alge-
rian Muslims after the 1914 ban on absinthe, and added: “But the natives seem 
more particularly affected. This is, we believe, the result of a particular idi-
osyncrasy, and of a weaker resistance to this toxin combined with an exagger-
ated consumption” (Pinaud 1933, p. 27).12 It appears that Pinaud understood this 
“idiosyncrasy” and “weaker resistance”—as well as the “exaggerated consump-
tion”—to be racial characteristics shared by all Algerian Muslims and marking 
them as different from Europeans. The weaker resistance towards alcohol that 
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Pinaud alleged in this quote seems to be comparable to Porot’s idea of Muslims 
as “virgin organisms” (Porot 1918, p. 383 f.).
As these quotes by Porot and Pinaud show, the less-than-adult status of the 
colonized was, for French observers, apparent in their physical reactions towards 
alcohol. It was claimed that their bodies reacted differently and did not tolerate 
alcohol as well as those of the French, in whose veins alcohol had flowed for gen-
erations. Judging by physical reactions to alcohol, both Porot and Pinaud ascribed 
to alcohol-drinking Muslims an evolutionary level beneath French adults. These 
descriptions of distinct physical reactions towards alcohol among the colonized 
are also reminiscent of French people’s attitudes at the time toward alcohol con-
sumption by their own children. Watered-down wine was often the recommended 
drink for children in order for their young bodies, not yet capable of handling 
alcohol in the same way as French adults, to become accustomed to alcohol.13 
The childlike colonized, with their alleged predilection for strong drinks, had 
sidestepped this stage of acclimatization, which explained why, in the eyes of 
many French experts, alcoholism was so rampant among them.
Lessons on Drinking
As mentioned above, the framing of Muslims’ alcohol consumption patterns as 
deeply childlike also introduced the idea that the French, in their “role” as the 
adults in the colonial situation, needed to teach the colonized how to drink cor-
rectly. A report concerning a discussion of the Higher Council of Government in 
Algiers on June 28, 1911 demanded just that, calling for urgent measures against 
the uncontrolled consumption of aperitifs among both the colonizers and the col-
onized in Algeria. With reference to the colonized, the report stated: “They [King 
Absinthe and Queen Anisette] have penetrated, these deadly sovereigns, into the 
heretofore recalcitrant territory of Islam—in Mecca, alcohol has been found, 
smuggled in oil drums, and, in Algeria, islets of alcoholism have been formed. 
It is time for a cry for help and for measures to protect our indigenous popula-
tions [who are] a little childlike” (Saliège 1911/1912, p. 154). Two sets of meas-
ures were recommended in the report: either a strict prohibition of both absinthe 
and anisettes, or a combination of abstinence education, restriction of sales, and 
surveillance of places that sold alcohol (Saliège 1911/1912, p. 155 f.). However, 
neither option was fully implemented in Algeria.14 Had they been implemented, 
these measures would have been imposed by the French government against the 
express wishes of the settler population in Algeria, many of whom loudly pro-
tested against such actions, stating that they very much enjoyed their aperitifs. 
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This report clearly framed France’s role in all of this as having to be the adult in 
the room—imposing unwelcome restrictions on those unwilling or unable to vol-
untarily limit their own consumption. This report further stated that France had a 
duty to protect the European populations in Algeria from absinthe and anisette: 
“We have to protect, like an attentive mother, the young Algero-European race” 
(Saliège 1911/1912, p. 155), and thus keep them from destroying themselves.
France, the motherland, assumed the role of the parent and assigned the settler 
colony that of the child, which fits into standard romanticized conceptions of the 
relationship between citizen and state. France’s attempts to restrict the consump-
tion of aperitifs by the French settlers in Algeria should be interpreted as an act 
of parental care. In contrast, this same report described the relationship between 
the colonized and France in a slightly different way: “With respect to the natives, 
of whom we are, to a degree, the guardians, we need to have a deep and serious 
conception of their needs, of their faults, of the duties that both impose on us” 
(Saliège 1911/1912, p. 155). The French term tuteurs, which is translated here 
as guardians but also means mentors, demonstrates a rather different relationship 
between the French government and its colonized subjects—one of teacher and 
student rather than parent and child. It was out of duty, not love, that France had 
to step in with the proposed measures. Yet the French observers clearly believed 
that through legal measures, education, and surveillance, as well as by French set-
tlers being better role models, the colonized would learn how to drink in a more 
mature and reasonable way. Like children, they had to be taught how to be more 
like adults.
Conclusion
In conclusion, little evidence of adulthood or self-determination can be found 
in the colonial descriptions of the alcohol consumption of the colonized in the 
Maghreb. The narratives of the French colonial doctors and psychiatrists writing 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggested that, when it came to 
alcohol, every aspect of the drinking habits of the colonized was influenced by 
factors outside their control, so to speak. Colonial subjects only started to drink 
because the French had introduced alcohol into their region; they only continued 
to drink because they were trying to imitate the French; character traits allegedly 
shared by the whole “race” pushed them towards particularly sweet and strong 
alcohol; their innate immoderation made them unable to control their consump-
tion; their bodies themselves reacted uncontrollably to alcohol as a substance; and 
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their only hope of moderating their own alcohol consumption was if they obedi-
ently followed strict measures enacted by their guardian, France.
This infantilization of the colonized by the medico-psychiatric profession is 
itself patronizing and problematic, but it also had political implications. If the col-
onized were childlike and without agency, even in minor, everyday issues, how 
could they ever hope to successfully govern themselves? How could the colonized 
ever hope for a change in the colonial situation, when their lack of modernity and 
rationality was proven “scientifically” by their “mental infantilism”? These vari-
ous reports by French doctors and psychiatrists, which framed the drinking habits 
of the colonized in the Maghreb as inherently childlike, must be placed into the 
wider field of descriptive mechanisms that served to dehumanize and undermine 
the colonized in order to deny them their right to self-governance. The colonial 
doctors and psychiatrists did not dispute the humanity of the colonized in the 
Maghreb when they constantly referred to them as metaphorical children, but this 
framing certainly suggested that their childlikeness, their “mental infantilism,” 
demonstrated that they were below the level of rational French adulthood.
All of these allusions to the childlikeness of Muslim alcohol drinkers should 
also be read within a broader discourse of the time that questioned the general 
ability of the colonized to “assimilate,” that is, become French. Most of these 
colonial doctors and psychiatrists understood themselves as crucial cogs in the 
mechanism of France’s wider mission civilisatrice. Their mindsets (and con-
sequently their publications) were deeply influenced by the central message of 
France’s colonial project: France had a duty to modernize the colonies, to civi-
lize the colonized under “its protection,” and to guide them until they had reached 
a certain level of civilization. French colonial doctors and psychiatrists believed 
that they were helping France to civilize the colonized and to assimilate them 
into French civilization, but without any clear definition of what exactly this 
process entailed. The colonial psychiatrists believed that they, with their expert 
knowledge of the minds of the colonized, were the ones to determine whether or 
not assimilation was possible. They interpreted the spread of alcoholism in the 
Maghreb as one of the main indicators of the inability of the colonized to assimi-
late, as proof that even when they began to adapt French habits, there were del-
eterious consequences. This, finally, is how we must interpret the diagnosis of 
“mental infantilism”: as a response by twentieth-century French colonial doctors 
and psychiatrists to the question of whether the North African colonized would 
ever be able to assimilate. By diagnosing all of them with “mental infantilism,” 
these colonial experts clearly denied their ability to assimilate into French civili-
zation.
146 N. S. Studer
Descriptions of the colonized in the Maghreb as suffering from “mental 
infantilism” provided, as a direct consequence of this devaluation process, a 
 quasi-scientific justification for the continuation of the French colonization of 
the region. It was obvious to the French readerships of these medical and psy-
chiatric texts that this childlike state of the population as a whole justified the 
region’s colonization, as people on or even below the level of children could not 
be expected to effectually govern themselves.
In this chapter, alcohol drinking served as a case study for far larger political 
questions, as the alleged childlikeness that the colonial doctors and psychiatrists 
observed in the habits of the colonized showed both their inability to assimilate 
and that they could not be trusted to look after themselves and consequently 
needed “adults” to govern them. Hence, this narrative of the colonized Muslims 
behaving and reacting like children when it came to alcohol further proved, in the 
eyes of French authors, the innate superiority of the French.
Endnotes
 1. An example of such a description of all North Africans being classed as 
children by a medical or psychiatric expert can be found in the 1905 medi-
cal dissertation of Henri Duchêne-Marullaz on the “Hygiene of Muslims in 
Algeria”, in which he nonchalantly referred to the “apathetic indolence of 
a population of children” when describing the experience of French doctors 
in Algeria (Duchêne-Marullaz 1905, p. 11). Similarly, in a 1912 article pub-
lished in the journal Presse Médicale on “Hygiene in Morocco”, the anon-
ymous author described Moroccans as “natives, ignorant and simple like 
children” (D. 1912, p. 39). All translations into English are by the author.
 2. This has been long established by historians working on other colonial con-
texts. See, for example: Cohen 1970, Prakash 1990, p. 386, George 1994, p. 
112, Gouda and Clancy-Smith 1998, p. 7. On the framing of colonised peo-
ple as children by colonial psychiatrists, see: German 1987, p. 435, Swartz 
1995, p. 403, Bullard 2007, p. 201.
 3. Some French authors, however, went even further. They suspected that North 
Africans lacked certain character traits of “normally developed” European 
children, which were understood to be crucial to their healthy development. 
See, for example: Porot 1918, p. 382 f. Such racist and pejorative com-
parisons by medical and psychiatric experts can also be observed in other 
colonial contexts. The French psychologist Gérard Wintringer, for exam-
ple, wrote in 1955 an article entitled “Considerations on the Intelligence of 
the Black African”, in which he compared the “normal” Black African (i.e. 
147The Infantilization of the Colonized: Medical and Psychiatric …
somebody without a psychological problem) with European “retarded chil-
dren”. Wintringer 1955, p. 55.
 4. These ideas of the colonised being comparable with European children, and 
of the colonies as a whole being at the stage of Europe’s childhood, are also 
connected to the countless comparisons of nineteenth and twentieth century 
North Africa with the European Middle Ages in the publications of French 
colonial doctors and psychiatrists. These comparisons were also used to 
explain alleged inherent differences between Europeans and the colonised. 
See, for example: Porot 1918, p. 381, Mazel 1922, p. 15, Porot and Sutter 
1939, p. 237, Pasqualini 1957, p. 77.
 5. In his 1907 dissertation on “The Mad in Tunisia”, for example, the psychia-
trist Henry Bouquet described Tunisians casually as a people, “who are still 
in their infancy” (Bouquet 1909, p. 20).
 6. The French colonial doctors and psychiatrists studied for this chapter usually 
lamented that Muslim men treated their female family members like chil-
dren, while at the same time stating that these same women were childlike. 
This contextualisation and treatment of women as children by French colo-
nial doctors and psychiatrists has also been commented on by postcolonial 
psychiatrists from the region (Anonymous 1969, p. 885 f.; Almeida 1975, 
p. 254; Bennani 1996, p. 198).
 7. In a 1903 “Treatise on Mental Pathology”, the symptoms of “mental infanti-
lism” were described in a case study as the following: “the habitus, the atti-
tude, the mimicry, the language, the tendencies and the expression of ideas 
[all] testify to a regression of the mentality towards childhood.” Ballet et al. 
1903, p. 1119.
 8. Arène and Porot were not the only psychiatrists who applied this diagnosis 
to the colonised in the Maghreb. See also: Arrii 1926, p. 33, Sutter 1937, p. 
74 f., Olry 1940, p. 83, Alliez and Decombes 1952, p. 154 ff., Sutter et al. 
1959, p. 912. The historian Alice Bullard described the problems surround-
ing the diagnosis of “puérilisme” by the École d’Alger in a 2007 article. See: 
Bullard 2007, p. 201.
 9. In the context of this chapter, “colonised” refers to both Arab and Amazigh 
Muslims in the colonial Maghreb. It should also be added that, on a theo-
retical level, the French authors studied for this chapter routinely divided the 
colonised Muslim population of the Maghreb into distinct groups of “Arabs” 
and “Berbers”, as seen, for example, in the quote by Sextius Arène presented 
above (Arène 1913, p. 137). However, these distinctions were not appar-
ent in colonial descriptions of the alcohol-consumption of Muslims. Only 
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 occasionally did reports differentiate between the drinking habits of Arabs 
and Amazigh—for instance, the psychiatrist Camille-Charles Gervais, who 
stated in 1907 that Arabs were far more likely to become alcoholics (Gervais 
1907, p. 47). Most of the reports on the alcohol consumption of the colo-
nised, however, ignored ethnic and regional differences and described all 
of them simply as “musulmans”, “indigènes” or even “mahométans”. For 
examples of this colonial vocabulary chosen to describe the colonised, see: 
Bouquet 1909, p. 26 f., Remlinger 1912, p. 749, 752, Coudray 1914, p. 47, 
Pinaud 1933, p. 39.
 10. In his 1913 book on the “Arabo-Berber Soul”, a doctor, Victor Trenga, for 
example, described North African Jews as: “Like any race that remains in its 
childhood, the mysterious attracts the Jewish race”. Trenga 1913, p. 25. See 
also: ibid. 1902, p. 33, FN 1.
 11. It should be added here that many French people also did not consume alco-
hol “reasonably” in this same time period, as the rising numbers of institu-
tionalised cases of alcoholism in France show. See, for example: Kérohant 
1887, p. 100, Navarre 1895, p. 336 f. The same can be said for the situation 
in the colonies, especially in Algeria, where the numbers of French alcohol-
ics rose steadily. Viré 1888, p. 88 f., Joly 1889, p. 67 f.
 12. In 1912, Doctor P. Remlinger also believed that there was a distinctly dif-
ferent reaction towards alcohol among Moroccan Muslims compared to the 
French, a distinct “ethnic characteristic”, but offered the qualification that the 
inferior quality of the alcohol that they consumed might have partly caused 
this difference. Remlinger 1912, p. 750.
 13. Witold Lemanski, for example, who spent his life as a medical practitioner 
in Tunisia, suggested in 1902 that watered-down wine was the best drink for 
French children from the age of “eight or ten”. Lemanski 1902, p. 81.
 14. Absinthe was prohibited in August 1915 in France and French colonies, but 
the sale and consumption of anisettes remained legal. On the prohibition of 
absinthe, see: Prestwich 1979, p. 301.
 15. Frantz Fanon, for example, described in 1961 similar mechanisms of dehu-
manisation of the colonised, stating that the colonisers often used a zoologi-
cal vocabulary when describing the colonised. Fanon 2002, p. 45.
 16. Assimilation as an idealistic colonial theory cannot be compared to specific 
cases of administrative or legal assimilation, such as, for example, that of 
Algerian Jews through the Crémieux Decree in 1870. On the history of the 
psychiatric theories concerning assimilation in the Maghreb, see: Fanon and 
Azoulay 1975, p. 1099, Keller 2007, p. 9, 138, 172. See also: Andrew and 
Kanya-Forstner 1981, p. 26, Lorcin 1995, p. 7 f.
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National Memory in the Making: 
Gendered Re-Configurations 
of Martyrdom in Post-revolutionary 
Tunisia
Perrine Lachenal
A large rose-tree stood near the entrance of the garden: the roses growing on it 
were white, but there were three gardeners at it, busily painting them red. Alice 
thought this a very curious thing, and she went nearer to watch them […]. 
“Would you tell me,” said Alice, a little timidly, “why you are painting those 
roses?” (Carroll 1865).
Almost ten years after the Tunisian revolution, narratives of the event are still 
vividly debated. History textbooks are still awaiting new chapters, and memori-
als and monuments have yet to be inaugurated. The “transition period,” associ-
ated with the disappointing process of transitional justice, seems to be extending 
longer and longer without clearly easing the memorial tensions related to the 
2011-revolution. Competing narratives coexist and the disagreements are visible 
in public spaces all over Tunis. They are perceptible on the walls of the city: on 
the colorful murals that have stood the test of time since 2011 and under the cor-
rective coat of white paint covering certain facades. They are personified through 
names: some of them engraved on elegant marble stone in front of the Interior 
Ministry, others handwritten on banners waved in demonstrations every January 
throughout Tunisia. They are represented by bodies: proudly posing, victorious, 
on billboards in downtown Tunis or shown injured or dead on posters displayed 
during gatherings of associations of victims’ families. In the fight over the revolu-
tion’s political meaning, images and terminology are crucial and are strategically 
used to play one narrative against another. Any post-revolutionary society must 
deal with the crucial question of the authority to recount what has happened. Who 
should have the power to choose the words with which the history will be nar-
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rated and the names and faces who will symbolize that history? In this chapter, I 
will focus on the re-configurations of the uses of the word “martyr” (shahīd) and 
of associated graphical representations. I seek to analyze the processes through 
which, in post-revolutionary Tunisia, some dead are officially and publicly hon-
ored while some others remain invisible and doomed to oblivion. Drawing from 
a gender perspective, I shall show that rival masculinities each of them associ-
ated with different political and moral meanings, compete within the national 
memory and shape the strategic labeling of “martyrs of the revolution” (shuhadāʾ 
 al-thawra).
After some introductory comments about masculinity studies, the “Arab 
Spring,” and some methodological remarks about my own position as researcher 
in the field, I will describe ways in which the issue of martyrs took on major 
political importance in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Families and local collec-
tives first used the label before authorities took charge of the project of listing 
the “true” martyrs of the revolution, providing an illustrative case of the selec-
tive processes through which national narratives are constructed and implying the 
marginalization of subaltern experiences. In public spaces and on official memo-
rials, “martyrs” appeared to have no faces besides those of uniformed police-
men and soldiers, whom official institutions portray as powerful, muscular, and 
 heavily-armed paragons of masculinity.
Arab Masculinities in Question
There is no need to bemoan the lack of research in gender studies about the 
2011 revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Some 
recent academic works demonstrate that sex categories are social constructs and 
privileged tools for organizing and performing specific social orders; thus, these 
structures help us to better understand the re-configurations in the MENA region 
since 2011 (Ryzova 2011; Ghannam 2013; Salime 2015; Kréfa 2016). Yet Tuni-
sian society largely remains understudied in the numerous special issues, papers, 
and conferences devoted to the topic; the underrepresentation of the Tunisian case 
among academic work on the MENA region is a preexisting tendency and in fact 
nothing new (Dakhlia 2011). Of the few insightful papers written on the 2011 
Tunisian revolution from a gender perspective (Khalil 2014; Kraidy 2016; Kréfa 
2016; Gronemann 2017), an even smaller number deals with masculinity. Exist-
ing studies give the impression that gender is synonymous with “women.” This 
classical misconception, as Maya Mikdashi argues in a recent piece published in 
the online magazine Jadaliyya, has damaging effects: it creates a false dichotomy 
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between gender and politics, reinforcing “a framework within which sexual or 
gendered violence happens to women and sexual minorities while political vio-
lence happens to men” (2017). Some analyses describe the uprising as an occa-
sion for Tunisian men to prove their “virility” and show the whole world that they 
are “real men” (Piot 2011). Journalists report that Mohamed Bouazizi, whose 
self-immolation triggered the Tunisian revolution, was supposedly slapped by a 
female police officer before he set himself on fire in December 2010, interpreting 
this sequence of events as an illustration of the over-importance of “honor” for 
Tunisian men (Belhassine 2011) without mentioning the social and political crisis 
Tunisia was facing at that time. Whether or not this famous slap ever occurred—it 
likely did not (Larguèche 2011)—this approach demonstrates the prevalence of 
the “masculinity crisis” interpretative frame with respect to Arab societies (Amar 
2011). Masculinity studies has fortunately shown that its academic and critical 
ambitions are more sophisticated than simply corroborating stereotypes about 
Arab men (Inhorn 2012). Researchers involved in that field follow feminist schol-
ars’ invitation not only to pay attention to the power relations between men and 
women but also to question the hierarchies within each category. They examine 
men’s experiences and develop intersectional analyses that take into account cri-
teria besides gender, such as class, race, sexual orientation, or age (Crenshaw 
1991; Connell 1987; Ghannam 2013). “Multiple masculinities coexist in rela-
tions of power, contestation, and negotiation,” Maya Mikdashi asserts, outlining 
what she considers to be one of the major premises of masculinity studies (2017). 
Following these approaches, I will explore the gendered dimension of narratives 
linked to the revolution, investigating the processes through which different mod-
els of masculinity have been framed and re-configured in post-2011 Tunisia. My 
main argument is that they do indeed inform the political challenges faced by the 
post-revolutionary Tunisian society.
Fieldwork: Investigating a Polarized Context
This chapter draws on empirical research conducted in Tunis during several stays 
in the field between 2016 and 2018. In addition to observational work conducted 
at political meetings and demonstrations, I interviewed twenty people represent-
ing the main groups engaged in the debates regarding the public recognition of 
the “martyrs of the revolution,” including representatives of martyrs’ families, 
human rights associations, political parties, transitional justice institutions, and 
governmental commissions.
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As a researcher, I have been affected by my fieldwork, just as I have influ-
enced it myself. Acknowledging this reciprocal dynamic is one of the premises 
of social anthropology (Favret-Saada 1977). In the field, my own gender, expe-
riences, and emotions constituted sources of knowledge, and I particularly paid 
attention to the ways my informants used my presence, understood my requests 
and interpreted my interactions with them. Despite my frequent clarifications, I 
was generally perceived as a French journalist whose imagined objectives varied 
depending on the position of my interlocutors. The institutional representatives 
saw me as an opportunity to demonstrate their efforts to overcome challenges of 
transitional justice for an international audience; political leaders tried to defend 
their own strategies and alliances; human rights activists frequently suggested that 
there were more important issues to focus on; and members of associations for 
martyrs’ families saw me as a potential ally—my gender drove them to call me 
“sister” or “daughter”—in their fight against national amnesia, expecting me to 
publicize their struggle in Europe. Gaining families’ trust and collecting their sto-
ries under such conditions often made me feel uncomfortable, and I repeatedly 
confessed that I seriously doubted my research could have any positive impact on 
their situation. As a researcher investigating the issue of the “martyrs of the revo-
lution,” whether I liked it or not, I became a part of the debate. My image was 
invested with suspicions and hopes. My picture was posted on Facebook walls, 
combined with different public and private comments. One of my informants had 
a dream about me and her deceased brother, while another tried to extract details 
of what other interviewees had told me. All sides warned me about the risk of the 
others manipulating me. In any field, there is no such thing as a neutral position—
and this is probably even truer in a polarized context such as the environment I 
found in post-revolutionary Tunisia.
The Early Days of the Revolution: The Impulsive 
Designation of “Martyrs”
The Tunisian upheaval started with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in 
Sidi-Bouzid in December 2010, and his death a few days later. As demonstrations 
multiplied in several Tunisian cities and social movements intensified in Decem-
ber 2010 and January 2011, the death toll increased. Repression was especially 
brutal in the marginalized governorates deep inside the country, where the con-
flict began. The longer the list of victims grew, the more the commemoration of 
the “martyrs of the revolution” became visible in public spaces all over Tunisia. 
From the first days of mobilization, memorials were erected in city centers to 
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honor local “martyrs.” Streets, schools, and squares were spontaneously renamed 
after some of them, usually in their families’ neighborhoods where they had lived 
(Fig. 1).
These commemoration processes, including the use of the label “martyrs,” 
reached a national level in March 2011, when the Tunisian postal service released 
a stamp bearing Bouazizi’s face, commemorating his “martyrdom” and the “revo-
lution of dignity” (thawrat al-karāma)1 (Fig. 2).
In downtown Tunis, a square previously known as the “Seventh of November,” 
the date Ben Ali’s regime came to power, was renamed “Fourteenth of January, 
2011,” the day he resigned. The celebration of the uprising implied the material 
destruction of the previous symbolic system, a phenomenon Bernhard Giesen 
describes in his major piece on martyrs and heroes (2004, p. 34). In a few weeks, 
one could observe Ben Ali’s portraits disappearing from the walls of shops, 
administrations, and restaurants, sometimes replaced with faces of local “martyrs.”
If the vast scientific literature devoted to “martyrdom” insists on the polysemy 
of the category (Mayeur Jaouen 2002; Verdery 2004; Blunden 2006; Buckner and 
Khatib 2014; Bozarslan 2015; Mittermaier 2015), the ways it was used in revolu-
tionary Tunisia in fact suggest clear nationalist and secular dimensions.2 Indeed, 
the word “martyrs” (shuhadāʾ) was usually followed by the phrases “of the revo-
lution” or “of the nation” (al-thawra/al-waṭan). This specific use is not surpris-
ing since the word is historically ingrained in the Tunisian national vocabulary 
Fig. 1  “Martyrs’ Square,” Gabes, April 2016 (P. Lachenal)
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(Bendana 2018), especially since the pro-independence struggles. The political 
function of the martyrs of the “Arab springs” nevertheless differed slightly from 
that of their predecessors, as Elisabeth Buckner and Lina Khatib assert (2014): 
the 2011 martyrs were used to unify a people against an oppressive regime, not to 
construct a collective identity against a foreign occupier. For the family members 
I interviewed, and in line with what Ieva Zakarevičiūtė (2015) witnessed in 2011 
Egypt, the word “martyrs” served as a common reference point with the capac-
ity to lend meaning to violent and unfair disappearances, integrating them into a 
Fig. 2  Stamp dedicated to the “martyr” Mohamed Bouazizi. March 11. Screenshot from 
the author
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national liberating narrative. Using the word “martyr,” I was told, implied recog-
nizing that the person did not die in vain but for a cause, and that his or her death 
ought to be collectively honored.3 The religious dimension of the “martyr” cat-
egory was rarely invoked during my fieldwork, although, in intimate spaces and 
informal discussions, my informants sometimes wished that God would accept 
the deceased as a “martyr” and offer them post-mortem rewards and peace.4
A Strategic Cause on the Post-Revolutionary Stage
In the months that followed the fall of Ben Ali, the issue of the “martyrs of the 
revolution” acquired major political importance. The first trials of people accused 
of killing demonstrators were accompanied by both national and international 
media coverage and street gatherings. Press conferences had to be held in very 
large hotel conference rooms to accommodate crowds of journalists, and tribu-
nals did not have enough space to welcome all the “martyrs’” families wanting to 
attend the adjudications. “Martyrs of the revolution” became a strategic source of 
legitimacy for those who wanted to play a role during the so-called “transitional” 
period. They served as a rhetorical tool and from 2011 on, any public speech 
regarding the revolution started and ended by referring to them and reminding 
listeners of the obligation to honor their memories and sacrifices.5 An activist 
told me jokingly that, in 2011, “It looked very good to appear among the mar-
tyrs’ families and to explicitly support their cause. Each political group wanted 
to have its own martyr!”.6 This quotation refers to the question of “ownership” of 
martyrs and their images. “It is not always obvious who ‘owns’ a martyr,” Andy 
Blunden argues; “A social movement or institution is going to be able to claim 
‘ownership’ of a martyr if it shares the icons and symbols of the subject” (2006, 
p. 51). Contradicting interpretations could challenge each other, as was the case 
for Mohamed Bouazizi, who was sometimes incorrectly presented as an “unem-
ployed graduate” in order to strengthen the demands of this specific demographic 
group (Desorgues 2013). Other appropriation attempts were aimed at the family 
members of martyrs. The sister of a “martyr” told me that as soon as she decided 
to begin wearing a hijab in 2011, she was approached by several religion-based 
groups who offered to take on the case of her brother’s death.7, 8 More generally, 
families had to distinguish potential allies from profiteers who tried, as I was told, 
to “make money off the cause”9 and to transform the martyrs into a business, as 
Kinda Chaib (2007) describes in great detail for the case of Lebanon.
During the period that followed Ben Ali’s resignation, several associations of 
martyrs’ families were established in Tunisia. One of them was Lan Nansākum 
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(We Won’t Forget You), which developed into a powerful mobilizing force and 
soon became a major participant in the debate over the “martyrs of the revolu-
tion”’ cause. It distinguished itself with its creativity, mobilization strategies, and 
political statements. This was especially remarkable considering that almost none 
of its members had been politicized prior to 2011 (Mekki 2017). The association 
organized regular marches in Tunis, occupying the front lines of demonstrations 
carrying the portraits of their deceased relatives. Mothers dressed in black were 
particularly visible among them.10 The demands were clear: the truth about the 
people’s repression had to be voiced and the individuals responsible for the kill-
ings had to be judged and punished, both those who had issued the orders to open 
fire on the demonstrators and those who had obeyed said orders.
Suspicious Masculinities: In Search of the “Fake” Martyrs 
of the Revolution
Given the sensitivity of the topic, official measures were soon taken regarding the 
“martyrs of the revolution.” In October 2011, a decree was published in an effort 
to regulate the ways in which post-revolutionary Tunisia would approach them 
(Ben Ghozi 2012). The decree’s first five articles focus on the “national memory” 
and on the collective duty to honor the people who died during the revolution 
with memorial sites. The decree also introduced the project of publishing an offi-
cial list of the “martyrs of the revolution.” Having the names of their relatives 
on that list would be a prerequisite for the families to benefit from some com-
pensation measures. This project of listing the “martyrs” immediately appeared 
problematic since it implied that, among the 338 people who were reported dead 
during the revolution,11 not all of them would be recognized as such. Samir 
Dilou, as the head of the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, 
asserted this in 2012, publicly expressing doubts about the validity of the first list 
and the veracity of some victims’ stories. A few years later, when I asked the head 
of the General Committee devoted to the “martyrs” about the necessity of creat-
ing such a list, she expressed a similar suspicion mentioning that “not everyone 
told the truth” during the initial investigation into repression by the police and the 
army:12
There are people who died, but not in the context of the revolution, and their 
families would like to benefit from the social advantages accorded to the martyrs’ 
families! … This revision will take some time because we have to check every 
single case in order to identify the fake martyrs. I understand the families’ impa-
tience; it has already been five years since the revolution occurred and the names 
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of their children are still not public. For the families of the true martyrs, this must 
be disappointing. [Emphasis added].
Later on in the same conversation, my interviewee once again stressed the 
importance of identifying the “true martyrs” and removing the names of those 
who do not deserve the title, calling them not only liars but also “thugs”: “We 
have to tell the truth and who the true heroes are. There is no way thugs’ names 
should appear on the list” [emphasis added].
If the decree specified the composition of the commission in charge of the 
martyrs list, which included representatives of civil society and of seven min-
istries, it remained silent about the concrete criteria according by which a per-
son should or should not be recognized as a “martyr of the revolution.” Only the 
chronological criterion is publicly known: a “martyr of the revolution” should 
have died between December 17, 2010 and the February 28, 2011. The few inter-
views I conducted with some members of the commission did not help me to 
better identify the other criteria. Indeed, the selection process seemed largely to 
be shaped by the commission members’ subjective perceptions of heroism and 
heroic masculinities. For example, the circumstances of death played a major role 
in the selection process and it seemed problematic, as I was explained, to recog-
nize as “martyrs” any young men who were killed while attacking the police or 
who died during a fire at the prison in which they were detained.13 Actors’ social 
status determined the ways their violence and political commitment could be 
publicly depicted, and the meaning of their death. Beyond the political dimen-
sion, which one could have reasonably expected in the context of a revolution, it 
seemed that ultimately the social actors’ “good morals” or lack thereof was the 
decisive argument determining whether or not they would be labeled “martyrs.” 
If the young men who died while in jail or fighting the police were not publicly 
remembered as “martyrs,” it is because they embodied models of masculinity that 
were suspicious due to a lower class status. Because their social and gender per-
formances were framed as immoral and violent, and their actions were perceived 
as threats to the social order by those in charge of determining the official revolu-
tion narratives, their names would remain unknown and their faces invisible.
The focus on the morality of the “martyrs” was particularly visible in the dis-
courses surrounding the cases of the many prisoners who died in 2011 during the 
destruction and burning of their prisons. These accounted for almost a quarter of 
the casualties of the Tunisian uprising.14 As various people in charge of generat-
ing the “final” list told me in interviews, it seemed problematic to publicly assign 
prisoners, who were probably sent to jail for committing crimes, the prestigious 
status of martyrs. The same reservation was expressed regarding the young men 
who were killed at the margins of the protests. In these cases, the disqualification 
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was often based on the probable immorality of the youngsters, embodied through 
the suspicion that they had died while drinking. When I met him in his office, in 
September 2016, one of the members of the Bouderbala commission explained to 
me:
Someone who was reported dead, burned alive inside the Magasin général, 
a supermarket, at midnight, was not expressing any political discontent—in the 
middle of the night, in a supermarket, in the spirits section! (laughs) With some-
one who died outside the trade union center or the Interior Ministry, it is totally 
different.15
Using gendered rhetoric as a tool, the authorities contributed to removing 
entire social groups from official Tunisian history without having to acknowledge 
any embarrassing exclusion process. Their choices were justified through terms 
such as “troublemakers,” “drinkers,” “vandals” and other references to problem-
atic and suspicious models of masculinity.
Subaltern Voices and Alternative Narratives
Confronting the state’s attempts to monopolize the public making of martyrs 
in post-revolutionary Tunisia, other narratives were constructed and circulated 
through unofficial channels and family networks. The more visible the suspicion 
regarding the “good” morality of the young men who died during the revolution 
became, the more the “martyrs’ families” publicly stressed the political dimen-
sion of their relatives’ deaths. Intentionally or unintentionally, they argued, those 
young men died while participating in the Tunisian revolution and took part, 
albeit indirectly, in its successful ending: the resignation of the former President. 
Contesting the top-down nature of the labelling of “martyrs,” “martyrs’ families” 
resisted the depoliticization and the moralization processes of the revolutionary 
subaltern experiences. The interviews I conducted with some of them stressed the 
decisive nature of the rhetorical dimension, expressing concerns about how the 
Tunisian revolution was starting to be publicly depicted. Terminological debates 
had clear political meanings, as I was told; for example, the word “victim” was 
strongly contested by the “wounded of the revolution.” According to Bachir, a 
28-year-old man who was seriously burned in 2011 and partly lost the use of his 
hands, being called a “victim” is insulting:16
I am one of the “wounded of the revolution” (jarḥā al-thawra). To say 
“wounded” is to recognize that we were actors of the revolution, we were fighters 
who got injured. But “victim” (ḍakhiyya) is not a political category. The word is 
pejorative; it implies passivity.
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Bachir’s words expressed the opposition of agency versus victimhood, defend-
ing the political rationality and intentionality of working young men who took 
part, sometimes violently, in the movement against the previous regime and were 
injured or killed.
These alternative narratives had graphic translations. Martyrdom’s political 
dimension was for example aesthetically asserted through the portraits “martyrs’ 
families” and relatives carried with them and waved in public events, illustrating 
the determination to link the killings of their relatives to the revolution. Such por-
traits could be seen as tools to build a “durable biography,” an expression used by 
Farha Ghannam about the “technologies of immortality” aiming to shape the pub-
lic afterlives of martyrs (2015, p. 640). The following picture, taken in January 
2018 during a gathering of martyrs’ families, the face of Qaïs Al-Mazlini, killed 
on the 13th of January 2011, appears on an expressive background: an image of a 
demonstration on Bourguiba Avenue, a Tunisian flag and the sentence “Tunisia is 
free” (Fig. 3).
These symbolic references are tools to engrain the individual story into the 
national one, if there was any doubt about that connection. Taoufic Haddad identi-
fies similar aesthetic choices when analyzing a large corpus of posters depicting 
Palestinian martyrs (2016): it is common for the families or the poster designer to 
make the deceased person appear as an armed fighter, even if he was not, so as to 
include him in the core of the national struggle.
Fig. 3  “The martyr Qaïs Al-Mazlini. Martyrized on the 13th January 2011″. Families’ 
exhibition, Tunis, January. (Foto by author)
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In post-revolutionary Tunisia, the state was not the only actor to build and 
broadcast martyrs’ iconographies. The role of non-state actors in the produc-
tion of alternative narratives and collective memory is partly based on practical 
considerations such as the democratization of access to technologies for design-
ing and printing. If disagreements have always plagued memorial practices, 
this recent technological shift has given them exceptional visibility (de Georges 
2013), and has demonstrated major re-configurations in the public making of 
martyrdom.
“Martyrs of the Nation”: The Consecration of Militarized 
Masculinities
While families continued to request the release of an inclusive list remember-
ing their own children as “martyrs of the revolution,” other kinds of martyrs 
were being publicly identified. Their faces were displayed by the Tunisian army 
and police in public spaces and their names carved on commemorative plaques: 
these were casted as the “martyrs of the nation” (shuhadāʾ al-waṭan), meaning 
the members of the Tunisian security forces who lost their lives not only during 
the 2011 revolution but also in the years that followed. The terrorist threat that 
emerged in the country in the wake of 2011 and the concomitant state of emer-
gency were incorporated into the process of re-configuration and securitization 
of the national narratives, paving the way for the celebration of martyrs from the 
police and military. Progressively, uncertainty seemed to have helped set the stage 
for celebrating victorious and heavily armed masculinity models that were per-
ceived as reassuring.
In 2016, the name of the governmental commission devoted to the “martyrs 
and wounded of the revolution” was significantly extended to include the words 
“and of the terrorist attacks.” Madjouline Cherni, a sister of a soldier killed in 
a 2013 terrorist attack, was chosen to direct it. Since 2011, intensive campaigns 
have glorified the commitment of the security forces to the Tunisian nation. 
Advertisements popped up all over Tunis. The picture in Fig. 4, which was dis-
tributed mostly in 2017, illustrates the process just described.
By mixing together different repertoires, applying the well-known slogan 
“Dégage”—an iconic fixture of the “Arab Spring”—in reference to  “terrorism,” 
the fight against terrorism was integrated into the story of the revolution itself 
and military “heroes” were placed at its forefront. Doing so seemed to absorb 
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the revolutionary moment into state hegemonic narratives. These kinds of 
catchy advertisements contributed to the processes of depoliticization and 
 securitization—as well as virilization—that attended the commemoration of the 
Tunisian revolution. According to Daniel Gilman, a state’s ability to build and 
glorify conservative martyr figures, such as those embodying order and security, 
mainly depends on a prior depoliticization process that is necessary to “set the 
stage” (2015, p. 693).
Fig. 4  You are the hero. We fully support you. Terrorism “Dégage” Mohamed V Avenue, 
downtown Tunis, September 2017. (Photo by the author)
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Conclusion
By determining those who should be officially honored and those who should 
be forgotten, drawing on gendered repertoires of morality and respectability, the 
Tunisian state sought to frame not only the history but also the meaning of the 
revolution, and the reasons why it occurred. In this chapter, I have shown that the 
public designation of “martyrs” influences how the 2011 uprising is narrated and 
understood, but also, more importantly, affects its political direction. Narrating 
and labeling is never only about the past. Behind the objective of writing history 
lies the question of the present and future exercise of power.
As I complete the final version of this paper in August 2019, the final list 
of the “martyrs of the revolution” has still not been published in Tunisia, eight 
years after Ben Ali resigned and several months after the responsible commission 
delivered it to the government. The issue of the “martyrs of the revolution” obvi-
ously remains delicate. Omitted deaths continue to haunt the post-revolutionary 
society through the mobilization of their families, relentlessly weakening official 
attempts to standardize revolutionary narratives.
Endnotes
 1. Bouazizi was sometimes referred to as a “Pan-Arab martyr” in the sense 
that his image widely circulated and was used as a shared signifier during 
the social movements that shook many countries after Tunisia, appearing for 
instance on Tahrir Square and on the walls of Cairo (Buckner and Khatib 
2014).
 2. The nationalist and secularist acceptation of martyrdom has largely been 
examined in other societies of North-Africa and West-Asia (Mayeur-Jaouen 
2002; Chaib 2007; Haddad 2016). Comparative studies are nevertheless 
missing, although they could be useful to show similarities and to undermine 
the conventional idea that martyrdom is “somehow more central to Arab or 
Muslim cultures than others” (Hayoun 2012).
 3. Personal interviews in Tunis, January 2018.
 4. Home visits in Tunis, May 2016.
 5. Observations, demonstrations in Tunis, January 2017 and 2018.
 6. Personal interview in Tunis, May 2016.
 7. Personal interview in Tunis, September 2016.
 8. Similar ideas about feminine performances of piety influenced the use of 
Sally Zahran’s images in revolutionary Cairo. Several controversies sur-
rounded the story of this young women who died in January 2011, one of 
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them being her seemingly problematic refusal to wear a headscarf. Some of 
her photos were manipulated to cover her hair, bringing her appearance in 
line with Egyptian Islamic standards and enabling social groups to use her 
portrait (Armbrust 2013).
 9. Personal interview in Tunis, May 2016.
 10. The “grieving mother” is an emotionally and politically vested figure, com-
monly constituting a powerful mobilizing force (Latte-Abdallah 2006; Lor-
ber 2002).
 11. The Bouderbala commission was the first official attempt to identify those 
who died and were injured during and following the Tunisian uprising. It was 
commissioned by the interim government in 2011 to conduct investigations 
in jails, hospitals, and several governorates in order to register and document 
abuse committed during a specific timeframe, from December 2010 to Octo-
ber 2011. The commission’s 1,041-page report was published in 2012.
 12. Personal interview in Tunis, May 2016.
 13. Personal interview in Tunis, September 2017.
 14. A total of 86 cases according to the Bouderbala commission (report on line: 
https://www.leaders.com.tn/uploads/FCK_files/Rapport%20Bouderbala.pdf).
 15. Personal interview in Tunis, September 2016.
 16. Personal interview in Tunis, September 2017.
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The research was conducted linearly and non-linearly and was comprised of 
several phases. The research employs a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches: questionnaires (which include both open-ended and closed-ended 
questions), interviews with students, teachers, and e-learning decision-makers in 
the country. The first stage of the research was a thorough review of the literature. 
The second phase of the research design employed surveys with more specific 
and targeted questions and considered various variables to measure the extent to 
which ICT is currently applied and how students and teachers perceive teaching 
and learning with ICT.
Populations
A total of 250 responses were returned by the participants. The target population 
included students from the selected locations in Tunisia. With the aim of col-
lecting quantitative data, all students were invited to answer the questionnaire, 
regardless of their field of study, age, institution, or education level. (Thus, all stu-
dents who were enrolled in a bachelor’s, masters, or PhD programme could par-
ticipate.) Likewise, teachers and instructors, regardless of their discipline, status, 
experience level, or location, were invited to complete the survey. This study was 
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conducted by using data collected from major stakeholders’ teachers and students 
at 13 universities in Tunisia in the period from 2016 to 2018.
Results and Discussion
Problems of re-configuration and reform are not a new phenomenon. In 1513, 
Machiavelli wrote in The Prince “There is nothing more difficult to carry out, 
nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a 
new order of things” (cited in Nisbet 1974, p. 32). Correspondingly, Seffrin et al. 
(2009) define a “barrier” as “an event or condition that hinders the adoption deci-
sion” (p. 62). Based on the findings of questionnaires and interviews, some major 
barriers were identified regarding ICT implementation in Tunisia’s higher educa-
tion. In fact, the Tunisian ICT policy faces impediments ranging from personal/
individual attitudes to more general barriers related to the entire system of educa-
tion and the ICT policies of universities, the Ministry of Higher Education, and 
the country as a whole. Studying the factors that may hinder the use of ICT in 
education may help teachers to overcome these impediments and become suc-
cessful technology adopters in the future (Bingimlas 2009). In order to identify 
the impediments encountered by teachers and students when integrating ICT into 
the country’s higher education institutions, I asked a group of faculty members 
(teachers, and staff) and students about the factors that may encourage a teacher 
to use ICT more frequently: “What would help you to use ICT more?” The col-
lated responses are illustrated in Fig. 1.
According to the findings, most teachers have entry-level knowledge on how 
to use ICT (open computer, connect to internet, surf, read materials online or 
download them, use social media, etc.). In the following, I will consider what 
some studies refer to as “extrinsic barriers” (barriers that are related to organiza-
tions as opposed to individuals) and “intrinsic barriers” (those which are related 
to teachers, administrators, and individuals).
Extrinsic Barriers
One factor impeding the implementation of ICT in higher education begins at the 
university and government policy level and is related to infrastructure and fund-
ing (cost of hardware and software). This first problem, which almost all devel-
oping countries face, is the paucity of financial resources and the scarcity or 
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out-datedness of equipment and resources. These factors are generally beyond the 
control of teachers and faculty members.
The Insufficient Number of Operational Computers and Peripherals
Many studies have pointed out that the scarcity or inadequacy of ICT infrastruc-
ture represents the main barrier to ICT adaptation. According to an ICT expert 
in Tunisia, infrastructural facilities such as computers, laptops, smartphones, 
electricity supply, and broadband connection, etc., are highly inadequate and not 
affordable to the middle class or people below the poverty line. Only private uni-
versities are focusing on ICT in higher education; state universities are unable to 
adopt it due to resource constraints (W. M. ICT expert personal online commu-
nication, 15 February 2017). Many teachers and students in the survey deemed 
the lack of computer rooms and the insufficient number of computers to be barri-
ers to using ICT in teaching and learning: “It would be more convenient to have 
computers in class, not only in the computer room” (BA student, Sousse personal 
online communication, 12 February 2017). A teacher in the same institution com-
plained:
It is impossible to always move the whole class to the computer room. First, 
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Fig. 1  What would help teachers to better use ICT?
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able, and second, we do not have enough time during the session (50 to 60 min). 
(Teacher of English, Sousse personal online communication, 12 February 2017).
Most institutions have ICT peripherals such as keyboards or printers, which 
are based mainly in the computer rooms. However, teachers, students, and fac-
ulty members complained about the insufficient amount of peripheral technology 
relative to the large number of students and teachers. At some institutions, there 
is no clear policy for ICT integration. This has led to unclear goals and processes 
and a lack of management when it comes to plans and the usage of existing ICT 
resources. A dean of a university in the capital said:
I can admit that most universities have the equipment needed to start imple-
menting technology in teaching activities, but there is clear mismanagement of 
resources and facilities; in each university, there should be someone responsible 
for the management of the whole process. (K. H. personal online communication, 
12 February 2017).
There is inadequate ICT infrastructure, including computer hardware, soft-
ware, and internet access, at higher education institutions. Furthermore, there is 
an almost total absence of ICT materials in class, apart from overhead projectors, 
speakers, and teachers’ private computers.
Lack of Trained Technical Staff
The lack of trained teachers is another challenge hindering developing countries 
from adopting ICT in their education systems (Gulati 2008; Kozma 1999). Most 
staff and faculty members interviewed agree that there is a lack of qualified ICT 
personnel and skilled human resources. Most institutions lack  computer-literate 
instructors and ICT experts to support and manage the integration of ICT in the 
learning and teaching process. That being said, most teachers answered “yes” 
to the survey question “Do you find ICT assistance in your institution when you 
need it?” However, when I asked this question again in a number of interviews, 
most teachers and faculty members admitted that “ICT assistance” is simply 
understood to be basic technical assistance related to fixing everyday connection 
problems related to the computer rooms or devices (e.g., video projectors). Even 
at the institutions that have settled equipment, some teachers stated that they can 
barely find skilled assistants to help them work with available materials.
The process of ICT integration in any teaching activity is based on the staff 
and faculty members’ knowledge and skills. It is not easy to find skilled staff in 
my institution who can help. (L. L. a teacher from Nabeul, personal online com-
munication 12 February 2017).
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In order to apply ICT in the classroom, faculty members need specialists and 
ICT assistants who are competent and who can fulfill the minimum requirements 
of teaching staff at Tunisian institutions.
Lack of Adequate Training Facilities for Teachers and Instructors
In Tunisia, the training facilities and programs for teachers and staff are still inad-
equate, according to the interviewees. In 2002, the Virtual University of Tunisia 
(VUT), a public university, was established. In collaboration with IBM,1 it offers 
online training programs for teachers only. One of its objectives was to offer 20% 
of all national courses online. This goal was never reached because there is no 
clearly defined strategy to encourage faculty members to adopt or use distance 
learning. Indeed, faculty members are very reluctant to give online courses, and 
the number of online courses is still limited. A VUT teacher and ICT expert said, 
Some institutions showed interest in our programs and courses, but still there are 
no clear strategies or engagement efforts. Most teachers are hesitant and reluctant. 
Faculty member VUT personal online communication, 12 February 2017).
Large Class Sizes
Large classes are also one of the most commonly cited barriers that hinder 
teachers from using educational ICT. Teachers mentioned that implementing 
ICT in their classes requires a small number of students to test the process and 
the results. There is the idea that the larger the class is, the harder the teach-
ing process will be, especially when the teaching is based only on lectures and 
 face-to-face communication in a class session. A larger class may result in a less 
interactive and collaborative session in which the teacher talks and students listen 
and take notes. According to the teachers I interviewed, 50% spent the majority of 
the lesson time lecturing, with little time spent on practical issues, presentations 
by students, discussions, or group work. This does not seem to be an ideal situ-
ation for the implementation of ICT. Another teacher commented in the survey:
To start to implement ICT in my classes, I would prefer to deal with a small 
number of students to see how well they are able to use it and what kind of results 
can be achieved. I have 43 students in most of my sessions. Do you think it is 
easy to implement something new and evaluate the process? (L. L. a teacher from 
Nabeul, personal online communication, 14 February 2017).
Didactic Issues
Most teachers do not have the competencies and skills to manage and plan an 
ICT-based session or ICT-based materials. This is largely because they are used to 
a face-to-face teaching methodology that is used in lectures and is always teacher- 
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and text-based. From a didactic perspective, some teachers think that ICT use dis-
tracts students and causes them to lose concentration. This leads them to say that 
they would never use technology because they fear they may lose control of their 
class. Other teachers complain that the heavy workload and limited time do not 
allow them to implement ICT and that they prefer to use a textbook. One faculty 
member said:
The system barely encourages creativity or any kind of change. Lectures are 
based on knowledge transmission of a large amount of information—Chap. 1 to 
Chap. 9—from a teacher who has been doing the same things for years. (A. L., a 
faculty member Gabes, personal online communication, 12 February 2017).
Another major problem is the variability in curricula at Tunisian institutions, 
meaning that students do not receive the same quality of education. Hence, edu-
cation policy and traditional curricula have to be revised for today’s needs.
Inconsistent ICT Policies and the Influence of Lobbies on Digital Strategy Plan-
ning
Tunisia has a plan for ICT integration, which includes large projects and a good 
strategy, “Digital Tunisia 2018.” However, economic and political pressure and 
crises during recent years have obstructed progress due to the prioritization of 
issues such as fighting terrorism. The changing political landscape and changes 
in the Tunisian Ministry of Higher Education have affected the implementation 
of the policy. Another concern is that the ICT sector in Tunisia is overrun by busi-
ness and politics. In 2015, the first meeting of the Strategic Council for Digital 
Economy (CSEN) was held, headed by the Prime Minister Habib Essid. The role 
of the council was to adopt and deploy new projects related to the National Strate-
gic Plan (PNS) and “Digital Tunisia 2018.” However, the council did not include 
representatives from civil society or ICT actors, who are meant to play a crucial 
role in the implementation of the National Strategic Plan for a Digital Tunisia. 
According to Ben Youssef, the Ministry of Communication Technologies and 
Digital Economy and the CSEN, which is also monitoring the National Strategic 
Plan and selecting experts and representatives from the private sector (2015), rep-
resent ICT actors in the public sector.2
Political Factors
Tunisia has always attempted to put education at the forefront and has allocated 
sufficient funds for the educational sector, with the aim of using ICT as a tool 
for improving education. This can be seen from the major budgetary allocations. 
However, since 2011, Tunisia has witnessed many political, economic, and social 
changes, which have had significant implications for the education sector. The 
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share of the national budget spent on higher education and research decreased 
from 6.9% in 2010 to 4.8% in 2015. Decision-makers and officials attributed 
that to the fact that the Ministry of Higher Education and Research has been inte-
grated into the former Ministry of New Technologies and Communication, leav-
ing both ministries with less money. Meanwhile, the combined budgets of the 
Tunisian Ministries of Defence and Interior increased by 15% in 2015 (Jamel 
2015, para. 3). The additional funding went to army infrastructure and the secu-
rity forces. In an interview with El Fanar Media, the former Minister of Finance, 
Ben Hammouda, said, “We raised the defence and security sectors’ budgets by 
15 percent since we all agree that terrorism constitutes a major challenge to the 
state” (Jamel 2015, para. 8). Apart from addressing terrorism, Tunisia is also 
attempting to combat the violence coming from the border with its instable neigh-
bour, Libya. According to Salem Labyedh, a former Tunisian education minister, 
“Limitations on the budget will hurt efforts to improve educational infrastructure. 
The budget for higher education will barely cover wages, much less support inno-
vation or scientific research” (Jamel 2015, para. 12). The education sector’s rep-
rioritization stems from a lack of political will, as has been observed elsewhere: 
“The most notable of the barriers to the use of ICT in education in developing 
countries seems to be the political will of the people in the corridors of power” 
(Sharma 2003, p. 1).
Intrinsic Barriers
One of the first and most important—as well as common—barriers to integrating 
ICT into higher education is teachers’ perceptions and attitude towards these tech-
nologies. Factors influencing teachers’ negative attitudes towards using ICT in 
teaching are a lack of time, their own lack of ICT skills, and a lack of confidence 
in using new technology in front of a class.
Teachers’ Resistance to Change
Teachers’ attitudes and inherent resistance to change are a significant barrier to 
their ICT use in education (Cox et al. 2000; Becta 2004; Schoepp 2005). Teach-
ers, especially those who have more experience, display a certain resistance to 
switching from a traditional text-based didactic method to a technology-based 
teaching method. I found out that some teachers are either skeptical of the effec-
tiveness of the new methodology or do not have enough confidence in using digi-
tal resources. This is related to teachers’ age and/or years of experience. I found 
that teachers with more teaching experience are more resistant to change; those 
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who are used to the “chalk and talk” methodology are not motivated to try to inte-
grate ICT in their teaching. An ICT expert in the MENA region said:
Adopting ICT in higher education is challenging from both pedagogical and 
technical points of view. Not only in developing countries, but also in other coun-
tries. Many teachers resist the adoption of ICT in their classes and many students 
do not know how to adapt to it. (W. M. online communication on ResearchGate).
An emotional resistance to change may not in itself be the (main) underlying 
reason for teachers’ reluctance to use ICT in teaching, but instead can be seen as 
an indicator of other explanatory factors—that is, teachers may have legitimate 
reasons pertaining to other barriers described in this section.
Length of Teaching Experience
The longer a teacher has been teaching, the more confident and satisfied he or she 
tends to be with the methodology he or she has been using. Teachers with more 
years of experience seem more resistant to any kind of change. Whenever their 
university updates its policies or makes an effort towards ICT integration, that ini-
tiative is always met with slow uptake from teachers. Teachers appear to see no 
need to change or question their current professional methodology, resulting in 
their lack of acceptance of the use of ICT in their teaching. Veteran teachers are 
considered a real hindrance to the process of innovation in education.
Lack of Competence and Digital Confidence
Becta (2004) considers teachers’ own lack of digital confidence to be a major bar-
rier to ICT integration in classrooms. Some researchers classify it as a psycho-
logical factor, which could stem from a fear of failure, a fear of losing time, or a 
fear of not getting the expected results. I found that most teachers in the study are 
familiar only with basic ICT use, either for communication or social media or for 
searches on the web. Digital confidence regarding the degree to which one is able 
to integrate ICT into teaching is also related to more sophisticated activities that 
require up-to-date technical skills and competence.
Lack of Motivation
Motivation is an important positive factor, which encourages teachers to use ICT 
in their teaching and to move from the phase of entry and adaption to adaptation 
and integration. I found, however, that a group of teachers were not motivated to 
participate in the process. Their answers to the survey included statements such as 
the following:
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• “I don’t like technology.”
• “I am doubtful about the results.”
• “I am not accustomed to ICT in the classroom.”
A lack of motivation might be a reflection of the MENA region’s educational 
paradigm, in which students and learners in general are not autonomous learners. 
Motivation is not a factor in itself, but a reflection of underlying issues. It stems 
from other factors such as digital confidence, infrastructure, time shortages, and a 
number of other direct and indirect barriers.
Gender and ICT: A Social and Cultural Issue
According to the latest Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum 2017), 
Tunisia is currently ranked 117th out of 144 countries. The gender equality in the 
Middle East and North Africa is at its best in Tunisia. Women work in the same 
fields as men with no differences in terms of position, rank, or time. However, in 
daily life, women in Tunisia still have more responsibilities at home and in car-
ing for children. These domestic responsibilities are on top of their professional 
workloads. In this study, many working and studying women declare that men 
rarely help in tasks related to domestic work and childcare. There is no alternative 
to doing two—or three—things at the same time. Women do not have much time 
left to use ICT facilities, except to do easy and entertaining tasks such as using 
social media, chatting, and shopping. Thus, female students and teachers often 
do not have much time left to use ICT for developing new teaching or learning 
activities. This applies especially to teachers; female teachers are even more con-
strained than their male colleagues with respect to a lack of time and a busy work 
schedule, in noncoastal and particularly rural locations, where most people have 
no internet connection at home and go to internet cafés, which are not often or 
easily frequented by women for social and cultural reasons.
Implementation Strategy
Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) Theory
Faculty members in Tunisian institutions are the main drivers in the process of 
ICT integration; hence, they constitute the change agents. Teachers and faculty 
members can be classified based on Rogers’s five categories of innovation adop-
tion.3 According to Medlin (2001), the most appropriate theory for studying the 
adoption of technology in higher education and other educational environments is 
Rogers’s diffusion of innovation theory (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2  Rogers’s diffusion of innovation (DOI) theoryIn ICT application, the innovators are 
the pioneers or creators. This group of teachers does not need to be controlled or guided as 
they will even put their own resources towards ICT use. They have new ideas, and mostly 
serve as examples. These teachers are generally skilled and eager to learn; they only need 
better infrastructure and more resources. The second group are what Rogers calls the “early 
majority.” They are real agents because they are a majority and they do not have many 
innovative ideas. However, they like to learn from new experiences and adopt to changes. 
These teachers need resources and much more support than the first group, as they want to 
be visible. A big part of the investment will go to this group through better training, better 
infrastructure and programs spreading awareness of innovations. Like the early majority, 
the late majority includes a large portion of the population; these teachers will wait until 
most of their peers and colleagues have adopted the innovation. These faculty members 
are sceptical about the process of change and its outcome. They will not join until they are 
persuaded that doing so is safe. This group need a lot of support, training, motivation, guid-
ance, collaboration, and peer work. They generally have some basic knowledge of ICT, but 
they are ready to learn more. This readiness varies from one individual to another based 
on many factors, including demographic, social-psychological, and cultural factors. The 
last group are those whom Rogers called “laggards” (1995): the saboteurs, mostly veteran 
teachers, who are the most resistant to any change. They are the custodians of the tradi-
tional view of education, and they are more skeptical about reform and change agents than 
the late majority. The adaptation periods of all resistant teachers are relatively long, and 
some totally refuse to embrace the change. A major mistake is to focus on the saboteurs or 
the rejecters in the reform process. They should either be ignored or used as a correction 
factor; they may serve as bad examples of negative feedback. The process of innovation has 
to start with pioneers and stop before the saboteurs, as one cannot change the whole group. 
Good examples and success stories are needed. The focus should be on models to capture 
the best of what is going on and make it available. In the next section, I consider in which 
direction the implementation should proceed: top-down or bottom-up
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Implementation Theories: Tunisia and the Case for the Top-Down Strategy
The top-down approach is an integration technique that involves political deci-
sions to initiate an innovation. In this approach, decision-makers are considered 
as the real actors in the implementation process while the administrative staff and 
faculty members are given little attention. In contrast to the top-down approach, 
the bottom-up approach recognizes the work of the actual actors and implement-
ers. The implementers are connected with the real situation and can evaluate and 
review more accurately than policy-makers, who usually miss a lot of informa-
tion. In the bottom-up approach, local communities are actively engaged in the 
development process in a participatory manner by proposing recommendations 
based on their individual perception of the situation (Prabhu et al. 1999). In the 
Tunisian case, the top-down approach produces more results and more successful 
ICT implementation initiatives since the system is complex. Within the  bottom-up 
approach, only faculty members and staff would be concerned if commitment 
and motivation were not high, whereas adopting a top-down approach automati-
cally guarantees the involvement of the Ministry of Technology and the Ministry 
of Higher Education. The top management of the Ministry of Higher Educa-
tion developed the e-learning strategy and issued directives that all lecturers and 
course teams had to adhere to. One reason for choosing the top-down strategy is 
that levels of ICT adoption vary significantly from one higher education institu-
tion to another. While some institutions only have online availability of course 
content, others can afford to develop content management systems. Teachers are 
more likely to be influenced through simple communication strategies, policies, 
or top-down orders communicated through formal channels, instructions, email, 
or an intranet. The senior management should engage the staff, most of whom 
will reliably implement their initiatives and ideas as active agents.
Conclusion
Tunisian teachers are more likely to be influenced through simple communica-
tion strategies, policies, or orders from the top through formal channels and 
instructions or via emails or intranet. Senior management should engage the staff, 
who are mostly relied on to implement their initiatives, by acknowledging that 
the drivers for the e-learning process are significantly different from the institu-
tional pressures on them (Clegg et al. 2003; Salmon 2005). This research contrib-
utes to knowledge in this field with information collected through questionnaires, 
interviews, and analysis of the literature, which in turn might support education 
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policymakers and ICT experts in their work regarding the future development 
of ICT in education. Although this research has answered the proposed research 
questions, it may have certain limitations. Some respondents might have inter-
preted the questions differently from what the researcher meant and accordingly 
provided invalid or inaccurate responses. The number of participants could still 
be considered small compared to the real population of both teachers and students 
in higher education. Hence, uncertainty always exists concerning generalizations 
based on data collected through questionnaires.
Endnotes
1. For further information about IBM, see: https://www.ibm.com/planetwide/tn/.
2. For more details, see: https://bit.ly/2PSoYiH.
3. The diffusion of innovation (DOI) theory, developed by E. M. Rogers in 1962, 
is “one of the oldest social science theories. It originated in communication 
to explain how, over time, an idea or product gains momentum and diffuses 
(or spreads) through a specific population or social system” (Rogers 2003, 
p. 130).
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The Role of Social Movements 
in the Re-Configuration of Youth 
Transition Regimes: The Biography 




For twenty-five years, North Africa and West Asia (NAWA) has been the region 
with the highest youth unemployment rates worldwide, and developments since 
the so-called Arab Spring have hardly changed those numbers (Kabbani 2019). 
Before 2011, the situation of these unemployed has been mainly discussed from a 
rather technical perspective that has focused on policies and institutions, and has 
problematized young people’s situation using the notions of “stalled youth transi-
tions” (Salehi-Isfahani 2008; see also Dhillon et al. 2009), and, more precisely 
waithood (Singerman 2007, 2011).1 However, few scholars have written about the 
collective strategies of the unemployed themselves (Emperador Badimon 2009a, 
2011b; Schwarz 2017, 2018).
In this chapter, I analyze the Unemployed Graduates Movement in Morocco 
from a youth transitions perspective that considers young people’s agency. This 
movement, which has been mobilizing since the early 1990s, is a particularly 
instructive example of how young people negotiate their own transitions to adult-
hood within an authoritarian regime. For these purposes, people are defined as 
“young” if they have not yet attained the economically necessary assets required 
for adult status according to the hegemonic social norms: the resources to provide 
for a family of their own.
© The Author(s) 2021 
R. Ouaissa et al. (eds.), Re-Configurations, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen 
Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-31160-5_12
C. Schwarz (*) 
Frankfurt a. M., Germany
e-mail: christoph.schwarz@staff.uni-marburg.de
186 C. Schwarz
In the first section, I will briefly discuss theoretical perspectives to analyze the 
phenomenon, and suggest applying the concept of “youth transitions regimes” 
(Walther 2006). The “regime” notion problematizes youth as a political issue, 
i.e. as the result of power relations, since it focuses on the structures and insti-
tutions that mold transitions to adulthood. However, by methodologically adopt-
ing a contextualized life-course approach (Nilsen et al. 2018), I intend to identify 
the dynamics within the Moroccan youth transitions regime from a bottom-up 
perspective, i.e. from the perspective of activists who contest it. In line with the 
Re-Configurations approach, I aim to reconstruct patterns of conflict and coopera-
tion between protesters, authorities, and institutions, and thus take into account 
the interrelation of agency and structure in order to bring to the fore the specific 
“order of change” (Elias 1970, p. 149).
In the second section, I will introduce and contextualize the Moroccan Unem-
ployed Graduates Movement against the backdrop of the re-configuration of 
the country’s social contract. From 2014 to 2017, I conducted seventeen inter-
views with activists of the movement, some of them life-story interviews, oth-
ers more thematically focused. In the third section, based on this material, I will 
introduce as an example the life story of one of the movement’s coordinators in 
order to illustrate the key dynamics of activists’ life-courses and to discuss the 
movement’s development since 2011. This example will be complemented by 
findings from other interviews with activists and the general literature. On this 
basis, the chapter also discusses generational and spatial dynamics, i.e. the 
 center-periphery relations that underly the movement and their moral economy 
(Thompson 1971), i.e. the way they draw on an older social contract—that of the 
development state under Hasan II—to justify their present claims. Last but not 
least, these interviews also illustrate that the 2011 “Arab Spring” protests resulted 
in a  re-configuration of the Moroccan youth transitions regime, in the sense of a 
disruption of the dynamic ritual of negotiations between the unemployed gradu-
ates and the Moroccan authorities. I will conclude with a brief discussion of the 
results and point to remaining open questions.
Life-Courses in Youth Transition Regimes
A rift between two approaches has long structured the field of youth stud-
ies: the “youth transitions” and the “youth cultures” approaches (Mendoza-
Denton and Boum 2015). Whereas the former emphasizes the institutional and 
 socio-economic milestones on the path to adulthood, the latter focuses on the sub-
jective meanings young people attribute to their status and status changes as well 
187The Role of Social Movements in the Re-Configuration of Youth …
as their cultural strategies for dealing with “being young” in a particular social 
place. Roughly speaking, the “transitions” perspective has focused more on poli-
cies and structures, whereas the “culture” perspective has aimed to reconstruct 
young people’s agency and the subjective meaning they attribute to their status 
as “youths.” In one of the most pointed criticisms, Wyn and Woodman (2007) 
argued that the transitions perspective is inherently flawed, since its characteri-
sations all rest on the assumptions that (a) there exists a normative transitional 
process, from which some young people deviate; (b) youth is a linear process or 
position on a  life-course; and (c) culture, economy and politics simply add ‘fla-
vour’ or context to the development process. In the main, the literature on tran-
sitions draws implicitly on popular conceptualisations of generations, in which 
the Baby Boomer generation has become the implicit norm. The transitions of 
this generation (from school to work, leaving home, establishing nuclear fami-
lies) have become the standard timeline against which subsequent generations are 
judged. This timeline calls young people’s life patterns and choices into question 
through established assumptions about what ‘ought to be’ (Wyn and Woodman 
2007, p. 498).
Accordingly, youth policies that apply a youth transitions perspective are often 
inconsistent, since they draw on a stereotypical idea of ‘youth’. Instead, Wyn and 
Woodman argue for a generational approach that departs from the differences 
between social generations. In a response to this criticism, Roberts (2007) argues 
that generational and transition approaches have, in fact, been inseparable since 
the onset of research. The current consensus, among transition researchers—that 
transitions have been prolonged, de-standardized/individualized, and are often 
reversible ‘yoyo’ transitions—is itself the result of an implicit application of 
 generational differences. By now, many studies are instead using transitions and 
cultural perspectives as complementary, and many transitions researchers concede 
the need to take young people’s subjectivities into account to a greater degree 
(Furlong et al. 2011).
In this chapter, I will apply a “grounded” transitions perspective that refrains 
from developmentalist and psychologist tenets, but is situated in the framework of 
a life course, or biographical perspective. In other words, I will adopt a “contex-
tualized” life course approach in the sense of Nilsen, Brannen, and Chelsom Vogt 
(2018, p. 85):
What characterizes a contextualist life course approach is its sensitivity to his-
torical and spatial contexts. Studies from this perspective do not seek to formulate 
“laws” about how transitions happen that transcend time and place. Life course 
transitions, included the transition from youth to adulthood, are studied with ref-
erence to the historical period and contextual features of particular societies and 
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groups that relate to social class, intergenerational relations, gender and ethnicity 
in which individuals are situated.
In this vein, I argue that a transitions perspective remains important in order to 
reconstruct the structural processes that reproduce social inequality along dimen-
sions besides the generational divide, such as class position, gender, or geograph-
ical situatedness; the latter is particularly important in a country like Morocco, 
which exhibits the highest rural-urban divide in the region (World Bank 2011). 
Such a grounded and contextualized transitions perspective allows us to identify 
how these divisions translate into typical turning points in individual life courses, 
and most probably result in the intergenerational reproduction of certain social 
positions. Likewise, a transitions perspective seems imperative in order to recon-
struct how socio-economic constraints, but also hegemonic symbolic representa-
tions and the acquisition of status symbols of “youth” and “adulthood,” impinge 
on young people’s trajectories, decisions, and political strategies.
The concept of regime of youth transitions, coined by Andreas Walther (2006), 
seems particularly useful for examining the political nature of these transitions: 
How are youth and adulthood socially and politically defined, and by whom? 
What notion of citizenship is central to the social contract within which transi-
tions to adulthood are institutionally organized and negotiated? Discussing such 
questions with a regime terminology results in an analysis that looks at power 
structures and political actors and does not restrict itself to a merely technical pol-
icy discourse.
Drawing on Esping-Andersen’s (1990) and Gallie and Paugnam’s (2000) 
typologies of welfare regimes in Europe, Walther defines ‘regimes’ as existing 
institutional settings that have a history structured not only by conflicts and the 
interests of specific social actors but also by the set of values and interpretations 
they constantly reproduce. Institutions and concepts merge into what is conceived 
of as ‘normal’ in a given context, which also includes a ‘normal’ relation between 
individual entitlements and collective demands. Herein, cultural and social pat-
terns are also concerned with influencing individuals’ biographical orientations. 
(Walther 2006, p. 124).
Translating the welfare regime concept to that of a “youth transition regime” 
also requires the analytical inclusion of schooling and training, as they relate to 
(gendered) concepts of work (and profession), and the respective structures of 
employment and unemployment benefit programs. Using such ideal types and 
clustering different national systems necessarily leads to certain generaliza-
tions. The interpretative value of this model represents “a heuristic compromise 
of medium range validity. The strength of such a model lies in referring to the 
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‘Gestalt’ of the different models through which young people’s lives are regu-
lated” (Walther 2006, p. 125).
Although the regime notion suggests a clear focus on institutions and policies, 
Walther stresses that his concept also aims to analyze the interplay of structure 
and agency. Hence, he also refers to young people’s biographical orientations in 
relation to their youth transition regimes. However, the youth transitions regime 
literature is still lacking an examination of politics from below, i.e. organized, 
collective, political strategies of young people in particular regime settings, for 
example in the framework of social movements. In the following, I aim to offer 
one such example.
Morocco: The Unemployed Graduates Movement and Its 
Historical Context
So far, there has been no systematic analysis or classification of the Moroccan youth 
transitions regime, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide one. Instead, 
I am going to focus on one particular transition segment, the transition from uni-
versity to work, and on the social struggles over how this transition is organized. 
If the education sector is key to any youth transitions regime, it is particularly so in 
Morocco, where in recent decades a very insightful negotiation of transitions at this 
particular juncture evolved between two actors: the monarchy and the government, 
on one side, and the unemployed university graduates movement, on the other.
The Youth Transitions Regime of the Development State
The diplômés chômeurs—or unemployed graduates—movement developed 
against the backdrop of a successive shift of the Moroccan social contract and its 
respective youth transitions. Whereas the decades after the country’s independ-
ence in 1956, under the reign of Mohamed V (r. 1957–1961) and the first two 
decades after Hassan II (r. 1961–1999) took the throne, the monarchy’s policies 
followed the logic of a development state. As in many other nation states in the 
region, the government, in order to consolidate its power, expanded the public 
sector, invested heavily in education and public administration, and granted citi-
zens certain social privileges and rights in exchange for their loyalty. In a pro-
cess termed ‘Moroccanization’, the makhzen2—the monarchy’s own network 
of patronage, repression, and control—brought many economic activities under 
its control and allotted resources to its supporters (White 2001). For university 
graduates, this meant a guaranteed position as a civil servant after obtaining their 
diploma.
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The flipside of the offer of economic benefits for loyalty was political repres-
sion and brutal human rights violations. The reign of Hassan II is often referred 
to as the ‘Years of Lead’, since those who refused loyalty to the regime—such 
as left-wing, democratic, or Amazigh3 activists or the student activists of the 
National Moroccan Student Union (UNEM, Union National des Étudiants Maro-
cains)—were often arbitrarily detained, tortured, imprisoned, killed outright, or 
‘disappeared’ to secret prisons such as the notorious Tazmamart (Vermeren 2006; 
Miller 2012; Hachad 2017; Menin 2019).
Redefining the Social Contract
The regime financed much of its expansion of the public sector, and the employ-
ment guarantees that came with it, within the framework of a rent economy. In 
this case, the natural resource from which to generate rents on the world mar-
ket is phosphate, of whose global reserves Morocco holds around 40%, making 
it the world’s most important exporter (Vaccari 2009). The heavy investment in 
the public sector came to a halt by the end of the 1970s. In 1975, the monarchy 
took control of Western Sahara, which resulted in heavy investments, both civil-
ian as well as military since it now engaged in an armed conflict with the Polisa-
rio movement, which claimed the territory’s independence. In addition, phosphate 
prices began to drop. This meant a reduction in government revenues, which 
could no longer cover the exorbitant public expenditures. Faced with massive fis-
cal instabilities, the monarchy sharply reduced public spending, which resulted 
in an increase in unemployment rates. At that time, major “bread riots” broke out 
in Casablanca in 1981. In 1983, Morocco had to agree to an International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment program (SAP). This 
SAP included a devaluation of the Moroccan currency, the dirham, liberalization 
of trade, and further public budget cuts (White 2001, p. 32).
Bogaert summarizes the monarchy’s strategy as a successive replacement of 
the old social contract of the development state with a new one, in which peo-
ple were “responsibilized” and encouraged to seize the opportunities of the (free) 
market. State power had to be redeployed and reorganized, not only to exploit 
strategic locations and redesign urban skylines but also to create neoliberal citi-
zens (self-reliant, entrepreneurial, individualized) and facilitate their integration 
into the formal market (“inclusive growth”). (Bogaert 2018, p. 166).
For university graduates, this meant that they could no longer count on a post 
as a public servant. Whereas between 1970 and 1977, university enrolment had 
tripled and the number of public servants had grown at an annual average rate 
of 5,5%, the unemployment rate among university graduates rose from 6,5% in 
1982 to 26% in 1991 and 40% in 2002 (Bogaert and Emperador Badimon 2011). 
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This rate tended to be higher among those with advanced degrees (Cohen and 
Jaidi 2006, p. 139), which is why Bennani-Chraïbi (2000, p. 143) even consid-
ered the integration of the educated urban young to be “the most pressing prob-
lem in Morocco today”. Since this assessment from two decades ago, things even 
have deteriorated, particularly since 2010, with unemployment rates of over 20% 
for people aged between 15 to 24 as the national average, and even over 45% in 
urban regions (Medias24 2017;  World Bank 2011).
Since Mohamed VI’s ascension to the throne, in 1999, educational reform 
has been one of the regime’s key priorities. Morocco was the first country in the 
NAWA region to introduce the Bachelor, Master, PhD system in its public univer-
sities (Kohstall 2012).
The Moroccan Unemployed Graduates Movement
First protests of unemployed university graduates date back to the early 1990s. In 
1991, activists founded the world’s first trade union-like organization for unem-
ployed graduates, the National Association of Moroccan Unemployed Gradu-
ates (ANDCM, Asociation Nationale de Diplômés Chômeurs du Maroc) (Sater 
2007, p. 97). The roots of the movement clearly developed out of university stu-
dents’ unions, like the UNEM, and the first activists shared a leftist ideology. 
However, they were frustrated with “traditional ideological politics” that had not 
brought any socio-economic improvements; meanwhile, their own and the pre-
vious generations’ experiences of the ‘Years of Lead’ had made them careful to 
avoid repression by the state forces. Against this backdrop, they opted for a form 
of “apolitical mobilization” (Emperador Badimon 2011b) focusing on one single 
subject: the right to employment in the public sector, and, concomitantly, opposi-
tion to recruitment through nepotism and patronage networks.
Among their central reference points were Articles 12 and 13 of the 1996 con-
stitution, which state that all citizens have “equal rights in seeking education and 
employment.” (13)4 and that “Opportunities for employment in public offices 
and positions shall be uniformly open to all citizens” (12); and two ministerial 
decrees, which guarantee direct employment into public service after complet-
ing a Master’s degree (Cohen and Jaidi 2006; Bogaert and Emperador Badimon 
2011).
The focus on the single subject of employment and the abstention from 
demands for any further political changes resulted in an approach that was very 
open-ended ideologically and that, from the very beginning, allowed Leftists, 
Islamists, Amazigh activists, and non-partisan graduates to come together for a 
common cause. This subverted the regime’s strategy of playing different actors 
against each other.
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At first, activists confined themselves to sit-ins and hunger strikes in the rela-
tively protected environments of the offices of supportive labor unions. However, 
after some years of consolidation and organizational expansion into more remote 
regions, the ANDCM adopted more public tactics, culminating, in 1995, in a 
nine-and-a-half-month sit-in—the longest in Moroccan history—outside the Min-
istry of Education. Ever since, their actions have been mainly street-based: dem-
onstrations and sit-ins in front of the parliament in the country’s capital, Rabat, 
demanding negotiations with the Minister of Labor, or, in case of repression, with 
the Minister of the Interior (Sater 2007, p. 94; Rachik 2010, p. 26; Emperador 
Badimon 2011b).
Within several years, a certain political ritual evolved: when protests inten-
sified, the government, employing methods of both repression and cooption, 
would regularly negotiate with the protesters and directly employ some of them 
in the public sector. The protest coordinators would in turn monitor their mem-
bers, using lists of participation, to make sure that only those who regularly and 
actively participated in the protests were employed. Activists were given tokens 
they had to return to their local coordinator after the demonstrations (Empera-
dor Badimon 2007, 2009b, 2011b; Bogaert and Emperador Badimon 2011). In 
some committees, those activists who exposed themselves to a higher degree to 
police violence, for example by forming the front row during sit-ins, would be 
given a higher ranking on the coordinators’ list.5 After successful negotiations 
and ensuing employment, the respective protest groups would dissolve, only to 
be replaced soon enough by new cohorts of fresh graduates who could not find 
public-sector jobs. In the course of this process, the structure of the ANDCM 
was successively side-lined and replaced by decentralized local chapters that in 
recent years organized not only based on region, but also on degree level, and 
thus became somewhat more exclusive.
At the time of my research, from 2014 to 2017, the activists would gather in 
groups (according to their local chapters) up to three days every week in a park 
situated 250 m from the Moroccan Parliament in Rabat. Usually, they would 
gather in circles and discuss organizational and strategic questions. When they 
decided they were enough activists for a significant protest, they would form a 
disciplined demonstration, many of them dressed in vests bearing their commit-
tees’ logos, and take to the streets. Organizers wearing special vests would walk 
alongside the demonstration and maintain order. In front of the parliament, the 
anti-riot brigades of the police would usually dissolve the demonstration. The 
activists applied a tactic called “provoke and run”: they ran from the police, then 
hid by mingling with passers-by on the avenue, only to return as soon as possible 
in smaller groups to the area outside the Parliament, where they would again take 
193The Role of Social Movements in the Re-Configuration of Youth …
out their banners and vests and recommence shouting and singing slogans until 
the police returned and chase them again.
In the following, I will take a closer look at the processes of engagement in the 
movement by introducing the life story of one of the activists, which I comple-
ment with findings from other interviews and the general literature.
An Activist Biography
Omar,6 who was in his early thirties at the time of the first interview in 2014, grew 
up in a small village in the Rif Mountains. He holds a BA and a MA in English 
Literature and was pursuing his PhD. Omar has five brothers and two sisters. His 
father, a tailor, had died when Omar was still a child. He emphasized that this was 
very difficult not only psychologically, but also socioeconomically. Most of his 
fellow students and colleagues remained financially dependent on their fathers. In 
his case, his oldest brother had to step in and support the family. He described his 
first experiences on the labor market after finishing his BA as follows:
I tried to find a job in the private sector. That was at the time that I had to go 
back to [my village] because staying in Fez requires a lot of money, because I 
had to rent an apartment—it was not easy. So I had to go back home, so at least 
I wouldn’t pay for the rent and the food. I tried my best; I applied many times to 
get a job but always in vein.
In comparison to other activists, Omar was lucky to actually find a job in 
the formal private sector, in a private high school. The salary, however, was not 
enough to allow him to start a family:
Then I worked as a teacher for primary school students from 2007 to 2010 
…. I would work for fifteen hours per week and I would be paid 1,500 dirhams 
(around $150) each month. So later on, I just made up my mind and I realized 
that continuing in that position wouldn’t help me establish a family, because with 
1,500 dirhams it is simply impossible.
Many other unemployed activists emphasize that in fact, they are working, as 
they struggle to get by with any job that comes up, usually in the informal sector, 
for example as private tutors for high school students. However, as Omar’s expe-
rience in the formal sector shows, the wage there does often not allow for real-
izing personal goals, such as marriage. Accordingly, almost all the activists were 
unmarried. Some had boyfriends or girlfriends, but many of their relationships 
ended—or were “ended” by their own or their partners’ parents—because the had 
not accumulated enough capital and lacked employment prospects to provide to 
start a household and provide for a family. Omar recounted that he quit his job in 
the private school to continue his studies in order to increase his chances to one 
day be employed on a higher rank in the public sector.
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A Precarious Cycle of Lifelong Learning
Most of the other interviewees shared similar experiences and decision-making 
processes. They re-enrolled, precisely because they could not find a job according 
to their qualifications. They affirmed that not putting their qualifications to work 
would solidify their precarious position and thus render their degree useless after 
they and their families had invested so much time and money in their education. 
In the meantime, their peers who had not studied at university had at least gained 
several years of work experience and reputation, and they often already earned 
more than their graduate peers would in their first job. The primary reasons for 
their preference for the public sector were secure pay, health insurance, social 
security, retirement benefits, and social prestige (Emperador Badimon 2011a). 
Catusse (2013, p. XV) understands the unemployed graduates’ mobilization not 
only as the expression of a right to work that is justified by individual and col-
lective investment in university education but also as a demand for protection in 
a society in which public employment offers by far the most abundant access to 
social rights.
Those interviewees who were holding jobs in the formal private job market 
would report that often they were simply not paid, or only with several months’ 
delay, and that they had to work many hours of unpaid overtime.
Protest as Part of the Transition
At the same time, many students saw re-enrolling at the university as tantamount 
to preparing for several years of protests in Rabat with the Unemployed Gradu-
ates Movement. Omar explained:
Most, if not all, of the students go through this step. When they decide to 
apply for the master’s program, they already have in mind that they will come to 
Rabat [to protest with the Unemployed Graduates Movement] after they get their 
MA because they know they will not find a job afterwards. Our university pro-
duces thousands of students, and they find themselves on the streets. They think 
it will be much better to get the MA and come to Rabat to demonstrate for one 
or two or three years … If you are lucky you demonstrate for only one year and 
get a job. In the previous generations [of graduates], there are some who demon-
strated only for one year and they got a job at the end.
Here, protesting after graduation seems like an almost logical step in a transi-
tion from higher education to employment, which for them was the step to finan-
cial independence, the economic key marker of adulthood. This is relevant to both 
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the temporal and spatial dimensions. Like Omar, all the activists I talked to came 
from the rural periphery, and they lacked networks in the metropoles, where pub-
lic sector recruitment was conducted. The decision to travel regularly between 
their home universities and protests in the capital also meant significant financial 
expense. Some activists regularly commuted to Rabat from as far as Oujda, on the 
northeastern border with Algeria, a twenty-hour train ride away. Omar, like many 
other activists, was co-renting rooms in two cities, one room that he shared with 
eleven other students in Rabat, where he would come to protest every week from 
Tuesday to Thursday, and another room that he shared with seven fellow students 
in Fez, where he was enrolled at the university.
The “Arab Spring” as a Rupture: Ushering in the End 
of the Movement?
At the center of the movement’s discourse and framing strategy is a critique of 
the nepotistic and corrupt recruitment procedures in the concours examinations 
for public sector employment, arguing that the examiners would naturally favor 
their own families or admit applicants in exchange for exorbitant bribes. It might 
seem contradictory that, in their protests, the activists at the same time demand 
their own hiring without any concours or qualification exams. The protesters to a 
certain degree take as a given the logic of cooption in the sense that they aim for 
a, so to say, “meritocratic and transparent cooption,” deliberately using political 
protest as a resource to get a job.
To link this to the discussions on temporality in youth transitions, Wyn and 
Woodman’s (2007) critique that in many youth transition perspectives, the 
Baby Boomer generation often served as an implicit and generalized blueprint, 
against which the trajectories of young people today are measured, points to a 
legitimate scholarly problem. However, the Moroccan unemployed illustrate 
the strategic and normative leverage that comes with such a comparison from 
an activist’s perspective. By strategically referencing the living conditions and 
social guarantees of the previous generation, who in this context grew up under 
the youth transitions regime of the development state (and its career prospects), 
they are defending a particular moral economy (Thompson 1971). The category 
of generation in this sense is also valid in that these graduates are, in the large 
majority of cases, the first generation of their families to have attained a univer-
sity degree. What further unites them as a generational unit (Mannheim [1928] 
1952) is the above mentioned spatial mobility pattern. All the activists I talked to 
came from small villages or small towns at the rural margins. Their protests thus 
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also express the power relations between the periphery and the metropoles in the 
Moroccan kingdom.
With their ‘apolitical mobilization’, they obviously resist the shift to a youth 
transitions regime that would individualize and de-politicize the risks of unem-
ployment, and instead refer to the old social pact under Hassan II, i.e. the prom-
ises of the development state of the Moroccanization period. Often, they directly 
address the king as guarantor of national unity and social justice, and activists 
like Omar clearly attributed the decision-making powers in this regard to the 
makhzen: “Those who are finding jobs for the students are not the government, 
but rather the deep, real rulers—I am talking about the king and his entourage. It 
is they who decide to employ these people.”
In our first interview in 2014, Omar emphasized that the amount of time spent 
protesting in Rabat required to finally get a post as a civil servant was very vari-
able: “It depends on the political situation. For us, I would say we are ((laugh-
ing)) not lucky enough because of the Arab Spring, for me it was like a curse to 
the unemployed movement.”
In 2011, a new protest movement had formed in Morocco, motivated by the 
protests and revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, and initiated mostly by young 
people: the 20th of February Movement (M20F), which, on that date in 2011, 
mobilized the largest demonstrations since independence, in fifty-three cities in 
Morocco. Its demands were mainly political: a democratization of the constitu-
tion, an independent judiciary, effective measures against the endemic corrup-
tion. In my interviews with M20F activists in the cities, some drew a thick line 
between social movements—which, in their view, pursued particularistic inter-
ests—and M20F as a political movement. Nevertheless, although sometimes mar-
ginalized, social issues were also addressed, particularly at the periphery of the 
M20F protests (Catusse 2013; Emperador Badimon 2019).
Omar recounts that the government, at the time headed by the Istiqlal Party,7 
worried that the well-organized Unemployed Graduates Movement would join 
forces with the M20F, and that this would result in a dynamic that could threaten 
the established order. In response, they offered the currently protesting cohorts of 
unemployed graduates over four thousand jobs in the public sector in exchange for 
not joining the M20F. However, many of the interviewees contended that the Istiqlal 
cadres abused the agreement and directly employed many graduates who were not 
even on the lists provided by the movement; they suspected that these posts were 
given to graduates from families better connected in the patronage networks.
What is more, when Istiqlal was ousted in the ensuing parliamentary elections 
in 2011, the incoming Islamist Justice and Development party finally ended the 
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negotiations with the unemployed graduates. Since then, there has been no more 
direct employment of members of the movement. Omar recounted:
The government had never before offered that many jobs, and now it was sim-
ply too much; they could not employ more people. That’s why the Arab Spring 
was a curse for us, for the following generations of unemployed graduates. When 
things began to calm down after the 20th of February, we knew the makhzen 
would not employ us anymore.
The movement continues protesting, but since 2011, it has not had any further 
success in negotiating public employment. Last time I visited Omar in 2017 in 
Fez, he had disengaged from the movement. Instead, he was focused on submit-
ting his PhD thesis, and was struggling to get by with precarious jobs at the uni-
versity and in the informal sector. Many of his fellow activists, however, were 
continuing to protest, together with the new cohorts of graduates that Moroccan 
universities had produced since 2011.
It remains to be seen if their protests will prove successful in the future, or 
if the ‘Arab Spring’ retrospectively marked the end of the Unemployed Gradu-
ates Movement, and thus the end of a key conflict in the re-configuration of the 
Moroccan youth transitions regime.
Conclusion
The Moroccan Unemployed Graduates Movement illustrates very vividly that 
transitions to adulthood are a matter of social and political struggle, and that the 
respective re-configurations in youth transitions regimes are subject to resist-
ance and negotiation. Faced with the dire and precarious prospects of the largely 
unprotected private job market, the activists reject the individualization of the 
risks of their transition from higher education to the labor market. Instead, they 
put forward the moral economy of the old social contract of the developmental 
state, which would have guaranteed them transitions to adulthood characterized 
by a secure post in the public sector and extensive social rights.
The movement does seem very particularistic and ‘apolitical’ at first sight. 
Accordingly, it does not offer a Western audience a case for easy identifica-
tion and idealization, as many of the ‘Arab Spring’ protesters did. Instead, the 
movement illustrates the constraints of long-term social mobilization under a 
repressive post-colonial regime. One important aspect is that the movement 
negotiates not only a temporal passage, but also a spatial relationship. Because 
the vast majority of the activists come from rural areas, either small villages or 
small towns at the rural margins, their protest also expresses the power relations 
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between the periphery and the metropoles in the Moroccan kingdom. In terms of 
space, the Moroccan case and a look at its history of structural adjustment pro-
grams imposed by the IMF and World Bank also illustrates that youth transitions 
regimes are not limited to the framework of the nation-state, but are embedded in 
international power structures.
Endnotes
1. I have argued elsewhere that the focus should be placed on precariousness 
instead of waithood, since the latter focus suggests passivity and fails to 
encapsulate the often hectic schedules that characterize the daily lives of many 
young people in the region. Many of them do in fact work a lot, mainly in the 
informal market, but their jobs, as exhausting as they might be, do not gener-
ate enough income to form or maintain a family (Schwarz 2017).
2. For a better understanding of the word makhzen, which would translate 
directly as ‘magazine’, see Daadaoui (2016, pp. 41–42): “Definitions of the 
makhzen formulated either through interviews with politicians, or by makhzen 
scholars, lack a precise sense of the notion of the concept. Makhzen, for most 
Moroccans, is an apparatus of state violence and domination, and at the same 
time a system of representation of traditional royal power. Makhzen is also a 
system of conflict resolution controlled by the king, who dominates all fields 
of the social universe. It evokes fear, awe, and respect in the Moroccan politi-
cal culture and refers to a patrimonial institution that has managed to adapt to 
the realities of modern Moroccan politics. A clear conception of makhzen is 
still elusive and, to capture its meaning, a cursory look at its origins and his-
torical development seems necessary at this point.” See also Daadaoui 2014.
3. The Imazighen (sg. Amazigh, “free man”)—or Berbers, a term that some 
activists reject, since it is associated with “barbarity”—consider themselves 
the indigenous population of the Maghrib, those who inhabited the region 
before the invasion of Arab tribes. Tamazigh, a language of the Afro-Asian 
family that is present in Morocco in three regional varieties, is often referred 
to as the strongest distinguishing feature from Arab cultural identity. The 
Moroccan Amazigh movement, which has developed along social and cul-
tural cleavages in the last decades, is a cultural and political nationalist move-
ment that opposes the projects of a Pan-Arab or Islamist hegemony, and the 
concomitant social exclusion and marginalization of the Amazigh population 
(Maddy-Weitzmann 2011, 2017).
4. For an English version of the Moroccan constitution see: https://www.ref-
world.org/docid/3ae6b5454.html.
5. Personal communication by one activist to the author, November 2014.
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6. All the names of interviewees were pseudonymized, and all the local and tem-
poral references were altered, in order to protect the interviewees’ identities 
and those of the persons that are mentioned in their life stories.
7. The Istiqlal, or Independence Party, was the first political party founded in 
Morocco. It has nationalist, Pan-Arab leanings and has headed the government 
for six legislative terms.
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The year 2007 witnessed the birth of the Southern Movement. After the unifica-
tion between the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Yemen 
Arab Republic in 1990, power in the state was equally shared across ministries 
between South and North Yemeni politicians and bureaucrats. The results of the 
1993 elections shattered the power-sharing agreement, marginalized the Yemeni 
Socialist Party (YSP) of the former PDRY, and strengthened the General People’s 
Congress and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Iṣlāḥ) and, with them, the 
tribal and Islamist elites of North Yemen. As tensions soared, civil war broke out 
on April 27, 1994. South Yemeni politicians proclaimed the Democratic Republic 
of Yemen on May 21, 1994 and, thereby, the disengagement of the territory of the 
former PDRY from the Republic of Yemen; however, this faction lost this war on 
July 7, 1994.
Initially, the Southern Movement was a loose coalition. Most of its members 
consisted of former army personnel and state employees of the PDRY who had 
been forced from their jobs after the war of 1994.1 In 2007, these people began 
to address their discontent publicly and appealed for socioeconomic rights, such 
as pensions, or the reinstatement of their former jobs. However, the Yemeni gov-
ernment was unable or unwilling to accede to their appeals. Government secu-
rity forces used brutal measures against protesters. This government-sponsored 
brutality and indifference strengthened this loose social movement (see Human 
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Rights Watch 2009). More and more people joined the demonstrations, and their 
appeals began to harden into concrete political demands, such as state independ-
ence of the territory that once formed the PDRY.
Since the Southern Movement began in 2007, I have regularly visited Aden 
and the surrounding governorates to conduct research. From March until May 
2014, I conducted a three-month field research for my PhD dissertation, which 
was followed by a stay in the field from January to February 2015. Since the out-
break of the war, I have participated in events of the South Yemeni diaspora in 
Europe. In 2014 and 2015, I conducted participant observations during demon-
strations and gatherings of the Southern Movement, as well as interviews with 
more than 80 people, ranging in age from 19 to around 70, and originating from 
almost all South Yemeni governorates. I analyzed the interviews via a grounded 
theory methodological approach as per Strauss and Corbin (1990).
Based on this longstanding field research in South Yemen, this chapter will 
investigate the role family memories play in the transmission of the independence 
struggle in South Yemen. Family memories evolve in the interaction between dif-
ferent generations. They imply negotiations and struggles over concepts pertain-
ing to the future of South Yemeni society during times of huge socio-political 
transformations and political turmoil in Yemen. As I will illustrate in this chap-
ter, family remembrance in South Yemen is a practice of resistance. According to 
Routledge, “practices of resistance cannot be separated from practices of domi-
nation, they are always entangled in some configuration” (1997, p. 70). Thus, 
family memories are re-configurations that refer to changes in discursive and 
symbolic power networks. Strikingly, young people have become very active in 
the Southern Movement, beginning before 2011 but especially once the protests 
of the “Arab Spring” began in Yemen. During my visits to South Yemen, I often 
heard young people born after Yemen’s 1990 unification saying how great life 
had been in the PDRY. They often said that “we had” such-and-such accomplish-
ments in the PDRY, that “our state” provided “us” with this or that achievement. 
Thus, they strongly identified with a state that had disappeared from the world 
map two decades earlier, before they were even born. Where did their longing for 
the PDRY come from? And how could claims of an independent state in South 
Yemen reemerge in 2007 after the previous attempts at independence were dis-
mantled in 1994?
Using interview extracts and participant observations from my field research, I 
will give insight into the enormous impact of family memories on young people’s 
longing for the PDRY, and, therefore, on their political engagement for an inde-
pendent state in South Yemen.
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The Role of Family Memories in Contexts of Defeats
The family, a network of individuals comprised of two or more biological gen-
erations related by kinship, is “the main channel for the transmission of lan-
guage, names, land and housing, local social standing, and religion; and beyond 
that also of social values and aspirations, fears, world views, domestic skills, 
 taken-for-granted ways of behaving, attitudes to the body, models of parent-
ing and marriage” (Bertaux and Thompson 1993, p. 1 f.). Besides school and 
media, the family “is the foremost mnemonic community, as it teaches children 
how to recall their past in a structured and socially acceptable manner” (Ryan 
2011, p. 156). Memories never exist as closed systems, however. They touch, 
strengthen, intersect with, modify, and polarize other memories in the social real-
ity (Assmann 2006, p. 17). Thus, an individual’s memory is always comprised 
of both individual and collective memories (Assmann 2006, p. 23) and socially 
supported, constructed, and stabilized by communication with other people (Ass-
mann 2006, p. 25). Family memories are “social memories” (Welzer 2001) that 
involve intentional forms of communication and transmission but also unnoticed, 
unintentional, and incidental transmissions of history (Welzer 2001, p. 16 f.).
I remember my own relatives, neighbors, and friends in South Yemen transmit-
ting to me the nostalgia that everything had been better in the past; that people 
had been united in the independence struggle against the British in the 1960s; that 
people had celebrated New Year’s Eve before unification; that people were well 
educated and knew the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Hugo; that education was 
much better by far than nowadays; that Aden had been a clean city with electric-
ity and running water; that not everything was forbidden (ḥarām) or a source of 
shame (ʿayb) as it had become; that unveiled women could go out in the streets 
without being harassed; that there had been an atmosphere of mutual respect, par-
ticularly towards women; that all children attended school, etc. Such pronounce-
ments are often interwoven in everyday communication without any specific 
intentions. These counter-memories link to the narration of a better past, a cur-
rent difficult present, and a desirable better future. The belief in a better future, 
that would be at least as good as the past, is an important trigger for the claims 
of reestablishing an independent state on the territory of the former PDRY. This 
belief is firmly linked to the South’s defeat in the 1994 war and to the subsequent 
marginalization of the South Yemeni population in its aftermath.
According to the unity narrative of the Republic of Yemen, which is omnipres-
ent in Yemeni textbooks, unification was the sole source of progress, advance-
ment, and development for the entire country. Most people in South Yemen 
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perceived the opposite to be true. The obstacles to unity in 1990, the brutality of 
the war in 1994, and the massive marginalization of South Yemenis after this war 
was silenced from national official history, such as from nationalized textbooks, 
museums, political speeches and documents, etc. Therefore, the national narrative 
of the Republic of Yemen contradicts the many-voiced social memories in South 
Yemen. According to Argenti and Schramm (2010), a hegemonic narrative is 
often created when a violent past becomes the foundation for building a common 
future. In this process, the hegemonic narrative “first cuts out everything that does 
not fit into the dominant story-line (of victimization, heroism etc.) and secondly 
puts the past at a somewhat comfortable distance from the present” (Argenti and 
Schramm 2010, p. 18). Nevertheless, “[i]ndividual memories are not easily over-
written and family stories are often preserved across generations through oral 
transmission” (Assmann and Shortt 2012, p. 4). As Yemeni unification in 1990 
and the war of 1994 are the primary events in South Yemeni remembrance, based 
on which historical experiences are (re)interpreted and construed, family memo-
ries are incompatible with the official narrative that has been constructed in the 
aftermath of the war in 1994.
The unity narrative, which became dominant in education, political speeches, 
and public life after the war of 1994, clashed with South Yemeni memories 
because South Yemenis have underlined marginalized elements of their collec-
tive memory and created new interpretations of the past countering the unity nar-
rative. These South Yemeni counter-memories challenge official versions of the 
past and emphasize South Yemenis’ suppressed experiences. This “mnemonic 
resistance” (Ryan 2011, p. 155), “the resistance to a collective memory narrative” 
(Ryan 2011, p. 159), refers to South Yemenis’ interpretative agency to resist “the 
encroachments of a powerful dominant memory” (Ryan 2011, p. 155). As politi-
cal and/or state institutions that allowed a remembrance of South Yemeni repre-
sentations of the past were non-existent after the war in 1994, due to the defeat of 
the South Yemeni faction and the flight of South Yemeni elites, the South Yemeni 
population took over the task of remembering in accordance with their represen-
tations of the past in daily communication and get-togethers.
However, the rupture that generated counter-memories on a collective level in 
South Yemen emanates from more than experiences of the war in 1994. It also, 
particularly, stems from the subsequent large-scale marginalization of South Yem-
enis. Most of the activists of the Southern Movement whom I met during my field 
research were either forcibly retired or had a relative (often a parent) who had 
been forced into retirement after the war. Thus, there is a connection between the 
forced retirees and political mobilization in South Yemen. Under certain condi-
tions, defeats can become central historical reference points; defeats are remem-
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bered, not only victories (Assmann 2006, p. 64). The memory of the losing side 
of the violent conflict can have a stronger impact than the same conflict has of 
the victors. Defeats do not necessarily destroy people’s collective self-perception; 
they can also strengthen a group’s cohesion. In cases in which a community’s 
identity is based on a consciousness of victimhood, for example, the memory 
of suffering is borne in remembrance: this encourages community cohesion and 
mobilizes opposition. In this respect, defeats may strengthen the will for national 
autonomy and/or independence from a hegemonic power (Assmann 2006, 
p. 65 f.). In the following, I will illustrate how family memories transmitted the 
desire for an independent state to young South Yemenis who grew up after Yem-
eni unification.
The Transmission of Independence in Families
In answer to my question about why young South Yemenis want to reestab-
lish a state that they have never experienced, a man at a qāt-chewing gathering 
explained that the Arab family structure has a strong cohesive influence on its 
members:
Arab society is different. Family ties in Yemen differ from those in Europe. In 
Yemen, in the south [South Yemen] or Arab countries, relations between father, 
son, and grandfather exist inside the family. The son absorbs the ideas that his 
father and grandfather have. They live together for a long time because they do 
not separate so much. He does not distance himself from them. That is why they 
transmit everything they carry to him.[…] The youth are influenced by the past, 
and they know that it was better than the present. This stems from the family rela-
tionships—because I explain to my son, and my father explains to my son how he 
lived in the past, and how I lived.2
The older generations pass on to the young the nostalgic representations of 
their earlier lives, and the young absorb the ideas of their fathers and grandfa-
thers. However, this is a very static notion of intergenerational transmission from 
the older to the younger generation and from men to other men. Daily communi-
cation in South Yemeni families involves counter-memories disseminated and dia-
logically transmitted in “conversational remembering” (Welzer 2010), in which 
representations of the South Yemeni past are invoked and collaboratively recon-
structed.
In many instances where youth have mobilized, their knowledge about the for-
mer PDRY and the independence struggle began with family memories:3
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A person—no matter how young—can become impressed by relatives, by 
uncles, by writers, journalists, academics, intellectuals, and party leaders. Con-
cerning my surroundings, my family and relatives have relations to the revolution, 
to politics. My paternal uncle was secretary general of the party during a certain 
period. My paternal uncles were YSP leaders in the 1980s and in the 1970s. Thus, 
ideas of rejection, of revolution, and of many ideas developed in me. The emer-
gence of the Southern Movement influenced the minds of all people and contrib-
uted to the development of a certain direction and mindset. … We feel that our 
economic problems take place on a family level. There is no health care, no qual-
ity education, no services provided by the state. The right to state employment is 
impossible in Yemen; you pay money for a mediator. All these things, this suffer-
ing, concern the people.4
Ṭāriq comes from a family of YSP politicians. He explained that these rela-
tives and others, such as “writers, journalists, academics, intellectuals, and party 
leaders,” impressed him, which led to his interest in the grievances and claims of 
South Yemenis and finally made him politically active. His sources of knowledge 
vary; however, his politically active family played the largest role in influencing 
him via transmission. Ṭāriq’s example demonstrates a strong connection between 
a family’s political orientation and that of its descendants. Nevertheless, active 
Southern Movement parents do not automatically have active Southern Move-
ment children, and vice versa. The situation in which people were living also 
made him aware of the grievances in South Yemen and the claims of the South-
ern Movement. Hence, “[t]he emergence of the Southern Movement influenced 
the minds of all people and contributed to the development of a certain direction 
and mindset,” as Ṭāriq expressed in the interview quoted above. Although not all 
South Yemeni families have been engaged in political parties in recent years, their 
children can still be politically active, as the following example demonstrates:
My father, my mother, the people, books; all those who speak [gave informa-
tion about the past]. It would be wrong to tell you that only the house, my mother, 
I and so on speak; rather, all people speak. You read books, news. Everywhere 
you feel it. You speak to someone, and he tells you “We were, we were, we were. 
I worked in this and now I am sitting [jālis] at home. In the past, I traveled; today 
I do not have anything.”5
Using a direct quotation, this female activist pointed out that South Yemeni 
forced retirees—known as jālisīn,6 meaning “those who sit at home”—have an 
impact on young people because they disseminate in conversation their feel-
ings of marginalization and exclusion. The forced retirees thus symbolize South 
Yemenis’ exclusion from development and embody the lack of improvement 
and opportunity in the region. Forced retirees were among the first protesters in 
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2007 and used collective action to show their discontent. However, long before 
the emergence of the Southern Movement, they were already numerous, and their 
forced retirement reminded their families, friends, and neighbors that the war 
in 1994 had been lost by the South Yemeni faction. People have felt punished, 
unjustly treated, and betrayed by the elites of North Yemen.
The following examples illustrate the connection between the forced retir-
ees and their impact on family memories, as well as on political mobilization in 
South Yemen. A young man in his late twenties recounted that his father had been 
a soldier. After the war in 1994, he was forced to retire from his post. In 2014, he 
sometimes received a monthly pension of 30,000 Yemeni riyāl (around 100 € or 
140 US$). The young man complained that a North Yemeni would receive three 
times as much as his father. Because of the inadequate income, his father lost the 
family’s house. After telling me the story of his father, the young man then asked 
me rhetorically how he could support unification in light of the injustice done to 
his father.
A woman in her early thirties reported that her mother lost her job and was 
forced to stay at home soon after the war in 1994. During the war, a North Yem-
eni pilot had seized the family’s flat in Aden. With legal documents proving their 
ownership, they were able to regain the flat by taking their case to court. The 
young woman is also an activist today. Thus, the basis of the Southern Movement 
comprised not only the forced retirees, but also their children, whose parents and 
relatives symbolized for them the injustice promoted by the central government 
in Sanaa. In these cases, it is not necessary for intergenerational transmission 
to occur as a speech act: parental unemployment, a family’s lack of money, and 
social insecurities transmitted the families’ marginalization to the next generation 
without the need for words.
Once, I was sitting in the Aden Mall and speaking to young activists when a 
forcibly retired army general heard us talking and approached us. He began nar-
rating his experiences of marginalization after the war in 1994 and his long strug-
gle to be re-employed. He also told me that about the frustration and stress of not 
being able to support the family. While listening to us, he felt resentment about 
what had happened to him in the past, and he began narrating, thereby giving 
us—the younger generation—ideas about his life and the negative consequences 
of Yemeni unification and the subsequent war. He transmitted representations of 
the past, encouraged to speak by the communication between the young activists 
and me about today’s independence struggle. Such narrations take place not only 
in interview situations, but also during everyday communication among families, 
on the streets, and in neighborhoods in South Yemen; people talk about perceived 
injustices, and, by doing so, they transmit their longing for the PDRY and their 
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desire to reestablish an independent state. This example shows that the intergen-
erational transmission of the independence struggle is not unidirectional from 
older to younger generations only, but is in fact a dialogical process in which both 
generations interact to construct a social memory, a process in which the past 
and current situation is reinterpreted and construed. The following statement also 
exemplifies this dialogical relationship:
The leaders of the generation of our fathers and grandfathers wrote history for 
us and wrote novels for us about what happened, what happened before the war 
in 1994 and before the signing of the unity [treaty], and during the war [in 1994] 
and how the transformation happened. … We are born during the phase of Yem-
eni unification. To this day, our school curriculum has not mentioned the PDRY 
but its relics still exist with us. … We learn from our fathers and grandfathers, and 
now we are transferring to the world [the knowledge] that marginalization hap-
pened here.7
Nadīm points out that leading figures of his father’s and grandfather’s genera-
tion wrote down the events of the past, those that occurred during the war in 1994 
and during the unity agreements. He also points out that young South Yemenis are 
now transmitting knowledge that was once transferred by the fathers’ and grand-
fathers’ generations. This dialogical transmission led to the young now becoming 
the ones narrating to “the world that marginalization happened” in South Yemen. 
Hence, the dissemination of memories among family members influences young 
people’s political engagement for an independent state.
Another extract from a group discussion with university students in Aden in 
April 2014 indicates similarly that family memories in South Yemen are impor-
tant for understanding young people’s mobilization for independence:
Man 1:   Every family fears for their sons, but they do not prevent you from 
carrying out your activities. They advise you to be careful; they fear 
for you. They call you, but they do not prevent your activities. The 
same goes for my mother. She sees her children in this situation. She 
does not accept this situation. My father does not accept it either. My 
brother, my sister, the entire house, do not accept this situation. They 
reject this situation. Thus, they allow you [to go to demonstrations 
etc.], but they fear for you with all certainty.
Man 2:   Our activities [in the streets/during protests/in university] are not hang-
ing around or something like this. Rather, it is a reality of tyranny that 
we suffer from. Our future is gone. Our country is gone. We have to do 
something. We are forced to do this, of course, to reject tyranny.
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Man 3:   The sacrifice for it, it is a duty. We have to make sacrifices when we are 
active.[…] This reality requires sacrifices. This is compulsory. These 
are my inner feelings. This matter is compulsory, whether the family 
consents or not.
Man 1:   Some families prevent you, but their sons reject that.
Man 2:   Many families.
Man 1:   Some sons do not inform their families. They go secretly [to protests 
etc.] without telling them.
Man 2:   There are even young people who are silent, but not in the sense that 
they accept the reality. However, the degree of anxiety differs from 
person to person. It is the issue of rejecting reality or changing reality. 
Sacrifice for the purpose of reality.8
This discussion indicates that the transmission of the independence struggle is a 
two-sided coin. On the one hand, families do “not accept this situation,” i.e. “tyr-
anny”, suffering, marginalization, unemployment, and the ramifications of Yem-
eni unification in general. Therefore, dissatisfied with the situation, families have 
transmitted to younger generations their discontent with their life circumstances 
and their wish to regain an independent state on the territory of the PDRY. On the 
other hand, families, especially those who are not politically active, are uneasy 
with or even reject their children’s participation in protests because they fear they 
could lose their children. However, according to my interview partner, it is “com-
pulsory,” “a duty” to “make sacrifices” for the future and the country. They feel 
“forced” to act, and their anxious families have to accept this. The independence 
struggle becomes a duty, an obligation, for a better future.
Conclusion
By nostalgically lamenting the PDRY past in daily conversations, older genera-
tions who lived in the PDRY have transmitted their wish to recreate a South Yem-
eni state to younger generations. The Southern Movement has begun to contest 
the unity narrative of the Republic of Yemen publicly since 2007. However, as 
the extracts and examples in this chapter indicate, the struggle for an independent 
state had already begun long before the Southern Movement emerged in 2007. 
In particular, South Yemeni involuntary retirees, who were affected by large-
scale marginalization after the war in 1994, had an enormous impact on trans-
mitting counter-memories to younger generations, and, thus, on South Yemeni 
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 society and its claims to reestablish the state on the territory of the former PDRY. 
These people became the basis of the Southern Movement in 2007, which soon 
transformed from a social movement appealing economic and social rights into 
an independence movement demanding the reestablishment of an independent 
state. Thus, family memories play a crucial role in the transmission of the inde-
pendence struggle in South Yemen, and particularly in the dissemination of the 
longing for the PDRY to young people and the hope that only independence can 
bring back a stable and safe life. Young people, who never experienced life in 
the PDRY because they were born only after Yemeni unification, have received 
knowledge about the past from their elders. However, the elders’ transmission is 
not a static process from the older to the younger generation, but a dialogical pro-
cess in which the young engage with the older generations’ remembrance. Thus, 
young people’s political engagement for an independent state in South Yemen is 
linked to family memories, which involve the transmission of counter-memories 
that challenge the unity narrative of the Republic of Yemen.
Endnotes
1. Thousands of South Yemenis were affected by forced retirement. See Kam-
beck (2016), for statistics on those forcibly retired after the war.
2. Personal interview with a man at a qāt gathering in Aden, March 2014.
3. Some interview partners, all of them originating from al-Dali’, told me that 
their consciousness of politics and the southern cause can be traced back to 
their own traumatic childhood experiences during the war of 1994. However, 
due to the geographical closeness to North Yemen, the war in 1994 could have 
been more intensive and more violent there than in other areas.
4. Personal interview with Ṭāriq (pseudonym) in Aden, January 2015.
5. Personal interview with Samīra (pseudonym) in Aden, January 2015
6. Jālis is an Arabic term used to designate forced retirees colloquially in South 
Yemen.
7. Personal interview with Nadīm (pseudonym) in Aden, March 2014.
8. Personal interviews (group discussion) in Aden, April 2014.
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On the Re-Configurations of Cinematic 
Media-Spaces: From Diaspora Film 
to Postdiaspora Film
Alena Strohmaier
Introduction1: “Diaspora is Highly Contemporary”
“Whether ‘diaspora’ is a common word, a scientifically constructed concept, or a 
rallying cry that gives meaning to a collective reality, it is highly contemporary. 
Denying this would be pointless” (2008, p. 106), Stéphane Dufoix claims. The 
case of the Iranian diaspora and its filmmaking are particularly interesting objects 
of investigation because they illustrate the re-configurations of both diaspora into 
postdiaspora and diaspora film into postdiaspora film, revealing the contemporari-
ness of the “diaspora” lens through its potential for accommodating transforma-
tion and change.
Iran, like most of today’s nation-states, has a long history of migration. As 
early as the eighth century, Zoroastrians fled from Iran to neighboring India for 
religious freedom after the Arab-Muslim colonization. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, many Iranians migrated to the neighboring czarist Russian Empire to work 
in the oil industry. After the Second World War, many Jewish Iranians emigrated 
to the newly founded state of Israel. In the second half of the twentieth century, 
many Iranians from the middle and upper social classes went to countries such 
as Germany, France, Britain, Austria, and the United States for higher education 
with the initial aim of bringing their newly acquired knowledge back to Iran (Raji 
2010, p. 193). The year 1979, however, marked a turning point: the Islamic revo-
lution, which resulted in the deposition of Shah Reza Pahlavi and the establish-
ment of an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Khomeini, led to probably the largest 
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wave of emigration the country has ever seen. The consequences of the Islamic 
revolution and the Iran-Iraq War prevented members of the first wave from return-
ing to Iran. Further waves of migration followed in the 1990s and increased after 
the uprisings of the Green Movement in 2009. There are currently no compre-
hensive statistics on the total number of Iranians living outside Iran, but it is esti-
mated to be between four and six million (Vahabi 2012). Most Iranians relocated 
to North America, closely followed by Europe and Australia, with major cities 
as primary destinations. Iranians also moved to business-friendly cities in the 
MENA region such as Istanbul, Doha, and Dubai.
This chapter is primarily concerned with the re-configuration of diaspora into 
postdiaspora fueled by the formation of the (self-applied) term “Iranian diaspora” 
and its cinematic representations in what are termed postdiaspora films. It makes 
three underlying theoretical assumptions: first, the development of a flexible and 
open concept of diaspora; second, an anti-essentialist definition of culture; and 
third, questioning of the dazzling category of the “hybrid.” In a close analysis of 
Ana Lily Amirpour’s 2014 film A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, I will demon-
strate that these re-configurations manifest on three spatial levels: the real space 
of the diaspora, which is subject to socio-political changes; the internal-diegetic 
spaces in the films themselves, which constantly bring new themes to the fore; 
and film as its own space-creating entity that constantly updates its own medial-
ity. In postdiaspora films, these different spatial dimensions come together and 
convey new cinematic media-spaces.
From Exile to Diaspora
“How then has this group of religiously, ethnically, and linguistically diverse peo-
ple with different pasts constructed an Iranian identity in diaspora? Why is Ira-
nian immigration even termed a diaspora?” (2003, p. 685), Nilou Mostofi asks. 
In order to answer this question, it is crucial to draw distinctions with other terms 
in the context of migration. The (self-applied) label of Iranians living abroad as 
“diasporic” or simply as “diaspora” is a recent development. In popular discourse 
as well as in research, the terms “refugee,” “émigré,” and “exile” were initially 
predominant, but this changed and Iranians “reinvented themselves as a distinct 
national and ethnic group outside of Iran. […] A move away from the urgency of 
an exilic and immigrant narrative to one that situates Iran and Iranian culture in 
the continuum of more global diasporic consciousness” (Elahi and Karim 2011, 
p. 382 ff.). The Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans claims: “Iranians are 
now at a point in their immigrant journey where they selectively choose elements 
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of their Iranian and American identities, developing a unique ‘diasporic’ identity 
that is quite different from native Iranians” (2014, p. 11). Babak Elahi and Persis 
M. Karim also emphasize:
Iran’s current diaspora is by necessity part of a longer continuous historical 
narrative in which Iranian peoples have adapted and reinvented themselves. It is 
not only the home culture that determines the direction of diaspora. Rather, the 
complex network of places and spaces of home and away are mutually transform-
ative (2011, p. 387).
Hamid Dabashi’s cultural studies research and Hamid Naficy’s work on the 
TV and radio landscape of Los Angeles in 1993 made the most significant con-
tributions to the designation of “Iranian diaspora.” Hamid Dabashi’s monograph 
Parviz Sayyad’s Theater of Diaspora uses the term prominently in the very title. 
In his introduction, he speaks of intergenerational links between artists of Iranian 
origin, implying the inherent characteristic of community in the concept of dias-
pora (Sayyad and Dabashi 1993, p. xi). Hamid Naficy, for his part, elaborates on 
the state of liminality and in-betweenness, and thus, despite the word “exile” in 
the title of his monograph The Making of Exile Cultures, speaks of “an ethnic 
minority, not just an exilic community” and “hyphenated Iranian-Americans and 
not just Iranians” (1993, p. 196), and finally invokes “people in diaspora” (1993, 
p. 16 f.). In his monograph An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmak-
ing, published in 2001, he further differentiated sharply between exile and dias-
pora: “There is nothing common about exile and diaspora” (p. 3). Hamid Dabashi 
also stresses this point by deconstructing the concept of exile, which occupies a 
central place in the experience and life reality of people living outside Iran, espe-
cially those in Los Angeles. According to him, the repeated term “exile” fuels a 
narrative that reinforces binary opposites instead of dissolving them. He unmasks 
the narrative of exile as a construct when he finally argues that the majority of 
people living outside Iran are, strictly speaking, in a diaspora rather than in exile:
The fact is that with few exceptions the overwhelming majority of Iranians liv-
ing outside Iran can get on an airplane and return to their homeland and there 
lead a half-decent life not particularly worse or better than what they lead in Los 
Angeles, Washington DC, London, or Paris (2009, p. 251).
In 2012, Hamid Naficy dedicated an entire volume of his four-volume mono-
graph A Social History of Iranian Cinema to the Iranian diaspora and its filmmak-
ing. Here, the concept of diaspora is omnipresent: he writes of “Iranian culture in 
the diaspora” (2012, p. 384) and of a “worldwide diaspora” (2012, p. 372), and 
uses the term in a clearly positive way:
Millions of Iranians are living outside their homeland in one of the greatest 
modern diasporas, from where they are creating dynamically intertwined multilat-
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eral, transnational, and multicultural communities tied to each other and to their 
homelands by a globaI mediawork (2012, p. 511).
In his opinion, the difference between “exile” and “diaspora” lies in the refer-
ence point or frame of reference: “exile” would tie it closely to the country of 
origin, Iran, whereas “diaspora” means the opening towards the current center of 
life and the coexistence of different influences:
While the exiles’ identity involved a near exclusive, vertical relationship with 
the Iranian homeland, diasporic consciousness was multisited and multilateral: a 
vertical relationship with Iran and horizontal relations both with Iranian compa-
triot communities elsewhere and with their coethnics and coreligionists across the 
globe (2012, p. 395).
Similar to Dabashi, he also argues that the change from “exile” to “diaspora” 
has to do with the practical possibilities of return: “Finally, as exile became dias-
pora and immigration, and as more Iranians returned home for visits, the sights 
and sounds of home of decades earlier lost their hold” (2012, p. 388).
The shift from the terms “refugee,” “émigré,” and “exile” to “diaspora” should 
be seen in the context of the expansion of the concept of diaspora and the con-
comitant Diaspora Studies. It follows the change from a negative concept of a 
specific form of dispersion to a flexible and positive concept of global migra-
tion (Brah 1996; Bauböck 2010; Tölölyan 2012). The Iranian diaspora, like any 
diaspora, is by no means a coherent community, it includes people of different 
political colors, social origins and generations. A problematic aspect of the term 
“Iranian diaspora” is the adjective, which makes the ethnic attribution visible 
and thus follows a logic of inclusion or exclusion. The Dictionary of Ethnology 
describes ethnicity as a concept of a group of people with a uniform culture and 
identity (Streck 2000, p. 53). In his text “Old and New Identities, Old and New 
Ethnicities,” Stuart Hall counters this all too simple, long-prevailing definition 
with the following:
They [ethnicities] are not already-produced stabilities and totalities in the 
world. They do not operate like totalities. If they have a relationship to our identi-
ties, cultural and individual, they do not any longer have that suturing, structur-
ing, or stabilizing force, so that we can know what we are simply by adding up 
the sum of our positions in relation to them (2007, p. 45).
Closely tied to the concept of identity as a never-completed process, Hall con-
ceptualizes ethnicity as an entity that is not self-contained either. The process 
from identity to ethnic identity, according to him, passes through identification 
and inclusion or exclusion mechanisms. These mechanisms play an important 
role, especially in the search for identity-forming narratives:
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In the course of the search for roots, one discovered not only where one came 
from, one began to speak the language of that which is home in the genuine 
sense, that other crucial moment which is the recovery of lost histories. The histo-
ries that have never been told about ourselves that we could not learn in schools, 
that were not in any books, and that we had to recover (2007, p. 52).
These narratives form the awareness of belonging and (self-)attributions. Stu-
art Hall cites the example of Jamaican people who, when asked whether they 
would describe themselves as “black,” initially reacted with disbelief. The dif-
ferent shades of brown and black were anchored in Jamaican parlance by many 
different terms, but there was no single category. This only emerged during 
 post-colonialism, as empowerment and demarcation from the white colonial pow-
ers. Stuart Hall therefore describes the category of “black” as follows: “Black was 
created as a political category in a certain historical moment. It was created as 
a consequence of certain symbolic and ideological struggles” (Hall 2007, p. 54). 
“Black” is thus a category that creates an ethnic attribution at a certain historical 
moment in a certain geographical place. What is made visible in an act of inclu-
sion or exclusion is primarily a power relationship, a valorization or empower-
ment vis-à-vis the Other:
This notion breaks down the boundaries, between outside and inside, between 
those who belong and those who do not, between those whose histories have been 
written and those whose histories they have depended on but whose histories can-
not be spoken (Hall 2007, p. 48).
Drawing on Stuart Hall, I would like to argue that the term “Iranian dias-
pora”—like the category of “black”—is a constructed category that stems from a 
specific socio-political and historical context. Taking the Islamic Revolution and 
the waves of migration associated with it as a starting point, the term is charged 
with the desire to describe the migratory condition in a positive way. Associated 
with this is the image of the well-integrated, left-wing, anti-religious, educated, 
and Western-oriented people of the middle to upper-middle classes, who are glob-
ally connected with Iran as well as with all other people within the Iranian dias-
pora and their respective countries. This carries the illusion of a homogeneous 
identity, which has been viewed critically:
The enemy had to be what we called “multi-culturalism.” […] Nobody would 
talk about racism but they were perfectly prepared to have “International Eve-
nings,” when we would all come and cook our native dishes, sing our own native 
songs and appear in our own native costume (Hall 2007, p. 55 f.).
In this sense, the term “Iranian diaspora” is not only symptomatic of a posi-
tive description of a certain experience and lived reality of people residing outside 
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Iran in a certain historical and geographical context. Ethnicity is used here as a 
definite means of cultural localization; “of positioning, of placing [that] the term 
ethnicity connotes” (Hall 2007, p. 61). Cultural localization is always tied up with 
identity, because, according to Stuart Hall, it takes place within representation 
itself, not outside it: “Identity is always in part a narrative, always in part a kind 
of representation. It is always within representation. Identity is not something 
which is formed outside and then we tell stories about it” (2007, p. 49).
The term “Iranian diasporic cinema,” like “Iranian diaspora,” also carries the 
ethnic attribution as a marker of positioning within a cultural field, in this case 
film. This approach assumes that such positions are always reached through pro-
cesses of negotiation and delimitation: “The fact remains that every new posi-
tion, in asserting itself as such, determines a displacement of the whole structure 
and that, by the logic of action and reaction, it leads to all sorts of changes in 
the prises de position of the occupants of the other positions” (Bourdieu 1983, 
p. 338; emphasis in original).
In the following analysis of Ana Lily Amirpour’s A Girl Walks Home Alone At 
Night, I will show that “Iranian diasporic cinema” is centrally concerned with the 
dissolution of cultural and generic ascriptions, leading to a new form of cinematic 
media-space in which postdiasporic conditions are negotiated.
Beyond Hybridity
In most films of the Iranian diaspora from the 1980s and 1990s, the  narrative 
themes of migration and travel are embedded in transitional spaces such as 
hotels and airports. Some early diasporic films that are popular for such scenes 
are Sarhad (Checkpoint), directed by Parviz Sayyad (USA, 1982); The Suitors, 
directed by Ghassem Ebrahimian (USA, 1988); Guests of Hotel Astoria, directed 
by Reza Allamehzadeh (USA, 1989); I Love Vienna, directed by Houshang Allah-
yari (Austria, 1991); and I Don’t Hate Las Vegas Anymore (USA, 1994), directed 
by Caveh Zahedi.
The imaginary city of “Shahr-i Bad,” depicted in the 2014 film A Girl Walks 
Home Alone at Night, poses an interesting example of transitional spaces other 
than airports and hotels. Ana Lily Amirpour started a crowdfunding initia-
tive to fund her directorial debut, which premiered at the Sundance Film Fes-
tival in 2014. The story goes as follows: Arash (Arash Marandi) lives with his 
heroin-addicted father, Hossein (Marshall Manesh). They are harassed by a 
cruel,  drug-dealing pimp named Saeed (Dominic Rans), who seizes the young 
man’s prized Ford Mustang as payment for the father’s debts to him. In a crime 
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of opportunity, Arash in turn steals a pair of diamond earrings from the wealthy 
young woman he works for, Shaydah (Rome Shadanloo). At night, Saeed comes 
across a strange young woman in a chador. “The Girl” (Sheila Vand) seduces 
Saeed and convinces him to take her back to his apartment, where she grows 
fangs and kills him; it turns out she is a vampire. As she leaves, she passes Arash, 
who has come to offer the earrings in exchange for his car. He finds Saeed dead, 
and takes back his car keys along with a suitcase of drugs and cash. Arash decides 
to sell the drugs, allowing him to quit his job working for Shaydah. Later, he 
attends a costume party at a nightclub dressed as Dracula. “The Girl” with the 
chador spends her time listening to music alone in her apartment, skateboard-
ing, or bedeviling pedestrians by night until she comes across the lost Arash. He 
shows vulnerability and compassion, and she takes him to her home, where they 
listen to music and she resists the temptation of his neck. Meanwhile, suffering 
from heroin withdrawal, Hossein has an episode where he believes Arash’s cat to 
be his dead wife. The following morning, Arash discovers Hossein’s dead body. 
Distressed, he runs to the apartment of “The Girl” and begs her to run away with 
him. They drive off together into an undecided future.
The film is shot in black-and-white and opens with a medium close-up of 
Arash. He is wearing sunglasses and smoking while he leans up against a gar-
den fence in a casual manner reminiscent of James Dean (Fig. 1). The tall 
wooden fence takes up the right three-quarters of the shot, leaving the protagonist 
the left quarter of the shot; in other words, the view of the surroundings is ini-
tially restricted. The camera holds the shot steady to show Arash waiting as the 
 Western-style opening credits roll. The first shot recalls the beginning of Sergio 
Fig. 1  A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, “Opening,” USA 2014
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Leone’s 1968 Spaghetti Western Once Upon a Time in the West. Suddenly some-
thing seems to be moving behind the slits of the fence and Arash jumps through 
a gap to catch a cat. He then makes his way along the path as the camera follows 
his purposeful steps.
Slowly the camera pans out to reveal dusty streets, an empty parking lot, a 
large industrial building, and finally, in the background, the city. Arash con-
tinues to walk down the street with confidence as the camera shoots him from 
a birds-eye view. He walks past a street sign that reads “Shahr-i Bad” in Farsi, 
translating to “bad city” (Fig. 2). The camera pans out even further to a wide shot 
that reveals an American suburb, squeezed between the city and the rural land-
scape. The shot lacks any central area with a church, mosque, town hall, market, 
or square, and the view only shows a few houses of Shahr-i Bad (Fig. 3). It is 
impossible to identify the area from the shot geographically, but director Ana Lily 
Amirpour explains:
I think things that happen, happen inside me, and they happen in all the places 
in the world […], which is loneliness, being misunderstood, wanting to find a 
connection, feeling isolated. I feel there is a heaviness that a lot of societies wear. 
And I don’t really think it’s a geographically specific thing (Amirpour 2015)2.
The street signs and the few spoken sentences in Farsi suggest that the story 
is set in Iran even though the film was shot in California. To the question if the 
director would have preferred shooting “on the actual locations,” Amirpour 
responds:
I do think it’s a fairytale and for me it’s just an Iran of my mind. Film is an 
opportunity to make your own universe, make your own world. I think that’s what 
is exciting and wonderful about it. […] The great thing about art is that the limi-
tations are actually the thing that encourages the creativity and push you to new 
places. I wanted to do this thing, ok so I cannot do it there, but then it became this 
limitless to really make my own place, make my own rules: we made the money, 
Fig. 2 and 3  A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, “Arash enters the city,” USA 2014
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we reinvented the posters, the street signs, it was like really glorious, like making 
a world, that’s one of the best parts (Amirpour 2015)3.
Ana Lily Amirpour does not see resorting to made-up spaces as an involun-
tary or secondary solution due to the lack of real alternatives, but as a chance to 
open up and create new spaces through film. She has produced her own world, a 
 no-man’s-land, between the United States and Iran. Mixing elements from Ira-
nian, American, and other (film) cultures links to Laura Marks’ concept of inter-
cultural cinema:
“Intercultural” indicates a context that cannot be confined to a single culture. 
It also suggests movement between one culture and another, thus implying the 
possibility of transformation. Intercultural means that a work is not the property 
of any single culture, but mediates in at least two directions. It accounts for the 
encounter between different cultural organizations of knowledge, which is one of 
the sources of intercultural cinema’s synthesis of new forms of expression and 
new kinds of knowledge. (Marks 2000, p. 6 f.)
The transitional space of A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night is not a third 
space combining two or more elements (as conceptualized by Homi K. Bhabha); 
rather, it is the point of departure, the premise of the film. Shahr-i Bad is not only 
a transitional space because the tattooed and pierced drug dealer Saeed drinks 
black tea out of small Persian teacups, or because the chador-wearing protagonist 
listens to songs by the White Lies. It is a transitional space because there is a thin 
line between life and death, day and night, black and white, danger and comfort, 
and horror and humor. Shahr-i Bad is a fluid space constantly in motion and pro-
cess, and most importantly, a space with cultural exchange and negotiation. The 
city goes beyond genre descriptions and reveals that diaspora is characterized by 
hybridity and not cultural essentialism. This hybridity appears in the transitional 
spaces of this film in a way that renders cultural designations impossible. Cultural 
and genre elements mix with imagined elements to the point that the construction 
is indicative of the relative arbitrariness of it all. In this sense Shahr-i Bad is a 
transcendent space, and so the dissolution of ethnic attributions coincides with the 
dissolution of genre attributions.
The vampire in A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night wears a chador that not 
only functions as camouflage, but as a nondescript look. In response to a question 
about reinterpreting the chador from a symbol of female repression to a rebellious 
vampire cloak, the director Ana Lily Amirpour says:
The chador has this weight, this velvety, satiny [texture], it catches the air in a 
certain way, it felt like really nice. The thing about the chador or any of the things 
we do, it could be the bumper stickers on your car, how you organize your house, 
all the things that make the system of how we appear in the world, the truth is that 
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whatever reason, once you start pealing back the layers there is very very strange 
things inside us people and often it contradicts the outside system (2015)4.
She does not see an ostensible political message in the use of the chador, but 
rather emphasizes the tactile and haptic dimension of the chador as a film prop.
“The Girl” is shown first in participating in everyday rituals like going for 
walks, putting on makeup, and listening to music. Only once she encounters 
the drug dealer Saeed, the camera zooms in on her face and reveals her pointy 
vampire fangs. She pounces on him and sucks his blood, after which the camera 
shows another close up of her face, her mouth smeared with blood and her eyes 
possessed with bloodlust (Fig. 4 and 5).
This closely parallels Jim Jarmusch’s staging of his protagonist in the 2013 
film Only Lovers Left Alive. After Eve (Tilda Swinton) drinks blood from a bottle 
for the first time, the camera zooms in on her face, showing her mouth covered 
in blood, her pointed teeth, and her eyes closed in a moment of pleasure (Fig. 6).
In both cases, the background becomes blurry and is no longer in the field 
of perception. The drug dealer’s apartment in Shahr-i Bad and Eve’s apartment 
in Tangier transcend into a new cinematic space of transformation. The woman 
Fig. 4 and 5  A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, “The vampire shows her teeth,” USA 
2014
Fig. 6  Only Lovers Left 
Alive, “Eve’s bloodlust,” 
USA 2013
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believed to be human becomes a vampire and the film transitions into the alleged 
vampire film genre. The close-up in both scenes is purposely implemented as a 
cinematic tool of (de)visualization. In distanced shots, the viewer cannot recog-
nize them as vampires. Only through the close-up do the traits of the vampire 
genre become visible in an over-exposition of blood and pointed teeth. The face 
becomes the cinematic space that reveals the genre.
In this “first Iranian vampire Western,” the protagonists do not ride into the 
sunset on horses, extending the frontier and claiming newfound territory. How-
ever, Arash drives a Ford Mustang that exemplifies the frontier motif and is remi-
niscent of 1950s Americana; “The Girl” rides a skateboard that calls to mind the 
1980s.
One scene shows an empty street lined with streetlights. In perfect symmetry 
with the shot, the vampire can be seen on the skateboard appearing in the distance 
(Fig. 7). She rides down the street towards the fixed camera before disappearing 
behind it, whipping her chador in the wind (Fig. 8).
The end of the film shows the Ford Mustang’s headlights close up before 
zooming out to show the vampire and Arash sitting in the car with the cat 
between them, listening to music. After a long pause, the shot cuts to the back of 
the car as the lights go on and the engine starts. The lights illuminate the license 
plate that reads “Shahr-i Bad” in Farsi, thereby casting the city in focus one last 
time (Fig. 9). The Ford Mustang drives over the dusty desert road leaving behind 
the city and a small horizon of light at the top of the screen before finally disap-
pearing in the darkness of the night (Fig. 10).
In both scenes, the shift from on to off screen, visible to invisible, by using 
alternating close ups and distance shots, becomes a crucial cinematic tool for con-
ceptualizing the genre element of the frontier. In this sense, A Girl Walks Home 
Fig. 7 and 8  A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, “The vampire rides her skateboard,” 
USA 2014
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Alone at Night merges Iran and the Unites States and reimagines diaspora as a 
phenomenon where the frontier is not just extended but disappears entirely.
Based on the theoretical foundation that genre structures in the production and 
circulation of cultural artifacts are just as effective as the various approaches to 
using and analyzing media, Ivo Ritzer and Peter W. Schulze describe genre as a 
non-hermetic category: “genres cannot be understood as closed systems, but only 
as processes of systematization. They are always in flux and undergo changes” 
(2013, p. 15). Accordingly, as an open-ended concept, genre is especially useful 
for expressing the uncertainty and distance from (cultural) essentialism that are 
inherent to postdiaspora films: “genres do not resemble each other because they 
have a common feature, but because they share multiple properties. Therefore, 
they cannot be designated essentialistically” (Ritzer and Schulze 2013, p. 10). 
Edward Said famously wrote: “All cultures are involved in one another; none is 
single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated and 
unmonolithic” (1993, p. xxv). The flexible motion and discarding of clear desig-
nations are symptomatic of the similarities between genre and postdiaspora. The 
frontier no longer exists, space has long been conquered, and cultural and ethnical 
designations are no longer recognizable as simple hybrid forms.
Conclusion: “Postdiaspora is an Emancipatory Move”
The example of A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night analyzed above must be seen 
as an advancement of pre-existing diasporic spaces, which make cultural and cin-
ematic attributions increasingly impossible. I would like to use the term “postdi-
aspora film,” as a variety of what Jeffrey Sconce called “smart cinema”:
Fig. 9 and 10  A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, “License plate and driving off,” USA 
2014
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While previous forms of art cinema concentrated on formal experimentation 
with film style and narrative structure as a means of critiquing the codes of “bour-
geois realism” and/or “bourgeois society,” the new smart cinema has for the most 
part re-embraced classical narrative strategies, instead experimenting with tone 
(2002, p. 352; emphasis in original).
His concept functions as an umbrella term for a multitude of aesthetic and nar-
rative forms, each of which is an expression of an individual handwriting. The 
postdiaspora film is thus an intelligent cinema that not only represents and depicts 
cultural differences, but may be taken as the premise for overcoming them:
Postdiaspora is an emancipatory move, refuting not the connection with one’s 
place of origin, but rather one’s unequal status vis-à-vis homelanders and host-
landers. Furthermore, postdiaspora is the struggle to overcome an imposed status 
position based on place of origin. Postdiaspora does not mean marginalization in 
the way diaspora does (Laguerre 2017, p. 22).
Using hybridized cultural and generic elements, Shahr-i Bad consists of mul-
tilayered intercultural spaces and thus opens up a field of plural potentialities. 
As a cinematic-hybrid space, Shahr-i Bad appears in such a way that the genre 
elements are used as cinematic means to create a genre-space that allows com-
plex cultural exchange processes to be observed and analyzed on the basis of 
 cross-spatial cinematic elements. Shahr-i Bad is a cinematic space in which sev-
eral spatial dimensions, which are actually contradictory and mutually incompat-
ible, are juxtaposed in one filmic-hybrid space. The unifying force prevails over 
the separating force in dissimilar constellations. Diaspora is not a culturally her-
metic space, and neither is film. Thus the cinematic space becomes a media-space 
through the interrelation of different cultural elements. The flexible movement 
of relating and withdrawing clear attributions is symptomatic of the postdias-
pora. This re-configuration of Shahr-i Bad’s postdiaspora filmic space is based 
on revising genre elements from vampire and western film genres. The frontier 
no longer exists, the space has already been conquered, and cultural and ethnic 
attributions are no longer recognizable as hybrid forms. Instead, they are now cin-
ematic media-spaces conceived less as transitions or passages than as places of 
residence. A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night thus joins the ranks of filmmaking 
that “survives (and at times thrives) at the symbolic and material intersection of 
‘Hollywood,’ the ‘indie’ scene, and the vestiges of what cinephiles used to call 
‘art’ films” (Sconce 2002, p. 351). As a filmic-hybrid space, it engages in cin-
ematic transformation processes that go beyond its own re-configurations, thus 
allowing conclusions about general cultural transformations of postdiaspora and 
postdiaspora filmic spaces as they express mobile and flexible intersections and 
collaborations, which in turn stimulate further connections.
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Endnotes
1. This chapter is based on research conducted for my PhD thesis between 
2013 and 2018 at the Philipps-University of Marburg, which has been pub-
lished as a monograph under the title: Medienraum Diaspora. Verortun-
gen zeitgenössischer iranischer Diasporafilme. Wiesbaden: Springer, 
2019. Available open access here: https://link.springer.com/content/
pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-658-24606-8.pdf.
2. Q&A Hosted by Roger Corman at the Hammer Museum (Part of MoMa Con-
tender’s Series). Amirpour, Ana Lily, Reg. A girl walks home alone at night. 
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The Metamorphosis of the Significance 
of Death in Revolutionary Times: 
Mohammad Rabie’s Otared (2014)
Walaa Said
All hope abandon, ye who enter here. Divine Comedy, 
Dante Alighieri
Introduction
Although violent death (and its related themes of fear, anger, mourning, loss, 
pain, torture, and despair) has been ever-present throughout the Middle East since 
2010, both as a trigger and an outcome of the mass-mobilization in the region, it 
has not been adequately addressed by various domains of intellectual discourse. 
In her 2015 article “Death and Martyrdom in the Arab Uprisings: An Introduc-
tion,” Amira Mittermaier criticizes the lack of anthropological research on death 
during this period (2015, p. 588). Furthermore, she urges her readers to recon-
sider “death as an analytical lens to think about street politics” (Mittermaier 2015, 
p. 587). Moving away from the designation “Arab Spring,” which tends to roman-
ticize the extensive popular political mobilization in public spaces across the Arab 
world, Mittermaier’s reminder provides a chance to scrutinize the effects of the 
intense incidents of violence and death and their affective consequences on repro-
ducing and disempowering both the individual and the masses. The article ana-
lyzes selected scenes from Mohammad Rabie’s novel Otared (2014) in an effort 
to trace the effects of violent death on bodies and to examine how those bodies 
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translate and internalize such deaths’ effects through the emotions of anger, hope, 
fear, and performative horror.
Violent Death: Between the Derealization of the Living 
and the Martyrization of the Dead
Violent death is medically defined as a death caused by intentional use of physi-
cal force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, a group, 
or a community (Norris 1992). As Rynearson explains, violent death thus has 
three dimensions, the “three Vs”: violence, violation, and volition. Correspond-
ingly, dying is either “injurious,” “transgressive,” or resulting from “irresponsible 
negligence” (2013, p. 21). In turn, these three dimensions mandate “retaliation,” 
“retribution,” and “punishment” and work as “an inherent counter-story to the 
[three] V’s of violent dying” (Rynearson 2013, p. 21). Those three Vs interfere 
with the mourners’ acceptance of death, causing what is called a “complicated 
grief,” “a form of bereavement marked by elevated and persistent separation dis-
tress, seriously impaired functioning, and difficulties ‘moving on’ with life fol-
lowing the loss of a loved one” (Currier et al. 2006, p. 404).
Since January 25, 2011, Egypt has witnessed bloody clashes, chaotic killing, 
sniping, and injuries at the center of its capital aired on television screens or cir-
culated via social media. Given such a state of emergency, where death is visible 
and fear becomes both permeable and ubiquitous, it is useful to briefly explore 
how death is facilitated, permitted, and received, and Judith Butler’s concept of 
“derealization of the living” provides an apt lens for this exploration.
In Precarious Life, Judith Butler describes at length how violence and death 
are facilitated and justified. While she mainly criticizes the ideas that allow US 
society to justify suspecting and killing “Others” in the context of the War on Ter-
ror, it is quite helpful to extend her argument to include other tense political situa-
tions in which systematic violence is a means to control widespread fear or cover 
national vulnerability. Life, accordingly, becomes a privilege that is not granted 
to everyone equally. On a discursive level, this privilege is bestowed upon those 
who demonstrate ethnic, political, and/or social commonalities within the domi-
nant group, whereas people who lack such commonalities are denied that privi-
lege. That said, there are those whose lives are considered valuable and, hence, 
“grievable.” And there are those who, because of cultural or political difference, 
unfamiliarity, or disputation, are distanced and othered; their lives are not valu-
able and their death is ungrievable (Butler 2006, p. 34 ff.). In Butler’s words, 
this discourse derealizes those lives, rendering them “unreal.” So when violence 
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is exercised against the invisible, “it fails to injure or negate those lives since 
those lives are already negated” (Butler 2006, p. 33). Accordingly, those dereal-
ized lives are “neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral” (Butler 2006, 
p. 33 f.). Those situations of political fragmentation beget what Butler calls “vio-
lence of the derealization” (Butler 2006, p. 33), a vicious cycle of violence that 
is nearly impossible to break, as it targets spectral bodies. Within this discourse, 
exerting violence against or even killing such spectral bodies is not considered a 
crime; it never happens. The process of derealizing bodies mirrors the state’s fear; 
therefore, the process constitutes a case of othering, in which the spectral bodies 
are scapegoated for the loss of security.
Since grief is essential for the living, not only to process death, but to assure 
them of the value of their lives and thus their deaths, the total absence of united 
national grief results in a “national complicated grief.” The spread of the arbi-
trary killings that took place on public spaces, intentionally at times, confirmed 
the unworthiness of individual lives and gave root to intense fear. In a frag-
mented political context that lacks national grieving, renaming the dead “martyrs” 
(shuhadāʾ) serves as an antidote to their derealization. This retrospective process 
of martyrizing the dead offers a healing solution. While the dead themselves can-
not benefit from being upgraded to martyrs, martyrization of dead has allowed 
bereaved survivors to find meaning for the death of their loved ones, and perhaps, 
for the dead’s lost lives.
Amira Mittermaier characterizes martyrdom positively as “about giving one’s 
life for a cause, a better state of affairs, and simultaneously … about one’s fate 
in the afterlife” (2015, p. 588). By contrast, in her introduction to Martyrdom in 
Literature, Friederike Pannewick problematizes the concept as “a voluntary act 
staged as a response to the collective experience of suffering, fear and utter con-
fusion” (2004, p. 1). Although the previous definitions stress the intentions of the 
dead, which are impossible for a witness to know for certain unless the dead left 
behind a note, martyrization cannot be accomplished without the living sharing 
the same suffering and/or cause. While both Mittermaier and Pannewick suggest 
the purposefulness of the dead, the latter not only stresses collective weariness 
with the socio-political contexts, but partially explains protestors’ insistence on 
continuing to occupy the public squares despite the random killings. However, 
for a person to count as a martyr, his or her death should be witnessed or attended 
by an “audience” (Mittermaier 2015, p. 588) and accepted by the local commu-
nity of survivors. Thus, martyrdom “is a label assigned retroactively” (Mitter-
maier 2015, p. 588): in order for this process to be completed, the life of the dead 
requires to be examined and idealized, and transformed into a legacy circulated 
to keep the memory alive. Although the factors of witnessing and/or intentions 
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were not satisfied in many cases during the clashes, martyrization continues to 
be widely practiced. It has been convenient for protesters and political activists 
to extend the label of martyr to anyone shot or killed during clashes and, equally 
important, to one’s political allies. At the outset, this grand narrative works as a 
coping mechanism for this new level of terror and heightened death rate, serving 
“as tools for holding the state accountable, as mobilizers of continuous protests, 
and as a source of inspiration” (Mittermaier 2015, p. 586).
On another note, Mittermaier points to the fact that “death does not erase 
hierarchies” (2015, p. 594), and not all martyrs are memorialized equally: some 
become famous and are branded through different media, while others are con-
signed to oblivion, or denied the rank altogether.1 Despite the intention of find-
ing consolation by martyrizing the dead, the discourse of martyrdom contributes 
more to the state of the derealization of the living, who are derealized twice. The 
hierarchy of death and martyrdom denies that all lives are valuable and therefore 
grievable. Evidently, the interrelationship between violence and the revolutionary 
act problematizes death as well as life and keeps lives “interminably spectral.” As 
much as martyrization becomes a way to grant death meaning, the intensity of 
fear remains: silently lurking and paving the way for the police and/or the mili-
tary state to take over and, most importantly, eradicate revolutionary bodies from 
public spaces. In short, empty public spaces subjected to military discipline have 
been haunted by the spectral bodies of the dead and the permanent stain of fear.
Death and Fear in Post-2011 Dystopias: The Example 
of Mohammad Rabie’s Otared
Mohammad Rabie’s novel Otared is graphically violent: it includes intense 
descriptive scenes of rape, necrophilia, and homicide. Dead, tormented bodies 
and bodies in terror are not only the pivotal theme in the novel; this is the text’s 
tool for demonstrating a deconstructive reading experience of the idealized upris-
ing. In this novel, published shortly after the dispersion of the Rabaa’ sit-in of 
2013, the uprising of 2011 is a point of departure, or better, a momentum, for 
the text’s fragmentation that implodes any possible discourse of hope. In the nar-
rative, January 25, 2011 instigates cycles of dystopic futures. The novel tackles 
the theme of sniping as the main reason for the deaths during the first eighteen 
days. Otared is a complex work, in which the violent death scenes are gravely 
elaborated. Through a circular labyrinth, Otared comprises three main temporal 
threads: 2025 AD, 2011 AD, and 455 AH (1063 AD)2 in five parts (with alternat-
ing 2011 and 2025 parts grouped around the central 455 section), named after 
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these points in time, besides a prologue, which takes place some time before 
2011. The novel is narrated in a line that cuts across the three temporal lines: a 
2025 grotesque under occupation Cairo, taking most of the narrative space; a 
briefer section during 2011 “revolutionary” Cairo; and a 455 AH early medieval 
apocalyptic Cairo, at the center of the narration. Once the narration passes the 
medieval portrayal of Cairo, the entire tone and vocabulary intensifies and reca-
pitulates the metaphysical idea of hell as an interpretative paradigm of the fol-
lowing course of actions. The characters portrayed in the 2025, 2011, and 455 
sections remain separated throughout the narration except for the final part, titled 
“2025,” in which Otared, the protagonist of the prologue and the 2025 time line, 
meets Zahra, the protagonist of the 2011 segments. The narrative voice is poly-
phonic, with both first-person and omnipresent narrators. In the following, my 
analysis will focus on scrutinizing how, in a revolutionary context, the narrative 
techniques strip any glorified significance from the moment of death and render it 
a mere public performance of terror.
2011: Hope as the Grim Reaper
In the 2011 narrative thread, Rabie uses two themes to explore how lives are dere-
alized. First, he dramatizes the random killings committed by snipers on rooftops 
overlooking Tahrir Square during the eighteen days of the uprising. The narrative 
demonstrates the effects of the extensive, arbitrary killings on the streets of Cairo 
on which people are entrapped, as death is inescapable. From another angle, 
Rabie presents the derealization of lives through the anonymity of the dead. All 
the sub-stories in this narrative thread center on dead bodies without ID cards, the 
state official document of people’s identification, visibility, and surveillance. For 
the “[m]any in this country [who] had no ID; many were too low down the scale 
to own one; [and] many had lost theirs on purpose” (Rabie 2016, p. 177). These 
scenes highlight the symbolic existence of the ID as a reference to the system and 
its concept of “humanity.” In the eye of the state, humanity is synonym to citizen-
ship based on a notion of complete docility and obedience. Without an official 
ID, both citizenship and human individuality are erased. Thus, those who decided 
to dispose of their IDs might escape the firm grip of state’s surveillance, but they 
lose any chance of personal visibility; their lives and their deaths are, therefore, 
not accountable or even valuable. Dramatizing those two themes touches upon 
how the system derealizes lives and, as a corollary, how people deeply internal-
ized this systematic derealization.
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Moreover, those two themes dismiss any glorified interpretations of death. In 
this context, death is not meant to be natural; rather, it is executed through kill-
ing and visibly deformed bodies in public spaces. Rabie captures the moments of 
extreme fragility and vulnerability that occur when citizens are exposed to those 
scenes of death. In other words, through emotions of terror and helplessness, 
the “2011” sections reproduce an alternative history of the first eighteen days. 
Accordingly, the novel renders revolutionary demonstrations distant and invis-
ible while foregrounding death and deformed corpses. The text brushes aside the 
role of the political activists, instead spotlighting marginal characters and their 
individual confrontation with the commonality of death. The image of the public 
space as a festive mulid3 is depicted as a space of fear.4
On another level, the novel’s 2011 narrative thread is concerned with portray-
ing the firsthand experiences of marginal unpoliticized characters from differ-
ent social classes. The narrative thread of the middle-class characters Insal and 
Zahra examines the death of the unidentified from another perspective, in which 
dead bodies affect living ones. As Cairo goes through chaos and paralysis dur-
ing the first eighteen days of the uprising, Insal, a teacher, finds himself responsi-
ble for his four-year-old student, Zahra, after she is left behind with no relatives 
or family to contact. Insal takes Zahra to live with him and his wife Layla, who 
is four months pregnant. Because he has never met Zahra’s father, Insal decides 
sorrowfully to take the little girl on a journey through Cairo’s morgues, which 
are packed with dead bodies, hoping to find her disappeared, “unknown” father. 
Insal’s experience in the streets of Cairo exhibits how civilians inherited the sys-
tem’s way of derealizing the living. On his way home after a long day of search-
ing, Insal watches civilians chase a man who is thought to be a thief because he 
is not carrying an ID. The man has been hit and tortured. When he is about to 
escape, Insal, taking him for a thief too, helps the crowd to grab him again. It 
takes only a few minutes until the man is hanged on a streetlight (Rabīʿ 2014, 
p. 159). Insal later approaches the body and observes that “[t]he nails were clean 
and the fingers well-formed. Unable to resist” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 159). This man was 
most probably not a thief; his mistake was to walk on the streets of Cairo without 
an ID while people are in a state of fear and doubt. Ironically, in Tahrir Square, 
where people are expressing their anger and shattering the old barriers of fear of 
the regime, fear becomes the predominate emotion that dictates people’s action 
outside the revolutionary spaces. Arriving home, Insal is unable to verbalize his 
own fear caused by what he has seen. In a moment of breakdown, he beat at his 
temples. He tugged at his hair. He covered his mouth with his hand and started 
to scream. He jumped up and down. He bit his fingers. He gripped his shirt and 
tugged at it violently, trying to rip it. Then he started slapping his face with a 
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relentless rhythm, a slap every two seconds, one slap after another, striking harder 
with each one … by the end each blow seemed to flood the scene before him with 
a bright light … after a quarter of an hour of violence, he settled (Rabīʿ 2014, 
p. 159 f.)
Traumatized and likely suffering survivor’s guilt, Insal inflicts violence on his 
own body. An example of the middle class, he is another marginal character who 
has never before encountered violent death in public. Before encountering the 
hanged man and the bodies of gunshot victims in the morgues, Insal has only wit-
nessed “peaceful” deaths: “the bodies of people he knew who had slipped quietly 
away after sickness or in their sleep” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 162).
All are exposed to rape, violence, death and deformed bodies of other mar-
ginal individuals. The exposure of this sudden severe violence disrupts their for-
mer contentment. The thin veil of security that their marginal existence provides 
them is abruptly and violently torn.
A closer look at the narrative perspective will help us to understand how the 
mood of obstruction and the sense of entrapment are expressed. The two parts 
titled “2011” share an omnipresent narrator that comments nonchalantly on the 
first eighteen days of the uprisings where “[t]he people out in the streets were 
angry. Murder was abroad” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 164). This third-person voice is 
not passively narrating selective death scenes, but it exercises the authority of 
explaining what lies behind these scenes and commenting on the characters and 
events. In one early instance, the narrator unveils the master plan behind the sense 
of torment and death that unfolds later, saying:
[n]o one realized that what had happened and what would happen thereafter 
was preordained, that the hell they lived in was perfectly normal, was in fact a 
hell that recurred elsewhere and often, and that all these things were a punishment 
(Rabīʿ 2014, p. 154).
This early articulation briefly introduces the central notion of Rabie’s politi-
cal dystopia. Rabie borrows the Islamic concept of hell and dramatizes it. While, 
in Islamic theology, hell is a place that awaits the disobedient and nonbeliev-
ers in the afterlife, Rabie decides to design his own version of hell as an earthly 
place and eliminates any possibility of salvation. In consequence, Egyptians are 
the inhabitants of an eternal hell, where they are punished and doomed for eter-
nity. The plot’s twist is that the hell’s inhabitants are unaware of living there; 
they mistakenly believe that they finally are able to demonstrate agency and top-
ple a regime. This dystopian construction completely dismantles the uprising’s 
status as a glorified act of resistance, rendering it absurd, as no revolutionary 
acts are expected in a traditional, theological hell: “There would be no victory 
today. There’d be no victory here, ever” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 165). In Rabie’s nihilistic 
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vision, life is stripped of meaning, and death, in this sense, is a torment to the liv-
ing, void of any glory and heroism.
“2025”: “Marters of the Reverlooshun!”
Death becomes conventional in public spaces, exactly as the narrator anticipates 
in the “2011” section. Fear is normalized. Brutal killings become an integral part 
of daily life against a backdrop of a cumbersome political situation. In the “2025” 
parts, fourteen years after a failed uprising, the spirit of political activism and the 
ambition of a possible political reformation are demolished. Moreover, Cairo has 
been occupied by the mysterious “Knights of the Republic of Malta,”5 who have 
divided it into Western and Eastern sectors.
Otared’s and his colleagues’ usage of “resistance” highlights the term’s ambi-
guity and its problematic aspects. By their definition, resistance means “safe-
guarding the state” in which “the life of the average citizen [is] worthless when 
measured against the value of safeguarding the state” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 72). Moreo-
ver, at one of their secret meetings, Otared describes the final plan set in motion 
by Sulayman Madi, a top Resistance leader, to oust the Knights of Malta. In 
short, this plan consists of enjoining civilians to revolt against the occupiers and 
kick them out by disseminating “pure panic” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 67) among civilians, 
which the Resistance would blame on the occupiers. Madi goes on to explain how 
panic would be spread:
[T]he streets are going to be full of murder. It will be a crime without punish-
ment … killing without rhyme or reason. The fragile barrier of security … will 
collapse without warning, and it is at that moment that the people will have no 
option but to rise up … there are no restrictions to what you can do—select your 
victims with total freedom. Men and women, children and the elderly, it’s all the 
same. It will be easy because you will be concealed (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 68).
This vicious plan aggrandizes the derealization of the “average citizens” and 
the systematic enshrouding of their existence. The overriding purpose of the 
Resistance movement is to expel the occupiers in order to restore authority to 
Otared and his cohort. The conflict, in this portrayal, is restricted between two 
poles of power over governing Egypt. This “national” resistance, in this sense, 
is a way to monopolize authority and surveillance and, moreover, to narrow the 
significance of “nation.”
Ironically, in this plan, the envisaged dead “average citizens” are not consid-
ered “martyrs”; this status will be reserved for members of the Resistance. In 
the same meeting, they remember the shootings that happened on the “Day of 
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Rage” in 2011. For Otared, Madi and their companions, the January 25, 2011 and 
the following days until the resignation of Mubarak are called the days of “trou-
bles” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 70),6 or mockingly “the reverlooshun” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 72), 
in which sniping was an “attempt to frighten people and get them to go home” 
(Rabīʿ 2014, p. 70). However, those “days of trouble” still conjure up a painful 
memory of their injured pride, when the people dared to burn down police sta-
tions and demanded the end of injustice. From 2011 to 2023 (a mix of factual and 
imagined events), this random shooting never stops; on the contrary, “killing was 
permitted [later on] to dispose of terrorists, troublemakers, fifth columnists, and 
demonstrators, with the unconditional support of the people, the prosecutor gen-
eral, and the judiciary. Indeed. Truly wonderful days…” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 70 f.). 
“The unconditional support of the people” draws a direct connection between 
the masses’ complicity in the state violence (inflicted on political opponents in 
an illusion of maintaining a fragile, conditional security) and their entitlement to 
punishment for their complicity.
As one of the best snipers, Otared plays a major role in “Operation Pure 
Panic,” where he is stationed on one of the high buildings in downtown Cairo, 
where he hunts “average” citizens. Quite surprisingly, after twenty-four hours of 
murder, sniping, and massive piles of corpses left on the streets, the Egyptians do 
not rise up; it is the Knights of Malta who decide all of a sudden to leave Egypt. 
As he enacts his fateful mission and roams the streets of Cairo in a Buddha mask, 
we see how the effects of killing civilians have changed dramatically. At this 
stage, citizens accept gunshots with indifference and anticipation, as if sloughing 
off the burden of living.
Rabie paints a rather grotesque portrait of Egyptian society in 2025 Cairo, 
where verbal violence, violent sex, homicide among civilians, public suicides 
and death penalties, and the availability of weapons are pandemic. Violent death 
becomes a performance of horror to which the spectators contribute to escalate 
it. The major scene of the SpongeBob-masked naked man committing suicide 
is wholly telling. Making use of the “arena of spectacles” (Edwards 2007),7 the 
man decides to perform his own death naked on one of the busy bridges of Cairo. 
Arranging his props to perform the self-killing, he knots a thick rope, one end 
tied to the rail and the other around his neck, smiles to the crowd through the 
hole in the mask, then starts to “spit,” “shake his hips,” and “grin” at them. He 
succeeds in establishing the desired attention from the crowd, who are “fling-
ing abuse at him and snorting derisively, and answering his shaking hips in kind. 
When he laugh[s] at them and wave[s], they laugh … and wave” too (Rabīʿ 
2014, p. 96). To maintain the spectators’ interactive engagement, he signals to the 
crowds with his first and middle fingers his urge to smoke, and a lighter and pack 
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of cigarettes are thrown to him. Introducing his climax, he smokes calmly while 
balancing himself on the railing and playfully starting to urinate on the people 
below the bridge. Finally he jumps off, and his neck is broken by the rope. The 
scene of his corpse is quite absurd: his swaying body maintains a lighted ciga-
rette and mix of urine and blood. The scene of death does not truly cease after 
the man’s personal demise; on the contrary, it makes space for its continuation by 
inviting the crowds to actively take part in it. The spectators transform into per-
formers when they start to thrash his corpse with “stones from the ground, pieces 
of wood, bags of trash, shoes, [and] tomatoes” (Rabīʿ 2014, p. 97). Later, some 
of them start to shoot at the rope, while the pellets spread on the corpse and the 
“unmoving” spectators. Finally, the rope breaks and people circle the deformed 
corpse. Unlike the scenes of death in 2011, the crowd shows no anger, fear, or 
empathy; the spectators are either pass by indifferently or participate grotesquely 
in such scenes. Death itself is no longer a source of terror, having become a pub-
lic performance. In parts of “2025,” violent death has been internalized by the 
people and is reciprocated among them. In this futuristic context, civilians insti-
gate even more horrific deaths than the state does. This accentuates an extrapo-
lated effect of violence and torture by allowing the normativity of violent death to 
prevail, which in turn provokes terror in the reader.
Conclusion
While Keraitim and Mehrez describe Tahrir Square as a “symbolic site of the 
birth of the [Egyptian’s] freedom” (2012), in Otared it only brings death and 
annihilation. Four years after January 2011, Otared was published as an intro-
spective view of the event and its reception and as an expression of anger and 
entrapment. This sense of entrapment stems from the fact that the matrix of the 
authoritarian regime is as unshakable as the theological notion of hell. As long as 
the likes of Otared are not held accountable, lives will continue to be ungrievable. 
This desperate realization, in turn, nullifies the potency of resistance. After Janu-
ary 25, 2011, dystopian novels have perceived the event as a dystopic moment 
at which false hope cost people their lives. It is too soon to predict how long the 
wave of post-2011 dystopias will last or how it will develop, but it is quite clear 
that the main aim of Rabie and his fellow authors is to deconstruct utopianizing 
discourses of the uprising as a way of commemorating the dead and acknowledg-
ing the suffering of the living.
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Endnotes
1. For further comments on the portrayal of the dead or martyrs (shuhadāʾ) in 
Egyptian media according to the social class and appearance, see Mohammed 
Abou Al-Gheit’s Al-fuqarāʾ awwalan yā wilād al-kalb [Poor First, you Bas-
tards!] published 17 June 2011.
2. This part of the novel is a dramatization of a tale mentioned in the book ʿAsha 
Baʿda al-Mawt (Those Who Lived After Death) by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muham-
mad ibn Abi-l-Dunyā. In this book, ibn Abi-l-Dunyā collected tales about 
people who allegedly reawakened shortly after their deaths, only to die 
again. Rabie integrates the tale of Saẖr Ālẖazraǧy (one of the names men-
tioned in ibn Abi-l-Dunyā’s book, who he died in 455 AH and reawakened) 
to intensify the effects of suffering at the heart of the narrative. The inci-
dent of Ālẖazraǧy's double-death was believed to forebode the great famine 
that seized Egypt from 457 AH (1065 AD) to 464 AH (1072 AD) known as 
the “al-Mustanṣiriyya Ordeal,” referring to the Fatimid Caliph Abū Tamīm 
Maʿaddal-Mustanṣir bi-llāh, who ruled the country for sixty years (1036–
1094). Mohammad Rabie mentions ibn Abi-l-Dunyā’s book in acknowledge-
ments of the Arabic original (p. 304).
3. Mulid is the Egyptian dialect pronunciation of Mawlid which is a festival 
made for celebrating the birth of Prophet Mohammed and/or the birth of a 
holy man or woman.
4. Keraitim and Mehrez “Mulid al-Tahrir: Semiotics of a Revolution,” p. 25 ff.
5. This occupation lasts for two years. The Republic of the Knights of Malta 
does not really occupy a geographical space; they are mysterious remnants of 
the crusades who first took over Malta, where they got their name, then were 
expelled from there to take shelter in Rome. The Knights of Malta are bureau-
crats, soldiers, and officers from all over the world; they speak Tunisian Arabic 
and English with different accents. They decide that Egypt could be a suitable 
place to practice land pirating. Their forces advance to the Egyptian heartland 
in 2023 by bombing strategic locations, such as the Central Bank, the minis-
tries of Health and Education, the Cairo Opera House, and facilities and facto-
ries belonging to the Egyptian army across the country (p. 27 ff.).
6. In the original Arabic, Rabie uses the word “shaghab,” a legal term designating 
disorderly conduct irregularities committed by rioters that undermine the rights 
of others and the public interest. The usage of the word, again, underlines the 
state’s perspective in framing the collective protests of 2011 as illegal.
7. In her chapter “Death as Spectacle: Looking at Death in the Arena,” Catherine 
Edwards traces the crowds’ obsession with watching gladiators’ deaths in the 
Roman Empire. She suggests that this obsession had roots in how Romans 
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“found meanings in the bloody deaths of gladiators” (2007, p. 46), which are 
linked to their “attitudes of dying and representations of death in Roman antiq-
uity” (Edwards 2007, p. 47).
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Processing the Revolution: Exploring 




Socio-political transformations can be complicated and messy. Understanding 
them requires context and an active engagement with the events that goes beyond 
a descriptive narrative. Literary fiction lends itself to this kind of rationalization 
or “processing,” as I will explain below. Still, an event such as the 2010–11 upris-
ing in Tunisia challenges literary expression; it is almost too overwhelming to be 
captured in its entirety between the covers of a novel. Yet political events of this 
scale contain a certain urgency and pervasiveness that pushes writers to narrate 
them and to put memory into words. This chapter explores how recent Tunisian 
novels that address the uprising deal with this challenge. Specifically, it analyzes 
novels that have found acclaim in the Tunisian literary scene. All four works ana-
lyzed here were laureates of the Tunisian prize for fiction, the Prix Comar d’Or. 
The selection of prizewinning novels suggests that the books represent ideas that 
are present within Tunisian society or at least supported by the jury of the liter-
ary award, as the first section of the chapter will explore. Although all four works 
deal with the uprising, their portrayals of it represent different trends. Some 
employ autobiographic reflections, with or without comparisons to past revolu-
tions. Others contain family stories, particularly examining the notion of the 
absent father, and relegate the uprising to the sidelines. These different ways to 
rework the revolution will be discussed and analyzed below.
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My main argument focuses on the novels’ discussion of intimacy and per-
sonal experience in politically tumultuous times. Each work seeks a solution to 
the literary “problem” of how to write about revolutions: How can an author jug-
gle both personal experience of the event and its national relevance? What should 
such a novel emphasize? A comparison of the works reveals that the revolution is 
already fading as a central theme of the novels.
Why Analyze Literature?
Before delving deeper into this investigation, one might ask how analyzing 
 post-revolutionary literature could help contextualize socio-political transforma-
tion processes. More specifically, how does a comparative reading of novels help 
us make sense of the Tunisian uprising of 2010–11 and its aftermath? This chap-
ter hypothesizes that literature is the outcome of a thought process, a rationaliza-
tion or interpretation that actively engages with the materials or events it portrays 
by highlighting certain aspects more than others. Literature proposes metaphors, 
draws parallels, and offers allusions for reworking its subject matter. Moreover, 
literature is always created in a certain historical and social setting and reflects 
the worldviews that dominate this setting. Lennard Davis describes this inter-
twinement as ideological. In his words, “novels do not depict life, they depict 
life as it is represented by ideology.” He goes on to describe fiction as “one of 
the ways in which the culture teaches itself about itself” (Davis 1987, p. 24 f.). 
This is another aspect of the “processing” that I am trying to highlight with this 
article. Since literature is in constant exchange with the societies in which and 
for which it was written, it not only offers its own processing of events, it also 
reflects changes in perspective within society itself. Joseph A. Massad suggests 
in his study Desiring Arabs that the novel functions “as a reading (and writing) 
of society that is most unintrusive in comparison with other genres of writing and 
investigation” (Massad 2007, p. 269). As such, an exploration of literary produc-
tion, particularly novels, from the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising paints a pic-
ture of how it has been perceived at different times. By examining novels that 
were awarded with literary prizes, we can draw conclusions about the ways in 
which the Tunisian literary establishment wishes the revolutionary events to be 
read by readers near and far.
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Literary Prizes and Their Influence: The Prix Littéraires 
Comar d’Or
Abir Kréfa describes the laureates of the Comar d’Or literary prizes as some of 
the most visible and respected Tunisian authors (Kréfa 2013, p. 398). Marc Ver-
boord adds more generally that the “winning of literary prizes is an indication 
of an author’s contemporary prestige” (Verboord 2003, p. 266). Accordingly, one 
can assume that the literary establishment and the officials behind the awards 
appreciate the four novels discussed in this chapter, which in turn allows certain 
interpretations regarding the ways in which the Tunisian literary establishment 
prefers for the revolutionary events to be processed in literature. The Prix Lit-
téraires Comar d’Or are an initiative by Comar Insurance to promote culture in 
Tunisia and are organized in cooperation with the Ministry of Culture, signifying 
a connection to the Tunisian state. The prizes have been awarded since 1997 to 
authors of Tunisian nationality and their works, which can be either published in 
Tunisia or abroad. The prizes are awarded in different categories and differentiate 
between Arabic and French, which reflects the prominence in the Tunisian liter-
ary landscape of publications in both French and Arabic. While winners of the 
Comar d’Or in Arabic or French receive 10,000 Tunisian dinars each, the win-
ners of the Prix Spéciaux des jurys win 5000 and winners of the Prix Découverte 
receive 2500 Tunisian dinars.1 In Europe, “the monetary value of literary prizes 
is quite often secondary,” according to Richard Jacquemond, yet this is different 
in the Arab world, where literary markets are weak and in need of state spon-
sorship (Jacquemond 2008, p. 47). Publishers or authors can submit novels to be 
considered for the prizes. A winning author cannot win another prize in the same 
category for five years.2
Authors, journalists, and academics sit on the jury that selects the win-
ning novel. Since the awards’ goal is the promotion of literature, being selected 
might be about literary quality, yet winning the prize is more about economics. 
This is important, since the Tunisian literary market is dependent on state fund-
ing. In addition to the monetary benefits, winning awards also increases a writer’s 
professional status. The publicity for a book enlarges its readership, and mean-
while its author gains professional opportunities. For example, Yamen Manai, the 
 Paris-based winner of the 2017 Comar d’Or, said that winning the prize paved the 
way to a variety of trips to and readings in Tunisia.3
Literary prizes form an archive (Ducas 2013, p. 8), not just of the novels pub-
lished each year or of the writers and books that had prestige at the time, as was 
argued at the beginning of this section. The prizes also track which publishers 
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have been publishing a successful canon of works. Since the award’s inception in 
1997, ninety books have been awarded in the different categories, as occasionally 
two works and their authors were selected per category. While many publishers 
only received an award in one year, others were more successful. Here are the top 
five publishing houses, in ascending order of the prizes they received: Arabesques 
Éditions (four awards), Dār Zaynab li-l-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ (five awards), Édi-
tions Elyzad (six awards), Dār Sahar li-l-nashr (seven awards), and Éditions du 
Sud (thirteen awards). These awards are almost all equally distributed before and 
after the uprising of 2010–11, indicating that the socio-political transformations 
did not make one or the other publisher more presentable than under the previous 
regime. The publishing house Zaynab li-l-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ is exempted from this 
observation, as it was founded in 2013.
Literary prizes can include as well as exclude. As Sylvie Ducas writes: 
“Comme tout réseau, les prix littéraires sont oxymoriques et paradoxaux: à la fois 
ouverture et fermeture, lieu de contrôle, de pouvoir ou d’échanges, d’interactions, 
frontière entre la norme et la marge” (Ducas 2013, p. 216).4 In the case of the 
Comar d’Or, one exclusion is the restriction against applying after winning the 
previous year. Another exclusionary effect can be that participants need to sup-
ply the competition with seven copies of the work to apply; this poses a finan-
cial burden for the respective publisher or author.5 In terms of the awards’ role in 
facilitating an exchange, this investigation will offer as an example since it brings 
together four novels that process the Tunisian uprising.
Individual Impressions of Socio-Political Change
Autobiographical accounts contain an individual perspective and are therefore 
exempt from the need to give all-inclusive explanations. This perspective was 
frequently adopted in and after 2011, not only in Tunisia. In Egypt, publications 
about personal experiences of the Tahrir protests proliferated, and in Syria, per-
sonal accounts narrated the beginning of the protests.6 Two recent laureates of the 
Comar d’Or 2017 exemplify fictional versions of this trend from Tunisia: Béchir 
Garbouj’s Passe l’intrus (2016) and Jamila Ben Mustapha’s Rupture(s) (2017). 
The works were written in French and are analyzed below in regard to their rep-
resentations of the socio-political changes associated with the Tunisian uprising.
In the first novel, a professor reflects on the uprising of 2010–11 against the 
backdrop of the 1968 Paris protests, which he experienced as a Tunisian exchange 
student. At the time, he was in love with the mysteriously absent Nadine. Passe 
l’intrus uses the 1968 Paris protests as a stand-in for the Tunisian uprising. This 
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creates a distance from the Tunisian events, which is further increased by focus-
ing on the private instead of the political. While the primary focus of the narrative 
is on the love affair, which ends during the 1968 protests, the novel itself speaks 
to and about the Tunisian uprising.
The professor explores what remains from tumultuous times and addresses the 
vagueness of memory. In the process, he illustrates the difficulties of contextu-
alizing or rationalizing socio-political transformations. His memories are blurred 
and the different temporal layers of the narrative blend into one another, a strat-
egy that highlights that the Tunisian situation is meant to be understood via the 
previous protests. Meanwhile, the professor attempts to understand his fascination 
for the Paris protests, which he became part of almost by coincidence and without 
expecting the turmoil (Garbouj 2016, p. 13, 155).
In returning to 1968, Garbouj suggests the possible consequences of 2011. He 
alludes to the importance of political changes and protest for the general course 
of history. The novel shows May 1968 as a political moment of exceptional 
importance for the twentieth century. The narrative’s parallelism suggests that the 
Tunisian uprising holds comparable importance for the twenty-first century. Both 
the love affair and the protests have left an impression on the professor’s life: dec-
ades later, the former lover is still on his mind, although his memories have faded.
The second novel, Ben Mustapha’s Rupture(s), similarly addresses in paral-
lel the consequences of socio-political transformation and personal turmoil. The 
novel, set in Tunisia between 2012 and 2014, follows the character of Inès as she 
comes to terms with the end of a love affair. In her diary, she processes both her 
secret relationship with Hassen and the immediate years after the uprising. Their 
relationship had lasted for over twenty years before it ended in a separation—one 
meaning of the French word rupture. Hassen, a member of the Tunisian opposi-
tion, was forced to emigrate to Lebanon, where Inès visited him regularly. She 
broke off contact three years before the uprising after being pressured by state 
security. After the uprising, Hassen returns to Tunisia yet does not approach Inès 
and instead devotes himself to a political career made possible by the regime 
change. According to Inès, he has changed and broken ties with former compan-
ions. Inès is disappointed, but she works through her heartbreak in her diary and 
starts to see him as both a political and personal opportunist. By the end of the 
narrative, she has made peace with Tunis and the situation, although she is aware 
of the influence of the previous regime and its practices on her own life, as the 
initial cause of her heartache. Still, she accepts the discrepancies in her life and 
in her country as she realizes that Hassen is less important for her happiness than 
her family and friends.
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The novel uses a personal account to study Tunisian post-revolutionary reality 
and thereby creates a sense of distancing. The political events seem to form the 
backdrop to Inès’s emotional journey, but really the private story is used to com-
ment on political developments. In Inès’s words, “la transition d’une situation à 
l’autre que le pays traverse, n’est pas moins exempte de désordres que celle, aussi 
chaotique, que je suis en train de vivre jusqu’aujourd’hui” (Ben Mustapha 2017, 
p. 86 f.).7 Accordingly, Inès’ initial response to the post-2011 situation is disap-
pointment. She believes that the very same practices of the previous regime—
those that negatively influenced her life—are continuing in a different guise. 
In addition, her fellow Tunisians have failed to keep their word and are striving 
for their own personal advancement, not that of the community. For Inès, both 
developments are the result of long economic struggles and repression by those in 
charge. The novel thus highlights people’s vulnerability to the effects of official 
pressure and socio-political changes on their lives, the other “ruptures” referred to 
by the title. Ultimately, this is a comment on those socio-political transformations 
and their effects.
Both novels play with the autobiographical trend that spread immediately 
after the uprisings in the Arab world (both in blogs and in print).8 While they 
are not strictly autobiographical themselves, the narratives resemble this genre. 
More obviously in Ben Mustapha’s novel, which takes the form of a diary, but 
also in Gerbouj’s novel, a narrator relives and thereby contextualizes the upris-
ing through memories. Both novels avoid giving an all-encompassing overview 
of the revolutionary moments and still capture their confusion, excitement, and 
socio-political turmoil. Both books employ distancing techniques that differenti-
ate them from the immediate autobiographical responses that followed the upris-
ings in the Arab world, which tended to be less sophisticated. The personal sphere 
is harnessed in portraying uprisings. This is not to say that the uprisings consti-
tute the narrative’s primary background. Rather, the personal sphere is being uti-
lized to shed light on the political sphere and its implications for individual lives. 
The main goal remains the contextualization of the revolutionary moment and its 
aftermath.
Family Drama Beats Revolutionary References
One year later in 2018, the Comar d’Or was again awarded to two novels that 
relate to the contextualization of the Tunisian uprising. In addition, I am jointly 
considering novels written in Arabic and French, answering Karima Laachir’s 
call for the necessity of such an analysis across language divides (a “reading 
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together”) to best reflect the literary community of Tunisia’s multilingual locale 
(Laachir 2016, p. 25 f.). In the previous year, the themes of the Arabic novels did 
not suit such a comparative reading.
In 2018, Ali Bécheur’s Les Lendemains d’hier (2017) won the Comar d’Or for 
the best novel published in French while Inès Abassi’s Menzel Bourguiba (2018) 
received the Prix spécial du jury for a novel in Arabic.
This is Ali Bécheur’s second time winning the Comar d’Or; in 2006, he 
received it for his novel Le Paradis des femmes. Les Lendemains d’hier, his 
eighth novel, describes a son’s effort to narrate his father’s success story while 
rebelling against the father’s expectations for him likewise to succeed: “Appre-
nant année après année que, quoi que je pense ou fasse, quoi que je rêve ou 
espère, quel que soit ton regard sur moi – fût-il posthume –, je ne serai jamais 
à ton image, papa” (Bécheur 2017, p. 251).9 The father’s story is a typical 
 rags-to-riches-narrative. The son of a barber from the Tunis medina, he not only 
reaches secondary education and becomes a lawyer but also increases his social 
standing with a successful marriage. In Les Lendemains d’hier, his son tries to 
come to terms with the legacy left by his late father. In exploring their relation-
ship, he tries to fill the silences it contained by turning his father into the hero of 
a story that is, for lack of information, semi-fictional: “Tout être humain est impé-
nétrable, on n’en perçoit que la surface, l’intérieur reste invisible” (Bécheur 2017, 
p. 263).10
The narrative is presented in vignettes told from different perspectives (indi-
cated by the personal pronouns je, tu, il). Occasionally, this makes it very difficult 
to differentiate the sections and determine who is speaking or being addressed. 
Parallel to the narration of the father’s story, the novel references Tunisian his-
tory from the protectorate era to the 2010–11 uprising. However, the historical 
events merely serve as the backdrop to the personal storyline. Take, for example, 
the portrayal of the father’s death:
Tu as jeté un regard par la fenêtre, mais ce matin de novembre avait perdu 
son ciel […] et tu t’es dit que cette vie-là ne valait plus la peine d’être vécue. 
[…] Alors tu t’es allongé sur le lit, tu as fermé les yeux. […] C’était avant la 
Révolution du jasmin. Parfois je me demande ce que tu en aurais pensé. Rien, 
 peut-être.11 (Bécheur 2017, p. 265 f.)
This treatment clearly diverges from the novels discussed above. Bécheur’s 
novel does follow Ben Mustapha’s observations regarding the impact of political 
events on the personal lives of individuals. Yet, here, the socio-political world is 
merely a point of reference, allowing the reader to date the story and characters 
and to see them as the children of their times. This indicates a certain distance 
from the political turmoil, as far as the necessity of commenting on them is con-
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cerned. They form a backdrop that has been normalized; they no longer are the 
emergency that needs to be the center of attention. They have been absorbed into 
the lives of the characters and no longer actively determine them. A contextual-
ization has already taken place, and it is therefore no longer necessary to work on 
that contextualization within the narrative. Other aspects are more important such 
as the relationship to the father.
The father figure is of metaphorical relevance, as we will see after analyzing 
the second novel, Inès Abassi’s debut novel Menzel Bourguiba.12 This book also 
discusses the relationship with a father, or rather with his absence, and the lack of 
such a relationship. After her father’s death, Jihān comes to terms with the effect 
of his absence on her upbringing and her adult life. Her father left her mother 
before she was born and relocated to the United States. Jihān joins her family for 
the funeral and the reading of his will and is motivated to solve a family mys-
tery: the disappearance of her father’s brother thirty years ago. In the meantime, 
she also learns more about her father. The mystery of the disappearance is partly 
autobiographical, as the author has mentioned in an interview (Abū l-Naṣr 2018). 
The novel is narrated from two perspectives: Jihān’s accounts are supplemented 
by chapters written from the point of view of her father’s second wife, Sofia.
Parallel to the events of the narrative, the Tunisians rise up against their presi-
dent. Jihān and Sofia are therefore both stuck in the city of Menzel Bourguiba 
(Bizerte Governorate) and are forced to stay there longer than planned. Menzel 
Bourguiba means “Bourguiba’s house.” This choice of setting could also be a ref-
erence to former president Habib Bourguiba, who styled himself as the father of 
his country and citizens. With his death in 2000, he left behind his “children,” 
who were already under the rule of his successor, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Men-
zel Bourguiba is also the author’s hometown, where she feels most inspired to 
write, as she states in an interview (Abū l-Naṣr 2018). Yet it is not only Bour-
guiba’s house that plays a metaphorical role, but also the house of Jihān’s father. 
It is the setting of much of the action of the novel and furthermore shapes its nar-
rative, insofar as the latter is divided into parts that are entitled with reference to 
the structure of the building (e.g. “al-Ṭābiq al-Arḍī,” “ground floor” or “Nāfidha 
fī-l-ṭābiq al-thānī,” “a window on the second floor”).
Moreover, the house exposes the rivalry between Jihān and Sofia: Jihān’s 
father bequethes the Tunisian house to his daughter, while his second wife and 
their daughter receive his restaurant in Chicago. Sofia is horrified when she hears 
this at the reading of the will, and exclaims that she will do everything she can to 
contest it (Abassi 2018, p. 10).
The Tunisian uprising is presented in the novel as an inconvenience that 
forces the characters to spend time together (Jihān, for example, would like to 
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leave earlier, but her aunt does not let her go out of concern for her safety; Abassi 
2018, p. 183). It thus facilitates the remaining action of the novel: the explora-
tion of Jihān’s complicated relationship with her father and the investigation 
into the family secret. Jihān is sad about her father’s absence from her life, and 
she expresses a certain longing for his presence, yet the situation is not shown 
to leave her incapacitated or utterly helpless. On the contrary, the narrative is 
resolved by a hopeful dissociation from the complicated family history: Jihān is 
an adult and able to escape the situation by returning to the life she has built for 
herself in the capital, rejecting any interest in inheriting her father’s house. She 
continues to live out her own independent future. This can be understood as a 
suggestion for Tunisia’s future, independent from father figures.
Read together, both novels are conspicuous for their discussion of fathers at 
a time when Tunisia’s leadership is in fact facing a crisis of power, a view that 
can be read in (or at least into) the two books. In its description of the 2018 situa-
tion, the International Crisis Group first singles out the ruling party Nidāʾ Tūnis’s 
internal struggle over control. Second, and more relevant for the context of par-
ticularly Menzel Bourguiba, Prime Minister Youssef Chahed lost some of his sup-
port from Nidāʾ Tūnis and al-Nahḍa in summer 2017. He was asked to resign by 
various political counterparts and was eventually dismissed from his party posi-
tion. He then decided to found his own party, Taḥyā Tūnis. Regardless, his posi-
tion has been weakened, as has the consensus between Nidāʾ Tūnis and al-Nahḍa 
(International Crisis Group 2018; Delmas 2018).
Both works present the uprising of 2010–11 as a historical backdrop against 
which characters experience and deal with their personal lives. The implication 
is that the personal discourse is of greater importance. Abassi comments on the 
use of history in her literary work in an interview in which she defends historical 
references and argues that they do not distract from the main narrative. She sug-
gests that she deals with history through her characters’ experiences instead of 
presenting it as a separate discourse (al-Falāḥ 2016). The necessity of defending 
this approach, using the historical backdrop, suggests a completely different situ-
ation from that of the first two novels discussed. The 2010–11 uprising only plays 
a role through characters’ experience of it, and not as of itself.
That both works were recognized by the Comar d’Or suggests that the novels’ 
normalized approach to political events is resonant, and not exceptional. This is 
a shift from the earlier works discussed in the previous section. It remains to be 
seen whether this trend continues in other literary publications.
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Political Upheavals and the Personal Sphere
A comparison of all four novels reveals a change in the uprising’s importance. In 
the earlier works, the complications of the socio-political transformations were 
at the center of Rupture(s) and Passe l’intrus, although the authors might have 
resorted to distancing techniques. The works were about the uprising, insofar as 
they discussed the events’ repercussions and their impact on individual lives. In 
particular, Jamila Ben Mustapha’s Rupture(s) clearly showed a sense of disap-
pointment with post-revolutionary Tunisia and the achievements of the uprising, 
which no longer seemed as glorious as it had in 2011. Since then, the country 
has experienced political changes and terrorist attacks, leading to a precarious 
economic situation, a disappearance of tourism, and stalled improvement in the 
lives of ordinary Tunisians. Corruption is rife in the country and it is questionable 
whether Tunisians believe in the power of political leaders to bring about actual 
change. Chahed’s declining support is in fact a result of his initiative to fight cor-
ruption (International Crisis Group 2018). This situation can be read between the 
lines in the more recent novels, Les Lendemains d’hier and Menzel Bourguiba. 
The revolution as a theme has moved to the background of both books. With a 
difference of merely one year, one notes a thematic shift from politics’ influence 
on personal lives to a discussion of the personal lives in which political events 
provide context. We can see a clear return of the private sphere. This is not to say 
that the personal is not also political, insofar as it can be read as a commentary, 
but the newer books do not present the uprising itself as the main issue. The polit-
ical meaning of personal experience is also more allusive: For example, an eager 
reader can interpret absent father figures as an allusion to the country’s leadership 
issues or its response to its history of autocratic rule by strong male figures.
The personal sphere has entered the texts in regard to questions of memory 
and remembrance that were already present in the earlier works. These works 
attempted to make sense of the socio-political transformations through fictional 
autobiographies and individual memories. In the more recent works, this personal 
aspect has become the narratives’ main concern.
Conclusion
This chapter explored the ways in which Tunisian novelists have reflected on the 
uprising of 2010–11 through the lens of four novels awarded prizes by the Prix 
Comar d’Or. All four novels address the revolutionary events of 2010–11, but in 
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different ways. They also illustrate changing trends in responding to the political 
transformations. The preceding analysis explored the autobiographical trend and, 
in one case, included an added comparison to another revolutionary moment. I 
then highlighted a second trend: a return to the private sphere, which relegates 
political turmoil and its depiction to the sidelines, as context instead of content. 
However, by presenting family stories and specifically father conflicts, the novels 
did comment on the internal politics of Tunisia, or could at least be read to do 
so. This development can be considered a sign of maturity with regards to the 
reworking of the Tunisian uprising of 2010–11: a move away from the style of 
political pamphlets to the development of original characters instead of stock 
characters. Memory is questioned, another indication that the age of testimony is 
gone. However, the question of how to deal with the past is still at stake. Both Les 
Lendemains d’hier and Menzel Bourguiba challenge the writing of history; the 
fleetingness of memory was already alluded to in Rupture(s) and Passe l’intrus.
Given that the two more recent novels were chosen as the winners of the 
Comar d’Or in 2018, one can assume that the Tunisian literary establishment 
currently favors this approach to the revolutionary events in literature. None of 
the recent protagonists were described as actively participating in the protests. 
Instead, they were portrayed as uninvolved observers. This suggests a much 
calmer perspective than a portrayal of a protest that simply develops, as one can 
read in Kamāl al-Riyākhī’s al-Gūrillā (2011), for example. The sense of calm 
presented here could be interpreted as a sign of an official effort to de-escalate, to 
return to docile civic life. Yet the move away from partisan writing also allows for 
a greater depth of language and style, as the narratives become more complicated 
and technically more sophisticated literary works. It remains to be seen what the 
next stage of the literary processing of the revolution might be: an ultimate focus 
on the personal sphere without any references to the uprising?
Endnotes
 1. Official website of the Comar d’Or, https://www.comar-d-or.tn/Fra/image.
php?id=113 (accessed 16 August 2019).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Yamen Manai read from his awarded novel L’Amas ardent on 2 November 
2017, at the Faculté des Sciences Humaines et Sociales de Tunis. I had the 
opportunity to attend the reading and the ensuing discussion at which Manai 
described invitations and events in Tunisia following the Comar d’Or award.
 4. “Like any network, literary prices are oxymorical and paradoxical: both 
openings and closings; places of control, of power or of exchanges, of inter-
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actions; the border between the norm and the marginal.” (All translations 
from French are by the author).
 5. Moncef Chebbi, the director of Arabesques Éditions suggested this difficulty 
to me in a personal conversation during the Tunis book fair in 2016.
 6. For example: Mona Prince’s Ismī Thawra, 2012; published in English under 
the title Revolution is my Name. An Egyptian Woman’s Diary from Eight-
een Days in Tahrir in 2014 or Samar Yazbek’s 2012 Taqāṭuʿ nīrān: min 
yawmiyyāt al-intifāḍa al-sūriyya that also appeared in English translation in 
2014 as A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution.
 7. “The transition from one situation to another that the country experiences is 
no less disorderly than the equally chaotic one that I am currently living.”
 8. For blogs see: Teresa Pepe’s Blogging from Egypt. Digital Literature, 2005–
2016, Edinburgh University Press (2019), for print see note v.
 9. “I learned year after year, no matter what I thought or did, what I hoped or 
dreamed, or what your view of me was – may it even be a posthumous one – 
I would never be like you, papa.”
 10. “Every human being is impenetrable, one only ever perceives the surface, the 
inside remains invisible.”
 11. “You looked out of the window, but this November morning had lost its sky 
[…] and you said to yourself that this life was no longer worth to be lived. 
[…] So you stretched out on the bed and closed your eyes. […] This was 
before the Jasmin Revolution. Sometimes I wonder what you would have 
thought about it. Nothing, perhaps.”
 12. A journalist by profession, Abassi published a collection of short stories 
inspired by a six-months residence in Seoul, South Korea, as well as poetry 
collections that found acclaim. Her collection Arshīf al-ʾAʿmā (The Archive 
of the Blind) won Tunisia’s CREDIF prize in 2007.
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Transformations of the “Syrian” 
Literary Field Since 2011
Felix Lang
The intellectual and artistic space in which Syrian authors, filmmakers, and artists 
move has changed markedly over the last eight years. In the light of the events 
unfolding in Syria since spring 2011, we are quick to attribute these changes to 
the revolution and the ensuing armed conflicts. Indeed, political crises as “turn-
ing points” have always held an important narratological function in literary his-
tory, as they have in any other fields which are in a dominated position in relation 
to the political sphere1. The discursive consolidation of such turning points and 
points of rupture tends to blur relations of causality by collectively attributing 
changes to “The War”. Continuities, which are grounded in the specific history 
and structure of the field, tend to be obscured by the dominant narratives of rup-
ture and change.
One way of counterchecking the powerful narratives of change current in aca-
demia and the media, as well as in the literary field itself, lies in a quantitative 
approach little used in studies of Arab cultural production so far. Thus, in the pre-
sent chapter, I will present some preliminary findings based on the data collected 
for a database on Syrian literature that is currently being assembled at the Depart-
ment of Arabic Literature and Culture at the University of Marburg2. The data-
base stores bibliographic data on the published works of 210 Syrian writers who 
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have published at least one novel between 1980 and 2016. This includes nearly 
every living Syrian novelist in 2016. In addition to approximately 2500 novels, 
the database contains over 5000 reviews, articles, publications about and by these 
authors and their literary works.
This chapter considers changes in the field between 2005 and 2016 insomuch 
as they can be inferred from the data collected. It intends to critically evaluate the 
widespread assumption that the uprising constitutes a watershed moment in Syr-
ian cultural production (e.g. Chiti 2016; Cooke 2016; Wedeen 2013; Ziter 2015). 
While much of this work has been dedicated to themes and forms of art and liter-
ature produced in the wake of the revolution, few scholars have considered struc-
tural changes3. In the following, the data available will be used to elucidate the 
question whether, and if so in which ways, the events that have been unfolding 
since 2011 have had a demonstrable effect on various important features of the 
field.
The Field
As Mohja Kahf has pointed out, in a familiar move of criticizing a notion of 
national literatures transposed on the Arab World by Western academia, there 
is no such thing as Syrian literature (Kahf 2001). The literary language shared 
across more than 20 nation-states is the foundation of what is in many ways a 
transnational space of literary production, which stretches to its limits an ortho-
dox, nation-centered approach to the literary field. Historically, we have seen 
close connections between Syria’s intellectual elite and the state. For the 
Baath party, which first came to power in 1963, intellectuals and writers had 
an important political role to play. Consequently, many institutions of the field 
were controlled by the state: many artists and intellectuals depended—and still 
depend—on the state for employment.4 Two of the most important Syrian pub-
lishers of the last 40 years are the Ministry of Culture (Manshūrāt Wizārat 
al-thaqāfa) and the publishing house of the state-controlled Arab Union of Writ-
ers (Ittiḥād al-kuttāb al-ʿarab). However, almost the same number of novels 
written by Syrians were published in Beirut as in all Syria during the period in 
question. Likewise, institutions of consecration are not found in Syria alone—
indeed, the regional and international institutions’ recognition is often connected 
with higher symbolic capital. Pan-Arab newspapers, notably al-Ḥayāt with its 
literary supplement, along with newspapers based in other states of the region, 
such as Lebanon’s al-Akhbār, are important sources of symbolic capital for Syr-
ian authors. Whereas the relative value of such reviews is difficult to determine 
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based on quantitative data, the sheer number of reviews in these media vouches 
for the relevance of such international actors: thus, al-Ḥayāt and the Al-Jazeera 
website rank highest when it comes to publications about writers from our cor-
pus. Regional literary awards also carry ample weight: the International Prize for 
Arabic Fiction is the prime example.
The integration of Syrian writers within the wider Arab field of cultural pro-
duction also makes it difficult to speak of an essentially Syrian literature on the 
level of symbolic products. Kahf, in her article quoted above, makes a case for 
the “silences” and circumvention of censorship laws and other forms of control 
required from writers in an authoritarian system as a unifying characteristic of 
Syrian literature, however she acknowledges that authors in Iraq and Libya faced 
similar conditions for much of the second half of the twentieth century. It is con-
ceivable that the literary production turning around the 2011 uprising and the 
ongoing war in Syria may come to be seen as the beginning of a truly Syrian 
literary tradition—analogous to the civil war novels in 1980s and 1990s Lebanon 
or the trauma of occupation and exile that draws together Palestinian literature. 
However, to this point these texts remain essentially transnational through their 
reference to notions of trauma, testimony and documentation.
Traditionally, as in many parts of the Arab World, poetry has been the most 
prestigious genre of literary production. This dominance has been seen to be wan-
ing since at least the 1990s (see Jacquemond 2003, p. 229). In the aftermath of 
2011, and in the international segment of the field, poetry played a minor role 
as a form of artistic expression: the dominant voices in the field now belong to a 
younger generation of novelists. Few, if any, of those who have recently left their 
mark on the field are poets. The short story, which has also been a more important 
literary genre in the Arab world than in the West, retains much of its importance 
in a context where online platforms, magazines, and social media have acquired 
an important role in the publication of literary works.5
While there may be no Syrian literature, there are undoubtedly novelists, 
poets, and short story writers who were born in Syria. Currently, at least three 
loosely defined generations of Syrian writers can be discerned. Authors who had 
already begun their literary careers before the Baath Party came to power in Syria 
in 1963 form the most highly consecrated generation. These authors inlcude the 
poet Adonis, who left Syria in 1955 and later renounced Syrian citizenship, and 
the novelists Hanna Mina (Ḥannā Mīna), Ulfat Idlibi (Ulfat Al-Idlibī), and Walid 
Ikhlasi (Walīd Ikhlāṣī). The next generation comprises authors who made their 
debuts in the 1980s, when younger writers such as Salim Barakat (Salīm Barakāt) 
were challenging the social realism of Mina and Ikhlasi. Finally, the late 1990s 
and early 2000s saw the entry to the field of a group of writers who have since 
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become the dominant voices in the international segment of the field during the 
conflict in Syria. Samar Yazbek (Samar Yazbik) published her first collection of 
short stories in 1999 (Yazbik 1999), Rosa Yassin Hassan (Rūzā Yāsīn Ḥasan) in 
2000, and Khaled Khalifa’s (Khalid Khalīfa) first novel (Khalīfa 2000) was also 
released in 2000.
In structural terms, the most notable effect of the violent conflict in Syria on 
the literary field no doubt arises from the displacement of a considerable part 
of its players. Most of Syria’s well-known authors, as well as a host of younger 
writers in the early stages of their careers, have left Syria since 2011. Typically, 
writers, as well as other artists, first moved to neighboring countries, especially 
Lebanon and Turkey, and later settled in Europe, with Germany as one of the 
most important destinations. Berlin soon became a center of the Syrian arts scene.
This displacement entailed the inclusion of a completely new range of inter-
national actors that have not been previously part of the field: public diplomacy 
organizations and their various funding programs, foreign publishers and transla-
tors, but also new platforms for publication such as online magazines like Dah-
non, Al-Jumhuriya and Raseef 22.
Arguably, these two intertwined processes drive the transformation of the Syr-
ian literary field. In the following, the data gathered will be used to two ends. 
First, bibliographical data will be used to describe more precisely the process of 
internationalization. Second, I seek to gauge how the inclusion of new interme-
diaries, along with the changing involvement of established intermediaries, is 
bound to change the structure and the hierarchies of the field.
Trends of Internationalization
Publishers
First, we will consider the development of the overall number of publications and 
the countries where Syrian authors have been published. These developments are 
charted based on the full set of novels published between 2005 and 2015 (Fig. 1).
The first thing to be noted in this chart is that the overall number of titles 
produced by Syrian authors has not been affected by the conflict beginning in 
2011—in fact, the mean output of about 48 titles per year is the same for the 
period from 2005 to 2010 as for the time period from 2011 to 2015. Nonetheless, 
we find two discernible peaks in literary production: one in 2008, which is most 
likely connected to the surge of publications in the context of the Damascus Arab 
Capital for Culture celebrations that year. The second, in 2014, might be attrib-
uted to a surge in publications connected to the war. More significantly, we see 
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a steady decline of literary production from 2011 to 2013, until it picks up again 
the following year. This slump would seem to be connected to the outbreak of 
the conflict in Syria. The number of works published by Syrian publishers shrunk 
by a staggering 80% in these two years while overall production only decreased 
by 30%. In the years between 2005 and 2010, approximately 40% of titles were 
published in Syria; in the years following the uprising, the proportion dropped to 
15%.
In other words, we see a clear trend towards internationalization of publishing, 
which appears to be a common feature of Arab literary fields in moments of cri-
sis. Tristan Leperlier, in his work on the Algerian field during the Black Decade 
in the 1990s, finds similar dynamics at work: a growing number of publications in 
France (Leperlier 2019) compensates for the decrease of publishing in Algeria. In 
the Syrian case, the destinations of authors who publish abroad are more diverse, 
and clear trends are more difficult to identify. Lebanon’s share, for instance, 
remains relatively stable between 37 and 39% of overall production. Egypt’s pub-
lishing industry clearly plays a more important role for Syrian authors following 
2011, but it does so on a relatively small scale, with a proportion of about 10% of 
total production. The clearest trend, however, is the increasing importance of the 
publishing industry of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states after 2011. In 2013 and 
2014, publishers in the Gulf were the second most important group in the Syrian 
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Fig. 1  Publications by Country (database of the research group “Figures of Thought | 
Turning Points. Cultural Practices and Social Change in the Arab World” (DFG) at CNMS, 
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for this sudden growth might be found in the close connections that many Syrians 
had with the Gulf as a place of work6. At the same time, the publishing sector in 
the Gulf has been growing for a number of years, and finally, the Gulf countries’ 
position in the regional conflict could also make the publication of Syrian authors 
critical of the regime a politically opportune endeavor.
Translations
Translations are another important marker of internationalization and recogni-
tion of Syrian authors abroad. Syrian authors, as well as authors writing in Arabic 
quite generally, are rarely translated into foreign languages, a fact that has been 
deplored by scholars of Arabic literature for decades7. Figure 2 shows the num-
ber of translations of works by the authors of the corpus, which were released by 
European and US publishers between 2005 and 2014. Numbers include translated 
texts in edited collections.
As we can see, the number of translations increased markedly from an average 
of four per year between 2006 and 2010 to an average of nine titles from 2011 
to 2014. Translations of Adonis’s works, which account for roughly a third of 
total translations, have been left out. Given the very low number of translations, 
the margin of error in these calculations is relatively high. However, it can be 
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abroad. Before 2011, the target languages were almost exclusively French, Eng-
lish and German, whereas translations published after the outbreak of the conflict 
also included Spanish as well as smaller European languages such as Dutch and 
Swedish. The proportion of women writers remained unchanged at about 30% of 
the titles translated.
However, the increase in the number of translations should not be equated 
with the emergence of a readership for Syrian writers in general. The works of 
Samar Yazbek, particularly her diaries of the civil war, and Khaled Khalifa 
(primarily his novel In Praise of Hatred) account for over 40% of the transla-
tions between 2011 and 2014. Thus, while the number of published translations 
has almost doubled, the number of translated authors has increased only by two 
from 12 to 14. In addition, the vast majority of writers translated after 2011 had 
already been translated. The conflict mostly worked to firmly establish some of 
the younger authors, among them Yazbek and Khalifa, but also Rosa Yassin Has-
san and (possibly) Dima Wannous (Dīma Wannūs) at the international pole of the 
Syrian field, while some older writers, such as Salim Barakat, Nihad Siris (Nihād 
Sīrīs) or the poet Faraj Bairaqdar (Faraj Bayraqdār) retain a certain international 
visibility.
As the well-established intermediaries in the literary field, publishers and 
translators connect the writer, the text, and the readership. As we have seen, for 
many Syrian authors Syrian publishers have been replaced by enterprises in other 
countries in the region, and Euro-American publishers and translators have con-
centrated on a small number of authors. In both cases, these developments pose 
a potential challenge to the established hierarchies in the field: the priorities of 
these new actors can present an advantage for writers who only enjoyed limited 
recognition before, provided their work fits the agenda of the new gatekeepers. 
Samar Yazbek, for instance, obviously managed to respond to a demand from 
European—and to some extent Syrian—readers with her diaries of a revolution, 
which more highly consecrated authors were unable to satisfy.
Challenges to the Hierarchies of the Field
Different publishers and translators are not the only intermediaries we encoun-
ter in authors’ post-2011 professional trajectories. In the following, I consider 
reception in Arab and US/European media, as well as social media. For the com-
pilation of this data, we have concentrated on a sample of 60 authors divided in 
five age groups, with 2016 being the year of reference. The proportion of male 
to female authors was made to reflect the distribution between the sexes in the 
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larger group of 210 authors referred to above. In order to reflect the wide vari-
ety in terms of output, professional background, and career trajectories—difficult 
variables to classify—we have otherwise opted for a random selection of authors.
In order to gauge the reception of Syrian authors in Europe and the US as well 
as in the Arab world, we have counted interviews, reviews, and other published 
texts about the authors in French, English, German, Spanish, Italian, and Ara-
bic. The corpus is limited to texts that were listed in Internet searches using the 
Google search engine between 2014 and 2016. Compared to a systematic search 
of a limited number of publications, this search yields a greater range of publica-
tions and gives a broader picture of the authors’ reception. The data should not be 
taken to represent a full record of publications about an author’s work. However, 
they will contain the vast majority of articles visible to internet users between 
2014 and 2016. Consequently, few articles will date from before 2000 and more 
recent articles are bound to be overrepresented. Nonetheless, I believe that these 
numbers are suitable to give us a broad overview of the relative importance of 
these intermediaries for Syrian authors at different stages of their career.
Social Media
With the conflict in Syria, social media have gained new importance for many 
Syrians abroad, including authors of fiction and poetry. The social network-
ing site Facebook, in particular, has served as a publication platform for many 
authors. In some instances, Facebook posts have been made into books published 
in translation: Aboud Saeed’s (ʿAbūd Saʿīd) Der klügste Mensch im Facebook 
(2013) is a case in point. The use of social media in furthering a literary career 
certainly existed before 2011, but, as can be seen with the example of Saeed, Syr-
ian authors find themselves in a situation where the potential impact of social 
media use is unprecedented. Saeed, who had not appeared as an author of fiction 
or poetry previously, became a published author translated into several European 
languages (among them German, Portuguese, and Swedish)—a distinction hith-
erto reserved to a few highly consecrated figures of the Syrian literary field—in 
no more than a couple of years. Figure 3 shows that posting in social media is 
widespread among Syrian writers. Even among those over age 65, who might be 
suspected to be less versed in the use of these new media, 30% wrote at least one 
post a week between May 2014 and May 2016.
Apart from this finding, it is maybe unsurprising that the percentage of writ-
ers making frequent use of social media for publication is highest between the 
two lower age groups. This, however, shows the transformative potential of social 
media platforms for the field: the lower age groups typically contain the less 
consecrated writers. Due to their presence on social media, they are more likely 
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to profit from the symbolic capital that can be accumulated through these sites 
and are thus able to circumvent the established gatekeepers of the literary space, 
which becomes a challenge to the established hierarchies of the field.
US/European Media
For a long time now, the institutions of consecration of the Euro-American lit-
erary fields have played an important role for Arab, and by consequence Syrian 
authors. Translation into foreign languages, hitherto the prerogative of literary 
figures well recognized in the Arab literary space, has always been a mark of 
distinction. However, the translation and publication of an entire literary work is 
not necessarily a prerequisite for an author to be recognized by Euro-American 
media. In the case of Syrian authors after 2011, the publication of shorter trans-
lated texts in anthologies, literary magazines, or as part of the activities of public 
diplomacy organizations, such as British Council or Germany’s Goethe Institut, 
made authors visible in the international media. Thus an extract of Samar Yaz-
bek’s Diaries of a Revolution, which appeared in Arabic in 2012, had already 
circulated in the European press in the second half of 2011 (Yazbek, August 
3, 2011a; August 10, 2011b; December 3, 2011c), laying the groundwork for 
Yazbek’s wider recognition as an important literary voice in the context of the 
conflict in Syria.
When we consider the average number of contributions per single author that 
we found in European and US media, it is interesting to note that the age group 
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the field’s highly recognized—and translated—figures such as Faraj Bairaqdar, 
Nabil Sulaiman (Nabīl Sulaymān), Nihad Siris, and Zakariya Tamir (Zakarīyā 
Tāmir) (see Fig. 4).
This certainly has to do with the fact that a number of these—Bairaqdar and 
Tamir among them—have long lived in exile in Europe. The interest of European 
media mainly lay with the illustration of current events in Syria. Again, this pri-
oritization of the symbolic capital of “being there,” or at least “having been there 
recently,” is bound to lead to a challenge, and possibly a transformation, of the 
hierarchies in the field. The fact that Euro-American media have solicited authors 
increases their visibility for publishers, but also for cultural journalists. For the 
literary avant-gardes, serving as an expert on Syria can appear to be an inroad 
into European cultural spaces, or at least certain dominated segments thereof, and 
a shortcut to the position of the translated author and the associated symbolic cap-
ital which can be used in the competition with their peers.
Arab Media
Arab media, especially the literary supplements of major newspapers, comprise 
some of the most important gatekeepers and institutions of consecration when it 
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authors, who are frequently those in the older age groups, would have the highest 
numbers of articles to their name (Fig. 5).
Indeed, the group of writers older than 80 scores relatively high. What needs 
further explanation, however, is the high scores for writers between the ages of 20 
to 35.
To a certain extent, this could be explained with the small sample: publica-
tions about the authors are rather unevenly distributed, as the sample con-
tains well-known as well as very little-known authors. Of the seven authors in 
this young age group, two, Muṣṭafā Tāj al-Dīn al-Mūsā and ʿAbdallāh Maksūr, 
who are fairly advanced in their careers and have already published several nov-
els, account for almost 40% of the publications between them. In addition, both 
have published widely in Arab media and are likely to possess the professional 
networks to bring their work to the attention of potential reviewers. Both had 
recently published works related to the conflict in Syria and one of them received 
an award for his short stories in 2015. While there are many reasons to suspect 
that the overall average for authors in this age group is lower, it would seem that 
the attention of journalists and reviewers in the Arab media is more evenly dis-
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Conclusion
Summing up, it appears that the practices of translation and the greater impor-
tance of social media and Euro-American media for Syrian authors’ literary 
careers favor emerging authors by offering access to new resources for symbolic 
capital. How the rise of this generation of authors will play out in the competition 
with the consecrated writers of the older generations seems far from clear. For the 
time being, we can observe the formation of an international segment of the Syr-
ian field, which is in the process of establishing its own hierarchies. This will cer-
tainly change the space in which all Syrian writers, including those in the national 
segment of the field move. However, considering the field as a whole, it is too 
early to speak of a “turning point.” Clearly, challenges to the existing structure 
and hierarchies are evident, as are the innovations in form and content pointed out 
by the scholars of Syrian art and literature referenced above. The revolution and 
the war play a role in perpetuating and intensifying processes of change that have 
been evident before this political crisis, and which, in due course, might lead to 
the “deep transformations of the symbolic relations of force” (Bourdieu 1996, p. 
126) which could be said to define a “turning point” in the Bourdieusian concep-
tual framework. If transformation happens, it will not only, and not even mainly, 
be because of the war, but because of the complex interrelations of the field of 
politics with internal processes at work in the space of literary production which 
go back to before 2011.
The cautious wording of the analyses above reflects the limits of the quantita-
tive approach pursued in this paper. The fact that there are no official publication 
records in the countries of the Arab world complicates the compilation of data, 
as does the often incomplete bibliographic information in older published books 
and the fact that newspaper archives are only partially digitized and searchable. 
This list of problems could easily be extended. Still, it is worth further developing 
methods for the quantitative study of Arabic literature as a contribution to an oth-
erwise largely anecdotal social history of literary production. Given the general 
lack of sources for the study of social networks of literary production in mod-
ern Arabic literature—such as edited collections of writers’ correspondence, for 
instance—and the dearth of research on the subject in the past, publication data 
is one of the very few opportunities we have for investigating networks of literary 
production in the past, other than interviews and notoriously unreliable human 
memories.
At the very least, as I showed in this chapter, counting articles, books and 
Facebook posts can help us form hypotheses about structural changes that can be 
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corroborated by further qualitative and archival research. In the end, it is certainly 
worthwhile to extend the use of quantitative methods to the analysis of content 
and form, following the example of digital humanities research in German or 
English literary studies—not in an attempt to replace the “traditional” analyses of 
artworks, but in order to seize the opportunity to ask new and different questions.
Endnotes
1. On the functions of political crises in the Arab cultural fields, see Lang 2019b.
2. The database is part of the activities of the research group “Figures of Thought 
| Turning Points. Cultural Practices and Social Change in the Arab World” 
headed by Prof. Friederike Pannewick and funded by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG).
3. Dubois’s work focusing on Syrian playwrights (Dubois 2018, 2019) is among 
these. Another example, albeit pertaining to a different time period and coun-
try, is Tristan Leperlier’s work on publishing in Algeria during the Black Dec-
ade (Leperlier 2018).
4. This was the case for university graduates quite generally. In 2003, 58% of 
graduates were employed in the public sector (Dickinson 2016).
5. On the Dahnon website, for instance, we can find pieces by Rosa Yassin Has-
san, Dima Wannous, Fadi Azzām and Muṣṭafā Tāj al-Dīn al-Mūsā, all of 
whom are established writers in the field. Rasha Abbas is an example for an 
author for whom the publication of short stories on such platforms played an 
important role for the entry to the field. See Lang 2019a.
6. See Al Junaidy on the Syrian presence in the Gulf countries (2018).
7. See, for instance, Edward Said’s classic essay on “Embargoed Literature” 
(Said, September 17, 1990) and Jacquemond 2008.
8. See Jacquemond 2003, p. 102, for the case of Egypt, and Lang 2016, p. 25 ff., 
for the case of Lebanon.
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The Year 1979 as a Turning Point 
in Syrian Theatre: From Politicization 
to Critical Humanism
Friederike Pannewick
This chapter will reflect on the year 1979 as a turning point in Arab theater, 
taking Syrian playwright Saʿdallāh Wannūs as a case study. This internation-
ally acclaimed author, born in 1941, belonged to a generation of Arab intellec-
tuals and artists whose political and artistic self-definition and worldview was 
strongly shaped by the Palestine conflict. Wannūs’s early works reveal an intense 
social engagement, which he characterized as a “theater of politicization/masraḥ 
al-tasyīs” (Wannūs 1996, p. 131). But his self-positioning as a politically 
engaged artist was not static throughout the latter part of his life, which was cut 
short by illness and ended when he was only 56 years old in 1997. Nearly twenty 
years earlier, in 1979, his political and literary convictions were seriously called 
into question by an event that interrupted his life and writing and interfered with 
his artistic production. In an extensive interview at the end of his life, he charac-
terized this event as decisive turning point in his dramatical writings.
According to narrative psychologist Jerome Bruner, turning points in indi-
vidual life stories, “though they may be linked to things happening ‘outside,’ are 
finally attributed to a happening ‘inside’—a new belief, new courage, moral dis-
gust, ‘having had enough’” (Bruner, quoted in Nünning and Sicks 2012, p. 8). 
This means that change in society goes hand in hand with personal transforma-
tions. Reaching a turning point “tends to result in, and correlate with, a height-
ened degree of self-awareness or self-consciousness on the part of the subject in 
question, an increased awareness that a decision has to be made” (Nünning and 
Sicks 2012, p. 7). The study of turning points looks for concurrences and dis-
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continuities beyond conceptions of time in terms of linearity (Nünning and Sicks 
2012, p. 17).
The term “turning point” is understood here according to Nünning and Sicks’s 
definition as “mininarration” and “metaphor” (Nünning and Sicks 2012, p. 7) 
inasmuch as turning points have a narrative character and “tend to interrupt regu-
lar patterns and trajectories in the life-flow” (Abott, quoted in Nünning and Sicks 
2012, p. 7). The narrative character points at the fact that turning points are not 
objective givens “but are instead conceptualized as results of retrospective con-
structions of meaning” (Nünning and Sicks 2012, p. 2).
The decisive turning point in Wannūs’s literary career was the day of Novem-
ber 19, 1977 when President Sadat became the first Arab politician to visit Israel 
on official business, where he outlined his plans for peace in a speech to the 
Israeli Knesset (parliament). A world came crushing down for Wannūs. This uni-
lateral peace offer, which led to the Camp David Accords of 1978 and resulted in 
the Egypt–Israel peace treaty signed in 1979, left the two key issues unanswered: 
the situation of the Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem and the occu-
pied territories. A comprehensive and coherent solution to the Israel-Palestine 
conflict seemed thus to recede into the distance. Wannūs tried to take his own life 
on the night of this epochal event. He stopped writing plays and would not com-
plete any for more than ten years.
This chapter will show how the writings he published after this self-imposed 
silence turned away from a didactic theatre of politicization to psychological 
studies focusing on the individual, as well as minority and gender issues, which 
might be considered part of what Fadi Bardawil described as an “inward turn” 
(2013, p. 1). This new literary style was as politically engaged as his previous 
style, but this political commitment is conveyed differently, arguing in favor of 
a new and critical humanism in a Saidian understanding whereby humanism is 
based on “the agency of human individuality and subjective intuition rather than 
on received ideas and approved authorities” (Abraham 2007, p. 5).
In the Syrian documentary film Wa-hunaka ashyāʾ kathīra kāna yumkin an 
yataḥaddath ʿanhā al-marʾ [There Are So Many Things Still to Say], directed by 
Omar Amiralay and broadcast by La Sept/Arte in 1997, Wannūs speaks about this 
crucial turning point in his dramatist’s life and work:
When Sadat visited Israel, I can’t describe my feelings. There was some aston-
ishment although I can’t say the visit surprised me. The sun was bright that day, 
even though I was shut up in this very room behind my desk. I closed all the inner 
and outer windows. I felt the sun was entering through the cracks in the windows 
and entering the sitting room. Like a foreign aggression against my inner peace. 
I sat and wrote (The Coffin and the Mourners Together). It was the last thing I 
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wrote before a long period of silence. After I finished writing it, I said “I’m tired” 
and I should go rest for a few weeks, some place, in Lattakia or Aleppo. But I was 
very nervous and knew I couldn’t control myself. It was around sunset, I took 
a sleeping pill, trying to escape through sleep. Two hours later, I woke up, even 
more nervous and troubled. The darkness was total. That night, I made a serious 
attempt to commit suicide. (Wannūs in Amiralay 1997, min. 25:14–28:50).
This impressive and touching testimony from one of the most important dram-
atists of modern Arabic theatre tells us about an individual and political turning 
point in the late 1970s. If we assume that something fundamental changed at this 
time, we might ask: what was this change about? And what about the notion of 
the political aspect of the arts—did it remain the same after this turning point in 
1979 and then later, in the 1980s and 1990s as Wannūs and others of his gen-
eration changed their literary styles, abandoning an aesthetic of politicization in 
favor of a call for critical humanism?
Politicization and Commitment in the Wake of 1967
International in his orientation, Wannūs was an intellectual who saw himself as 
part of a worldwide avant-garde movement. The early period of his writing, from 
the early 1960s to the late 1970s, was formatively influenced by Erwin Piscator’s 
political theatre, but above all by Bertolt Brecht’s didactic drama. Wannūs’ initial 
works reveal an intensive social engagement, which he characterized in his thea-
tre manifesto Bayanāt li-masraḥ ʿarabī jadīd, published in 1970, as a “theatre of 
politicization or masraḥ al-tasyīs” (Wannūs 1996, vol. 3; cf. also vol. 1, p. 131). 
In a phase marked by significant social developments that were triggered by the 
country’s defeat by Israel, Wannūs provocatively formulated the lineaments of a 
“politicizing” aesthetic which was to make Arab theatre into a vehicle of hope, 
instigating political reforms and undergirding processes of democratization: 
“We perform theatre to develop and change consciousness. We want to deepen 
the grasp of our collective consciousness for our shared historical consciousness” 
(Wannūs 1970, p. 24).
It is noteworthy that the June war of 1967 did not trigger resignation or despair 
in this dramatist’s work. On the contrary, in the wake of the all-embracing hazīma 
(defeat), he conceptualized his theatre of politicization. His play Ḥaflat samar 
min ajl khamsat ḥuzayrān (An Entertainment Evening for June 5), published 
shortly after the 1967 defeat, stages.
The profound malaise of a majority of Arabs in the aftermath of the 1967 
war: people overwhelmed by humiliation, disappointment, anger, and fear. With 
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his inimitable honesty and lucidity, he depicts a malaise caused primarily, in his 
opinion, by state repression and manifested in military defeat, but also in cultural 
mediocrity, intellectual futility, and personal despair. (Kassab 2010, p. 53).
The articulation of his concept of “politicizing theater” is thus to be seen in the 
context of Wannūs’s devastating critique of the political and intellectual situation 
in 1967. Given that theater was an important domain for cultural critique, Wannūs 
developed the lineaments of a “politicizing” aesthetic within this realm.
Between Commitment and Despair
However, this rather optimistic and somewhat idealistic perspective changed sig-
nificantly due to the gloomy political circumstances in the Middle East. Through-
out the late 1970s and the 1980s, Wannūs had been imbued with such a strong 
sense of living through a crisis that it encroached upon and damaged his entire 
personal life, an affect he emphasized repeatedly in various statements. One of 
these statements is the interview with Omar Amiralay in the documentary quoted 
above. Another revealing text in this regard is a short piece Wannūs wrote after 
Sadat’s visit to Israel: “Anā l-janāza wa-l-mushayyiʿūna” [“I am the Deceased 
and the Mourners”] (1996, vol. 3, p. 439 ff.). Here, politicizing art seems to have 
lost its validity, the individual is cut in two parts while one observes the funeral of 
the other:
My life has neared its end and I still dream of saying “No.” I wanted and I 
want to say “No” to the “Yes” citizen, to the prison-homeland, to the moderniza-
tion of the methods of torture and domestication, to the official discourse. … I 
wanted and I want to say “No.” And I search for my tongue but find only a foam 
of blood and fear. From my severed tongue the defeat started, and the funeral 
procession set out. From my suppressed “No” the enemy got through, as well as 
the separation, the poverty, the hunger, the prison, the torturer, and the contem-
porary Arab collapse … Briefly, if it weren’t for my suppressed “No,” half of me 
wouldn’t be in the coffin and the other half dragging itself behind it. And my dep-
rivation from my “No” made me not only into the victim and the spectator, the 
dead and the mourner, but also into a conspirator … [T]he “No” citizen is, for 
the Arab thrones, a bigger danger than the Israeli danger, and a conspiracy worse 
than the imperialist conspiracies … And until I recuperate my suppressed “No”, 
the funeral procession will continue, with us dragging our tails behind it. (English 
translation quoted in Kassab 2010, p. 56 f.)
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The high degree of self-criticism and disillusionment in this text is character-
istic for this dramatist’s writings in the late 1970s. The metaphoric mini-narration 
clearly marks a turning point in his life that, according to the characteristics of a 
turning point quoted above, “tends to result in and correlate with, a heightened 
degree of self-awareness or self-consciousness on the part of the subject in ques-
tion, an increased awareness that a decision has to be made” (Nünning and Sicks 
2012, p. 7).
After his suicide attempt in November 1977, Wannūs did not write a single 
play for eleven years. He first broke his silence in fall 1989 with a play that was 
as celebrated as it was controversial—a play that attempted to relate to the Pales-
tinian conflict from an Israeli viewpoint: al-Ightiṣāb [The Rape] (Wannūs 1996, 
vol. 2, p. 61 ff.). The Rape (originally published with Dār al-Ādāb, 1990) marks a 
turning point in Wannūs’s dramatic writings. For the first time, the focus is placed 
on the individual, instead of the collective, and on the physical and psychologi-
cal consequences and implications of political oppression. This drama deals with 
interpersonal problems, providing psychological studies, and achieving mul-
tidimensional characterization on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides. The 
enemy that for decades had been represented in Syrian literature as a dehuman-
ized monster and a united, homogenous block was now depicted as an individual 
suffering from Israeli state violence like its victims.
I would call Wannūs’s new approach to theatre as a means of generating 
insights into individual and psychological phenomena “individualistic human-
ism.” This form of humanism, which is closely tied to individual and psychologi-
cal dimensions, is not without political implications. Indeed, the decision to point 
relentlessly at the devastating effects of violence and abuse on both victims and 
perpetrators is a deeply political act with a clear-cut humanistic meaning. Since 
Wannūs addresses the effects of violence on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and, in so doing, breaks a taboo that had been maintained for many dec-
ades in Arab discourse, this humanistic meaning could be also called critical and 
Wannūs’s approach could, therefore, be understood as a form of “critical human-
ism.”
Viewing The Rape (Wannūs 1996, vol. 2) as an example of critical humanism 
allows us, furthermore, to perceive an intriguing link between Wannūs’s thought 
and that of Frantz Fanon, who repeatedly stressed the importance of collective 
and individual responsibility on “a truly historical scale … If nationalism is not 
explained, enriched, and deepened, if it does not very quickly turn into a social 
and political consciousness, into humanism, then it leads into a dead end” (Fanon 
2004, p. 144).
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This humanism, which lies at the very root of both Fanon’s and Wannūs’s 
critical thinking, was also one of the main tenets of the Arab Spring uprisings, 
as exemplified in popular revolutionary slogans such as “al-shaʿb yurīd isqāṭ 
al-niẓām” [“the people want to bring down the regime/the system”]. Moreover, 
this vision of humanism links the perspectives of both Wannūs and Fanon with 
perspectives put forward in the context of the Arab Spring, and suggests the rel-
evance of Fanon’s argumentation to the process of engaging in a critical reflec-
tion about the dilemmas of the Arab societies in the late twentieth and early 
 twenty-first centuries. Thus, what is being argued here is that The Rape may be 
understood as Wannūs’s critical answer to the complete failure of a social and 
national humanism within both Israeli and Arab consciousness since 1948.
Saʿdallāh Wannūs died in 1997, before he could witness the beginnings of the 
Syrian revolution. Nevertheless, Lebanese novelist and journalist Elias Khoury 
counts intellectuals and writers like him as forerunners of “a new culture, one 
which only fully emerged with today’s generation of Syrian men and women 
who are bringing about a revolution from the heart of oppression and despair” 
(Khoury 2012, p. x). He considers his plays and essays as “the intellectual roots 
of the Syrian revolution” (Khoury 2012, p. xiv). Hence, Wannūs’s idea of a criti-
cal humanism in the face of the devastating political circumstances in the Arab 
world seems to be an appropriate answer to the post-2011 situation as well.
In regard to dramatic changes in Wannūs’s personal life, it is important to note 
that a second turning point after the first one in the late 1970s occurred in this 
dramatist’s life and work: Wannūs came down with thyroid cancer in 1991. His 
terminal illness, diagnosed shortly after the Gulf War, lent his bleak words even 
greater weight. For his own part, Wannūs stylized himself as a victim of the polit-
ical history of his era, portraying his illness and imminent death as the result of 
unsolved political problems:
It seems like we were destined to see a series of continuing blows. The last 
blow was so painful that I suspected it as the direct cause of my being stricken 
by cancer. The blow was the 1991 Gulf War which did away with the remaining 
hopes of the Arabs. It’s no coincidence that I began to feel the tumor during the 
war, during the monstrous bombing carried out by the US against Iraq. (Wannūs 
in Amiralay 1997, min. 40:21–41:17).
In the following years, from 1991 to his death on May 15, 1997, he wrote, as 
he put it, against death. The perspective evident in his writing shifted after the 
outbreak of his illness, and along with it his literary techniques and characteriza-
tion of figures.
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From Didactic Theatre to Psychological Studies
In contrast to the parable-like style of his politically accentuated didactic theatre, 
where the figures were examples, in the final phase of his creative life Wannūs 
addressed specific individual themes, exploring interpersonal problems, furnish-
ing psychological studies, and achieving multidimensional characterization. 
Breaking more than one taboo, these plays are no less political and critical than 
his earlier texts of the 1960s and 1970s, however.
In an interview with Mari Elias in 1992 (p. 101), Wannūs explained a crucial 
turnaround in his work as stemming from the realization that, in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, political activism in the Arab world was hopeless. The opposition 
groups in society were marginalized, and established political forces were rotten 
to the core and hopelessly factional. Any belief in the possibility of changing the 
world through struggle, heroic acts, and martyrdom was suddenly revealed to be 
an illusion. In those years, which included the beginnings of the Lebanese Civil 
War and tragically culminating in the Israeli invasion of 1982, Wannūs bid fare-
well to the idea that had hitherto guided him: that the problems of the Arab world 
could be traced back to simple power relations in society.
The literary forms and themes of Wannūs’s work changed accordingly. From 
consciously simplifying representations that aimed to ignite political change and 
restructure power relations, he now turned to an approach that sought to generate 
insights into problems of the individual in society as well as minority and gender 
issues. This new conception touches upon Said’s concept of humanism: “Human-
ism is centered upon the agency of human individuality and subjective intuition, 
rather than on received ideas and approved authority” (Said 2003).1
More difficult than instigating a change of regime, Wannūs said in 1992, was 
“stir[ing] a society adhering to and petrified in superstition” (p. 101). This new 
style of drama led Wannūs to a kind of aesthetic liberation and self-discovery:
For the first time I have a sense of how writing can be a liberating act. Pre-
viously, I had certain ideas: I imposed a kind of self-censorship. An inner cen-
sorship which—as I imagined it—consisted in repressing everything that was of 
secondary importance, and left me to deal exclusively with the purportedly big 
questions. For the first time, I feel that writing is enjoyable. I was of the view that 
personal worries or individual problems were bourgeois, were superficial, unim-
portant affairs which one can put to one side. My whole interest was focused on 
grappling with and understanding history, and I thought—wrongly—that I had to 
avoid the traps of petit-bourgeois literature and go beyond all that was individual 
284 F. Pannewick
and personal. For this reason, I never felt as if entirely at one with myself in my 
work as playwright. (Wannūs 1992, p.101).
This quotation brings Wannūs quite close to Fadi Bardawil’s description of the 
disenchantment of the 1960s’ militant intellectuals in post-1967 discourse who 
“focused their analytical gaze inwards toward the social structures and culture of 
their societies” (2013, p. 92). Fadi Bardawil rereads the critical literature written 
after 1967 by the Syrian Marxist thinkers Yāsīn al-Ḥāfiẓ and Ṣādiq Jalāl al-ʿAzm, 
demonstrating how books like these reveal a kind of “turning of the critical gaze 
inwards, focusing on the level of social structures, culture, and values while seek-
ing to move beyond analyses restricted to the political surface, such as those 
which theorized the defeat as a result of imperialism or the ‘shortcomings of the 
Soviet Union’” (2013, p. 95).
This inward turn implied an essential transformation of the leftist intel-
lectual’s self-image. Wannūs’s turn away from the belief that the problems and 
power relations of the Arab world might be solved and changed by the theatre 
of politicization could be placed within these Arab leftist discourses of political 
disenchantment—which in Wannūs’s case did not set in until after Sadat’s visit to 
Israel in 1977, ten years later. The Arab leftist intellectuals who shifted their criti-
cal gaze inwards towards a harsh critique of the backwardness of Arab society in 
the aftermath of 1967 did not lose their solidarity with the masses in the process. 
This new approach is aptly described by al-ʿAzm in an interview from 1997:
What al-Hafez brought out for me was the importance of critically confronting 
the superstructures of thought, culture, heritage, and religion, which were imped-
ing the economic, social, and political accomplishments of the Arab liberation 
movement. (quoted in Bardawil 2013, p. 95).
Al-ʿAzm criticized the contradiction between the Arab liberation movement’s 
“revolutionary” core economic and political agendas and the movement’s own 
“conservative” superstructure. According to al-ʿAzm, this contradiction was 
reproducing “values of ignorance, myth-making, backwardness, dependency, and 
fatalism” and thus “impeding the propagation of scientific values, secularism, 
enlightenment, democracy, and humanism” (al-ʿAzm quoted in Bardawil 2013, 
p. 94). To my mind, this argument is exactly what motivated Saʿdallāh Wannūs 
to modify his dramatic style after his long literary silence in the late 1970s and 
1980s.
Succeeding The Rape (Wannūs 1996, vol. 2) as his first endeavor of a new 
psychological approach, the five plays Wannūs wrote in the 1990s up to his death 
in 1997 reflect the author’s new self-definition.2 These dramas no longer contain 
a simple and clearly political message or ideology which addresses “the people” 
or “the masses”; the addressee here is rather the individual, or a limited group of 
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open-minded and attentive individuals who are astute enough to understand the 
veiled articulation of harsh political and social criticism.
In the last phase of his writing, and in the context of a litany of political set-
backs in the Arab world, Wannūs renounced the idea that a change in power 
relations would automatically change society from within. This disenchantment 
of a committed leftist intellectual clearly reflects the new socio-political reality 
in 1979 and the two decades that followed. Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel did 
indeed destroy or at least severely damage the imaginative possibilities of this 
Syrian author’s understanding of intellectual and literary engagement. He no 
longer believed that the problems of the Arab world could be traced back to sim-
ple power relations in society and devoted himself instead to “to stir[ring up] a 
society adhering to and petrified in superstition” (Wannūs 1992, p. 101).
Thus, the political events of 1979 represent the parallel trends of societal 
change and personal transformations in a leading dramatist’s biography and liter-
ary style. In Wannūs’s autobiographical and intellectual self-narration, these polit-
ical events are represented as a turning point that triggered a heightened degree 
of self-awareness and self-consciousness combined with an increased awareness 
that something has to be changed. The plays he published after his long liter-
ary silence until 1989 are Wannūs’s critical answer to the complete failure of a 
social and national humanism within Arab consciousness in the postcolonial era. 
Here, the concept of critical humanism as a coping mechanism for ongoing injus-
tice and backwardness in postcolonial Arab society and state, as coined by late 
Edward Said, nearly converges with Wannūs’s position after his 1979 turning 
point: “humanism is the only—and I would go so far as saying the final—resist-
ance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human 
history” (Said 2003).
The Lebanese author and journalist Elias Khoury (Ilyās Khūrī) also believes 
that only a blunt and unsparing self-criticism could enable the Arab world to 
deal adequately with the complex postcolonial situation. In an article, pub-
lished in 2002 in the leftwing Beirut journal al-Ṭarīq, Khoury advocates a “third 
nahda/cultural awakening” (p. 28). He sees Said as a forerunner of a specific type 
of Arab intellectual, one who willingly assumes a highly visible public profile in 
intellectual opposition to the ruling powers. Comparable to the position taken by 
Wannūs, Khoury demands that the traditional roles of Arab intellectualism such 
as king, sheikh, poet, politician, officer, entrepreneur, or journalist be replaced by 
a new set of roles. In the spirit of Said’s critique, a new oppositional practice and 
intellectual movement needs to be initiated, one that counters both the repression 
and the injustices of Arab governments and the xenophobic cultural and religious 
ideologies circulating in the Arab world. This new understanding of the public 
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role of the Arab intellectual precisely fits Saʿdallāh Wannūs’s new orientation and 
outlook as an intellectual committed to a new critical humanism.
Endnotes
1. That the aspect of power is not excluded at all in this understanding becomes 
clear in Said’s following sentences being much relevant for Wannūs as well: 
“Texts have to be read as texts that were produced and live on in the historical 
realm in all sorts of what I called worldly ways. But this by no means excludes 
power, since on the contrary I have tried to show the insinuations, the imbrica-
tions of power into even the most recondite of studies.” (Said 2003).
2. Munamnamāt tārīkhiyya (Cairo 1994; Beirut 1996), Ṭuqūs al-ishārāt 
 wa-l-taḥawwulāt (Beirut 1994), Yawm min zamāninā (Beirut 1995), Aḥlām 
shaqqiyya (Beirut 1995), Malḥamat al-sirāb (Beirut 1996): all in al-ʿAmāl 
al-kāmila vol. 2.
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